JACK RAY HALL, APPELLANT,
v.
LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; JAMES T. WAINWRIGHT, SUPERINTENDENT, LAWTEY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION; THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEES
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Jack Ray Hall appealed the dismissal of his petition for writ of mandamus challenging the Department of Corrections' denial of additional gain time. The court affirmed the dismissal because Hall failed to exhaust administrative remedies by raising new factual allegations in his mandamus petition that were not included in his prior grievance petition.
Hall did not exhaust his administrative remedies because three material facts alleged in his mandamus petition—that officers told him he would receive day-for-day work gain time, that he received a progress report showing day-for-day work gain time and outstanding performance, and that his work was rated satisfactory or above—were not presented in his grievance petition.
[1] A petition for writ of mandamus is an improper remedy when a party has not exhausted administrative remedies by presenting all relevant factual allegations in their initi…
[2] A party must allege all factual bases for a claim in an administrative grievance to satisfy the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Since the above facts numbered (1), (3), and (4) were not alleged in the grievance petition, appellant has not exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to the provisions of rule 33-3.07, Florida Administrative Code.”
Establishes the court's holding that new factual allegations in the mandamus petition constituted failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHall filed a grievance petition with the Department of Corrections claiming entitlement to additional gain time based on four grounds: no officers com…
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SMITH, Judge.
Appellant appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his petition for writ of mandamus for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. We affirm.
Appellant alleged different facts in his petition for writ of mandamus than he did in his grievance petition filed with the Department of Corrections. In the grievance petition, he alleged that he was entitled to additional gain time because (1) none of the officers complained about the quality of his work; (2) he never received a progress report; (3) no disciplinary actions were taken against him; and (4) had the officers known that a “satisfactory” rating would have prevented him from being awarded the gain time, they would have rated him differently. In his petition for writ of mandamus, he alleged that he was entitled to additional gain time because (1) David Osteen and Sergeant Bell told him he would receive day-for-day work gain time; (2) none of the officers complained about the quality of his work; (3) he received a progress report informing him that he was receiving day-for-day work gain time and that his work was rated outstanding; (4) his work performance was rated as satisfactory or above on all reports; and (5) he had no disciplinary reports during the interim. Since the above facts numbered (1), (3), and (4) were not alleged in the grievance petition, appellant has not exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to the provisions of rule 33-3.07, Florida Administrative Code. Curry v. Wainwright, 422 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
We disagree with the state’s contention that since the award of gain time is discretionary, a petition for writ of mandamus is an improper remedy. While there is no automatic right to receive day-for-day work gain time, Dickinson v. Wainwright, 416 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), the procedures for awarding the gain time must be applied uniformly, Pettway v. Wainwright, 450 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). This court has also held that since its jurisdiction to entertain direct appeals by prisoners from final orders of agencies has been eliminated, prisoners may seek their remedy in circuit court by way of a petition for an extraordinary writ. Thomas v. Florida, Parole and Probation Commission, 436 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Hansen v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 436 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
AFFIRMED.
THOMPSON and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
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Stovall v. Sergeant William Cooper, 860 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…emently denies that is what he is seeking. When alleging a deprivation of gain time, prisoners who have exhausted all administrative channels must seek their remedy in circuit court by way of a petition for an extraordinary writ. Hall v. Wainwright, 498 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). If a prisoner’s sentence would have expired had the Department properly awarded gain time, habeas corpus is the proper remedy. Searcy v. Singletary, 590 So. 2d 1034, 1034 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Otherwise, a petition for a writ…1 / 2
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Sherrill Turner v. Singletary, 623 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…ght is enforced, and is not the appropriate procedure for the establishment of such a right. State v. Gamble, 839 So. 2d 694 (Fla.2d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 422 (Fla.1977). Nevertheless, as this court acknowledged in Hall v. Wainwright, 498 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), a petition for writ of mandamus may, in certain instances, be a proper remedy for review of DOC’s denial of gain time. There we further explained: While there is no automatic right to receive day-for-day work gain time, Dickins…
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Johnson v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 543 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…der an appeal of a PPRD. Jurisdiction in the district courts then, is only available through common law writs of mandamus for review of PPRDs. Griffith, 485 So. 2d at 820. See also Wainwright v. Taylor, 476 So. 2d 669 (Fla.1985); Hall v. Wainwright, 498 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Thomas v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 436 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Hansen v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 436 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Therefore, review of PPRDs set by the Florida Parole…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Thomas v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 436 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Curry v. Louie L. Wainwright, 422 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Pettway v. Louie L. Wainwright, 450 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Cap. Lincoln Mercury & Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Special Disability Tr. Fund, 416 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)