BELLSOUTH ADVERTISING AND PUBLISHING CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND JANET RENO, AS STATE ATTORNEY OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, APPELLEES
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The court affirmed the trial court's finding that Dade County Code Section 10.4.1 is constitutional, rejecting BellSouth's challenges based on vagueness, delegation of legislative power, and First Amendment free speech grounds.
Dade County Code Section 10.4.1 is constitutional and does not violate the First Amendment or constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
[1] An ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague merely because it is challenged on that ground; vagueness claims must be supported by specific evidence of the ordinance's la…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBellSouth Advertising and Publishing Corporation challenged the constitutionality of Section 10.4.1 of the Dade County Code on multiple grounds.…
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PER CURIAM.
Treating the order appealed from as a final declaratory decree in which Section 10.4.1 of the Dade County Code was found constitutional, we conclude that (1) we have jurisdiction, as urged by appellant, to entertain this appeal as a final judgment, Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla.Const., and (2) the trial court committed no error in finding the said ordinance constitutional.
We have not overlooked the extensive arguments made by the petitioner Bell-south Advertising and Publishing Corporation attacking the constitutionality of the subject ordinance, but find them singularly unpersuasive. The ordinance is not, as urged, unconstitutionally vague and consequently does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Moreover, the ordinance does not constitute an abridgement of appellant’s free speech rights under the First Amendment. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood, 673 F. 2d 1213 (11th Cir.1982); Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126, 1130 (Fla.1982); Sanicola v. State, 384 So. 2d 152 (Fla.1980); Morales v. State, 407 So. 2d 230, 231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
The final declaratory decree under review is therefore in all respects
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. The Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (U.S. 1982)
- Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1982)
- Fla. Businessmen FOR Free Enter. v. The City OF Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213 (11th Cir. 1982)
- Sanicola v. State, 384 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1980)
- Remy Morales v. State, 407 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)