RONALD C. STEVENS, CHARLES D. CARTER AND STEPHEN VINSON, APPELLANTS,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI AND ROBERT D. KRAUSE, APPELLEES
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Police officers who accepted a settlement in a federal reverse discrimination lawsuit and signed a release of all claims against the City of Miami later sought back pay for the period they were bypassed for promotion. The court affirmed summary judgment against them, holding that the statute of limitations barred their claim and that they were bound by the general release they had signed.
The court affirmed summary judgment for the City on statute of limitations grounds. The appellants were not similarly situated to the other promoted officers because they had accepted the benefits of the federal settlement and executed releases. Even if unaware of veterans preference provisions at the time, this does not provide a valid ground to void a general release.
[1] A general release of claims is not voided by the releasor's subsequent discovery of a statutory preference that was in effect at the time the release was executed.
[2] Officers who accept the benefits of a settlement agreement, including promotion, and execute a release of claims are in a different legal status than those who do not.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The record shows that these three appellants are in a different status having accepted the benefits of the federal court action and the settlement thereof, than those promoted who did not receive benefits of the federal action or execute any releases.”
Explains why the appellants were not similarly situated to other officers, defeating their equal protection argument.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1979, appellants Stevens, Carter, and Vinson took exams entitling them to be on a promotion registry for sergeant. The City of Miami's affirmative …
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PER CURIAM.
The appellants, police officers for the City of Miami, took certain exams in 1979 the results of which entitled them to be on the registry to be considered for promotion to sergeant. Subsequent to that time a lawsuit was brought in the federal court by the Fraternal Order of Police on behalf of those officers bypassed by the city’s affirmative action program seeking to void the affirmative action program promulgated by the City of Miami, or, in effect, a reverse discrimination suit. That litigation was ultimately settled, with the settlement being approved by the membership of the F.O.P. As a result of the settlement, the three appellants were promoted to sergeant and executed a release of all claims against the City. Subsequently, the City promoted three individuals to sergeant who did not agree to the settlement, and did not execute the releases. Upon their promotion they were awarded back pay and seniority to the date they were entitled to promotion, 1980. Thereafter, the instant action was commenced by the appellants seeking back pay from 1980 until the date they were promoted to sergeant.
The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of the City because of a statute of limitation «defense, pursuant to Section 95.11(4)(c) of the Florida Statutes (1979).
The trial court did not rule on the merits of the release.
We affirm. See Carpenter v. Metropolitan Dade County, 472 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
The appellants urge that we should reverse because they have been denied equal protection of the law in that they have been treated, differently than others similarly situated, to wit: the other three officers who were promoted and paid back wages with no contention that a claim for wages was time-barred. We disagree. The record shows that these three appellants are in a different status having accepted the benefits of the federal court action and the settlement thereof, than those promoted who did not receive benefits of the federal action or execute any releases.
Although the trial judge did not reach the issue of the releases and their effect, his ruling can be sustained if there is any theory in the record which would support it. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla.1979); Carpenter v. Metropolitan Dade County, supra; May v. Fundament, 444 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
Examining the record in light of this principle, the plaintiffs contend they should not be bound by the release that they each signed because they were unaware at the time they exe cuted it of the “veterans preference” in-Section 295.09(l)(a) Florida Statutes (1979).
Even if this be true, we find this not to be a good ground to void a general release. DeWitt v. Miami Transit Company, 95 So. 2d 898 (Fla.1957); Dean v. Bennett M. Lifter, Inc., 336 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Stiff v. Newman, 134 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).
Therefore, for the reasons above stated, a final summary judgment under review be and the same is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Cited By
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City OF Miami v. Meynarez, 546 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…city manager that Meynarez be reinstated to the position of finance manager or its equivalent. At the outset, we reject the city’s contention that the release executed by Meynarez was binding upon her under our decision in Stevens v. City of Miami, 500 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). In Stevens, it was determined that certain city officers were bound by claim releases they executed as part of a negotiated settlement to litigation between the officers and the city employer. Meynarez, on the other hand, faced a…
Authorities Cited
- Pitcher v. Schneider (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
- Albert v. Applegate et ux., 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1979)
- DE Witt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1957)
- Stiff v. Newman, 134 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
- Dean v. Bennett M. Lifter, Inc., 336 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Blanchard v. Blanchard, 336 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- L.B. v. State, 472 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- George I. MAY, M.D. v. Richardo Fundament and Margarida P. Fundament, 444 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)