RONAL W. SOUDER, APPELLANT,
v.
KATHLEEN B. JOHNSON, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF DR. ARTHUR M. EDWARDS, AND LAWRENCEVILLE SCHOOL AND AL KORAN SHRINE HOSPITAL FOR CRIPPLED CHILDREN, APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 1987-02-04
No. 4-86-0943
ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.
501 So. 2d 745 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1987) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A stepson challenged his inheritance of a villa and its "contents" under his stepfather's will, claiming the term "contents" was ambiguous and should include stock certificates and bank account proceeds found in the home. The Florida appellate court affirmed that "contents" refers only to tangible personal property used to maintain a home, and intangible assets like stocks and bank accounts are excluded.


Holding

The court held that "contents" in a will devise refers only to tangible personal property items that convert an empty building into a habitable dwelling, and does not include intangible personal property such as stocks or bank accounts. The term is unambiguous and must be construed without resorting to extrinsic evidence.


Headnotes

[1] The word "contents" in a will, when referring to a dwelling, ordinarily encompasses only tangible personal property that makes the dwelling habitable.

[2] Intangible personal property, such as stock certificates and bank accounts, are generally not included within the definition of "contents" of a home.

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Key Quotes

“we have no difficulty in aligning ourselves with the majority view, nationwide, which holds that only tangible personal property is contemplated when defining house "contents."”

Establishes the controlling legal standard that "contents" encompasses only tangible personal property.

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Facts & Procedural History

Dr. Arthur M. Edwards' will devised a villa-type condominium and its "contents" to his stepson Ronal Souder, along with a separate $10,000 cash beques…

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Opinion of the Court
LETTS, Judge.

LETTS, Judge.

The trial court ruled that the devise of a villa-type condominium and its “contents” did not include stock certificates or the proceeds from financial institutional passbooks found on the premises. We affirm.

The decedent’s stepson, who was the recipient of the villa, is not content with that inheritance and essentially claims the remainder of the estate, predicated on the theory that the meaning of the word “contents” found in the will, was ambiguous. As a consequence, he argues that extrinsic evidence should have been admissible to resolve the ambiguity and establish that the testator intended, in this particular instance, that the word “contents” encompass the stock evidenced by certificates and the cash represented by the passbooks and bank statements found in the house.1

Surprisingly, this particular controversy has never been resolved by a Florida court. However, we have no difficulty in aligning ourselves with the majority view, nationwide, which holds that only tangible personal property is contemplated when defining house “contents.” Annotation What Passes Under Legacy or Bequest of Things Found or Contained in Particular Place or Container, 5 A.L.R.3d 466 (1966). As a corollary, mtangible personal property, exemplified by stock certificates and bank accounts, are not included in that definition.

The stepson’s argument is not without merit, however. He posits that if the testator had bequeathed a “shoe box and its contents” there would be no question that stock certificates contained therein would come within such a testamentary disposition. Sub judice, he equates a shoe box as being synonymous with a condominium villa. We do not agree with that equation.

It is uniformly recognized that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to vary, contradict ... or to show a different intention on the part of the testator from that disclosed by the language of the will. Id. at 482. Obviously, such extrinsic evidence is not to be countenanced if there is no ambiguity, latent or patent, which affects the ability to carry out the terms of the testamentary instrument. Id. at 482.

The word “contents” cannot be defined in isolation, but must be considered in the light of the surrounding language within the four corners of the will. In Re Estate of Lamb, 445 Pa. 323, 285 A. 2d 163 (1971). In the case at bar, the will, in addition to leaving the house and “contents” to the stepson, left him $10,000 in cash. If all intangible personal property found in the house were contents thereof, check books, representing cash bank balances and financial institution passbooks would be included along with the stocks, rendering the $10,-000 bequest meaningless. Moreover, it would also almost totally deplete the residuary estate and nullify the bequests to the residuary beneficiaries.

We adopt the language employed in the footnote contained in In Re Estate of Lamb to the effect that, when used in its ordinary sense, the phrase “contents of a home” designates those items of tangible personal property which convert an empty building into a habitable dwelling. Such a construction would suppose the inclusion of furniture, fixtures, floor coverings, electrical appliances, pictures, articles of decoration, linens, kitchen appliances, silverware, house and gardening tools, garden furniture and other articles of similar character commonly used to maintain a home. It would not, under the facts of this case, include mtangible personal property.

Accordingly, we hold, sub judice, that the word “contents” is not ambiguous and agree with the trial judge that the devise of the villa and contents must be construed without resort to extrinsic evidence outside the four corners of the will. We further agree with the trial judge that this devise did not include any mtangible personal property other than the $10,000 bequest.

AFFIRMED.

ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur. . Villa valued at $138,000. Contents: $4,000. Stocks: $377,000. Life insurance: $16,000. Passbooks and bank statements: $124,000. Cadillac: $5,000. Total estate: $664,000. (Figures approx, to nearest $1,000.)


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Citator

Cited By

  • Robinson v. Robinson, 676 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
    …alternative constructions of the trust’s provisions, the trial court was constrained by the four corners of the trust and erred by accepting evidence of the grantor’s intent. Adkins v. Woodfin, 525 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Souder v. Johnson, 501 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Campbell v. Campbell, 489 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). We find no error as to any other issues raised. DELL and KLEIN, JJ., concur. . We deem inapposite Appellants’ characterization of the majority opinion in In re Estate o…
  • Ludwig v. Amsouth Bank OF Fla., 686 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
    …So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Robbins v. Hunyady, 498 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied 500 So. 2d 544 (Fla.1986). Extrinsic evidence should be considered only if the language used in the document is ambig [*1377] uous. See Souder v. Johnson, 501 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). The trust instrument for Fisher Trust No. II may not be entirely clear concerning all possible future distributions, but it clearly and unambiguously expressed the settlors’ intent to continue the trusts for the maximum period…
  • In re the Est. OF Dykes James Riggs v. Jacqualyn Wyroba, 643 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
    …o. 2d 312 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Barnett First National Bank of Jacksonville v. Cobden, 393 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Extrinsic, including parol, evidence should be considered only if the language used in the will is ambiguous. Souder v. Johnson, 501 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Campbell v. Campbell, 489 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).” [e.o.] Adkins v. Woodfin, 525 So. 2d 447, 448-449 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). In this case the trial judge was apparently led into construing the will as he did because he firs…

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