DAVID ROBINSON, AS CO-PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND AS CO-TRUSTEE, SHIRLEY ANN ROBINSON, AND JILL ROBINSON, APPELLANTS,
v.
MARILYN Z. ROBINSON, AS CO-TRUSTEE OF THE MARVIN ROBINSON MARITAL TRUST, S. SAM TOOTALIAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CO-TRUSTEE, STEVEN SMILACK AND JEFFREY BOREN, APPELLEES
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's decision reforming a revocable trust and will based on alleged ambiguities regarding allocation of estate taxes. The court held that the trust provisions were unambiguous on their face and thus precluded consideration of extrinsic evidence of the grantor's intent.
The court held that the trust provisions are unambiguous on their face and contain no conflict or ambiguity. Trust article IV B clearly states estate taxes must be paid before creating the three sub-trusts, and articles IV E and IV I recognize the sub-trusts are funded after tax payment. Because the trust language demonstrates no alternative constructions, the trial court erred in accepting extrinsic evidence of the grantor's intent.
[1] A court may reform a will and trust if the language of the instruments is ambiguous and conflicting, and extrinsic evidence may be admitted to determine the grantor's int…
[2] A court should not admit extrinsic evidence to determine a grantor's intent when the provisions of a trust are unambiguous within its four corners.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The language of trust article 'TV B" clearly states that estate taxes are to be paid prior to the creation of the three sub-trusts. The trust, in articles "TV E" and "IV I," also clearly recognizes that the marital and Shirley Robinson trusts are to be funded after payment of the amounts due under article "IV B," namely the estate taxes.”
Establishes the unambiguous plain language of the trust regarding tax allocation and the sequence of distributions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMarvin Robinson executed both a will and a revocable trust. The will provided that estate taxes be paid from the residuary estate without apportionmen…
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STONE, Judge.
Finding no ambiguity within the provisions of the Marvin L. Robinson amended and restated declaration of trust, we reverse the order of the trial court with regard to the allocation of taxes in distributing the estate of Marvin Robinson.
During his lifetime, Marvin Robinson, deceased, executed both a last will and testament (the will) and a revocable trust (the trust). Pursuant to the terms of the will, all estate taxes, whether or not based on property passing under the will, were to be paid from the residuary estate without apportionment. In conflict with this language, under the terms of trust article “IV B,” all estate taxes were directed to be paid from the trust principal with any sums passed to the trust from the estate divided pursuant to the trust’s terms. The trust provided further for the creation of three sub-trusts, the marital trust, the Shirley Ann Robinson trust, and the Jill Robinson trust. As defined in trust article “IV E,” the marital trust was to consist of one-third (1/3) of the net trust estate after liabilities and after payment of taxes as defined in article “IV B.” As defined in trust article “IV I,” the Shirley Ann Robinson trust, in relevant part, was to consist of all remaining trust assets after payment of taxes as defined in article “IV B” and distributions to the marital trust and the Jill Robinson trust.
Upon Marvin’s death in 1993, his spouse, Marilyn, as co-trustee and beneficiary, instituted an action to reform the will and the trust. Marilyn alleged that the will provision providing for payment of estate taxes from the residuary estate was in conflict with the trust provision providing for payment of the estate taxes from the trust’s principal. Further, Marilyn alleged that trust article “IV E” was ambiguous and in conflict with trust provision “IV B.” Marilyn asked that the will and trust be reformed and that extrinsic evidence be admitted as to Marvin’s intent.
The court held that the language of the will and trust was ambiguous and conflicting on both asserted grounds. The court, based on extrinsic evidence admitted at trial, ruled that Marvin had intended his probate estate to pour over into the trust free of estate taxes, intended the marital trust to be free of estate taxes, and intended the Shirley Robinson trust to bear the impact of all estate taxes. Although we are in agreement that the trial court was correct to find conflict between the will and the trust and approve of its resolution of that issue,1 see O’Neill v. Sacher, 451 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); In re Estate of Baer, 446 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 456 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.1984); Sun Bank/Miami, N.A. v. Hogarth, 536 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), rev. denied, 545 So. 2d 1369 (Fla.1989), we find no conflict or ambiguity in the provisions of the trust itself. Therefore, we are compelled to reverse notwithstanding that there is substantial evidence, inadmissible absent an ambiguity, supporting the trial court’s findings concerning Marvin’s intent.
The language of trust article ‘TV B” clearly states that estate taxes are to be paid prior to the creation of the three sub-trusts. The trust, in articles “TV E” and “IV I,” also clearly recognizes that the marital and Shirley Robinson trusts are to be funded after payment of the amounts due under article “IV B,” namely the estate taxes. As nothing in these provisions demonstrates any possible alternative constructions of the trust’s provisions, the trial court was constrained by the four corners of the trust and erred by accepting evidence of the grantor’s intent. Adkins v. Woodfin, 525 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Souder v. Johnson, 501 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Campbell v. Campbell, 489 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
We find no error as to any other issues raised.
DELL and KLEIN, JJ., concur. . We deem inapposite Appellants’ characterization of the majority opinion in In re Estate of Strohm, 241 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)(affirmed per curiam without opinion), as well as our opinion in Yoakley v. Raese, 448 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 456 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.1984). Unlike the instant case, where the will and the trust were executed in tandem to form an overall testamentary scheme, in both the above cited cases, the instruments in question lacked any form of mutuality which would justify reading them together.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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In re Est. OF Marvin Robinson v. Robinson, 720 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…im for reformation of the trust. On appeal, this court found that even though the provisions of the will and the trust instrument conflicted, the provisions of the trust instrument controlled and were not internally ambiguous. Robinson v. Robinson, 676 So. 2d 511, 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). We reversed the judgment, finding that absent an internal ambiguity in the trust instrument itself, the evidence supporting the court’s finding of intent was inadmissible. Marilyn then petitioned the trial court for a ruli…
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Brigham v. Brigham, 11 So. 3d 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…tent to give the Brigham Tree Farms Property to Dana. The trial court thus erroneously disregarded the unambiguous terms of the EFP Land Trust and the 1990 Revocable Trust, as well as the requirements of section 737.403(2). See Robinson v. Robinson, 676 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). The trial court erred when it took testimony and made findings on Marion’s intent. In addition, here, the trial court excused the numerous conflicted transactions presented at trial by finding that it was Marion’s intent and/or…
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Robinson v. Robinson, 805 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…d not rule on Marilyn’s claim for reformation of the trust at that time. We reversed the judgment, holding absent an internal ambiguity in the trust instrument itself, the evidence supporting the court’s finding of intent was inadmissible. Robinson, 676 So. 2d 511. Marilyn then petitioned the trial court to rule on her count to reform the trust. The court ruled the trust could be reformed after Marvin’s death where evidence of a unilateral mistake existed, and ordered the trust reformed to conform to Marvin’s…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Campbell v. Campbell, 489 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- SUN Bank/Miami, N.A. v. Hogarth, 536 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- In re The Est. OF Myer G. Baer, 446 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- In re Est. of Glen A. Strohm, 241 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
- Yoakley v. Raese, 448 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Ronal W. Souder v. Johnson, 501 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Stack v. Guardian OIL Co., 525 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Sylvan M. Cohen v. Friedland, 451 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- O'Neill v. Sacher, 451 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)