D.M., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed a juvenile's adjudication for grand theft of an automobile and the imposition of community control with restitution, but remanded the case to allow the trial court—rather than "all interested parties"—to set the restitution payment schedule. The court rejected the juvenile's challenges to the restitution amount and scope.
The court affirmed the adjudication and the restitution amount but reversed the delegation of payment schedule responsibility. The trial court must itself set the payment schedule rather than leaving it to all interested parties to agree upon. The restitution for the infant seat and stroller was proper because such damage bore a significant relationship to the convicted offense, and the $988.00 amount did not exceed what the child and parents could reasonably be expected to pay.
[1] A trial court may order restitution for damages that bear a significant relationship to the convicted offense.
[2] Restitution ordered against a juvenile may not exceed an amount that the child and their parents can reasonably be expected to pay.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“such damage bore "a significant relationship to the convicted offense," J.S.H. v. State, 472 So. 2d 737, 738 (Fla.1985), and was therefore properly included within the restitution ordered under Section 39.11(l)(f), Florida Statutes (1987).”
Establishes that restitution for the stolen infant seat and stroller was proper because these items bore a significant relationship to the grand theft offense.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceD.M., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for grand theft of an automobile. The victim's automobile contained an infant seat and stroller that were…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the respondent D.M. from an adjudication of delinquency for grand theft of an automobile and an order placing the defendant under a term of community control, subject to a condition that the respondent “make monetary restitution [to the victim] in the amount of $988.00; a payment schedule to be agreed upon by all interested] parties.” We affirm the adjudication of delinquency and order placing the respondent under community control, save for that portion of the restitution provision which delegates to “all interested] parties” the responsibility of developing “a payment schedule”; on remand, the trial court itself shall set the payment schedule. O.L. v. State, 497 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
In all other respects, however, we reject the respondent’s attack on the restitution provision. (1) The trial court properly ordered the juvenile to make restitution for, inter alia, the cost of the infant seat and stroller which was stolen from the victim’s automobile at the time the automobile was stolen; contrary to the juvenile’s argument, such damage bore “a significant relationship to the convicted offense,” J.S.H. v. State, 472 So. 2d 737, 738 (Fla.1985), and was therefore properly included within the restitution ordered under Section 39.11(l)(f), Florida Statutes (1987). (2) Although the juvenile arguably established that the $988.00 in restitution ordered below was beyond his financial ability to pay, it is absolutely clear that he failed to establish that it was also beyond the financial ability of his parents to pay. This being so, the restitution ordered was not forbidden by Section 39.11(l)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (1987) (“When restitution is ordered by the court, the amount of restitution shall not be greater than an amount the child and his parents could reasonably be expected to pay or make.”) (emphasis added).
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
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In the Interest of M.D. v. State, 561 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…on upon parents was added to the statute in 1981. Ch. 81-218, § 11, Laws of Fla. Although this restitution provision has been previously applied, the due diligence exception has not been interpreted in any prior appellate opinion. See D.M. v. State, 550 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). The parents and the state present widely divergent views concerning the degree of effort which should constitute “diligent good faith efforts” under the statute. The state argues that the trial court correctly interpreted the st…
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Wightman v. State, 555 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…m; this being so, the trial court quite properly assessed this amount of restitution against the defendant. § 775.089(1)(a), Fla.Stat. (1987). See Spivey v. State, 531 So. 2d 965 (Fla.1988); J.S.H. v. State, 472 So. 2d 737 (Fla.1985); D.M. v. State, 550 So. 2d 149, 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Affirmed.…
Authorities Cited
- J.S.H. v. State, 472 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1985)
- O.L. v. State, 497 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)