LIZABETH CARLSON AND CURTIS CARLSON, APPELLANTS,
v.
CALUSA GOLF INC., APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment because the undisputed evidence showed the fence served a useful purpose, negating the claim that spite alone was the motivation.
This appeal arises from a prior lawsuit where Calusa Golf, Inc. was granted summary judgment in an action for a preliminary injunction. The trial cour…
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PER CURIAM.
The feud between these parties has been raging for years. In 1983 we held that Calusa Golf, Inc. could not, on estoppel grounds, extinguish a restrictive covenant by circumventing the covenant’s requirement for the consent of seventy-five percent of the adjacent property owners. Calusa Golf, Inc. v. Dade County, 426 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
Two years later, in an appeal from an order granting a preliminary injunction, we held that even though the construction of a fence may have been partially motivated by spite, the adjacent property owners could not seek to enjoin the construction where the evidence showed that the fence would serve the useful purpose of protecting the golf course from trespass and vandalism. Calusa Golf, Inc. v. Carlson, 464 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 476 So. 2d 673 (Fla.1985).
This appeal is from a summary judgment entered for Calusa in appellant’s action for a preliminary injunction, based on a finding that no issue was presented on the material fact that the fence served a useful purpose. That finding being correct, Calusa was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Johnson v. Gulf Life Insurance Co., 429 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Proprietors Insurance Co. v. Siegel, 410 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). We are not persuaded by appellants’ , argument that “spite” raises a state of mind question for a jury which could totally negate the otherwise undisputed evidence that the fence served a useful purpose. See Calusa Golf, 464 So. 2d at 1271; Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359-60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959), cert. denied, 117 So. 2d 842 (Fla.1960).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Sarron v. Barbel I. Sarron, 429 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Foust v. State, 410 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Calusa Golf, Inc. v. Dade Cnty., 426 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Tatum Corp. v. Vinyard, 117 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1960)
- Giliespie v. State, 117 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1960)
- Calusa Golf, Inc. v. Lizabeth Carlson and Curtis Carlson, 464 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- State v. Ferris, 464 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)