THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN H. WASSEL, APPELLEE
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Florida reversed a writ of prohibition barring prosecution of a DUI case, holding that the defendant waived his speedy trial right by requesting a continuance after the case was set for trial shortly after commencement.
A defendant waives speedy trial protections by moving for and obtaining a continuance, regardless of whether the case was set for trial soon after commencement.
[1] A defendant waives speedy trial rights by requesting a continuance after the case is set for trial, even if the case was set for trial shortly after the charge was filed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“His deliberate decision, nevertheless, to move for a continuance carries with it the necessary consequence of effecting a waiver of any rights under the rule.”
The court explained that the defendant's attorney's choice to seek a continuance, despite having adequate time to prepare, constituted a waiver of speedy trial protections.
The state charged defendant Wassel with DUI. The case was set for trial a short time after commencement, but Wassel's attorney moved for and was grant…
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PER CURIAM.
The state appeals from a writ of prohibition precluding the county court from proceeding against the defendant-appellee in a d.u.i. case on speedy trial grounds.
We reverse because, when the case was first set for trial a short time after commencement, the defendant moved for and was granted a continuance, thus waiving the benefit of the rule. State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla.1971); Homer v. State, 358 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 886 (Fla.1978). As in the converse case of State v. Belien, 379 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), in which the defendant claimed that no waiver should be applied because the case was filed toward the end of the speedy trial period, we find nothing to support the defendant’s contention that there was no waiver because the case was set “too soon” to permit counsel adequately to prepare.
The record shows, to the contrary, that having taken the depositions of the investigating officers and been offered a view of the videotape of his client at the scene, Wassel’s attorney was as capable as he ever would be to defend his client on the day of trial. His deliberate decision, nevertheless, to move for a continuance carries with it the necessary consequence of effecting a waiver of any rights under the rule.
Reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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State v. Brown, 527 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…ailability for trial at these points in time and effecting a conclusive waiver of her rights under the speedy trial rule, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(d)(3). See State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla.1971); State v. Wassel, 502 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Homer v. State, 358 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 886 (Fla.1978). The defendant attempts to invoke a purported exception to this rule set forth in dicta in such cases as State v. Del Gaudio, 445 So. 2d…
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State v. Guzman, 697 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…denied, 541 So. 2d 1172 (Fla.1988); Passavant v. State, 523 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)(per curiam); Stemas v. State, 522 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)(per curiam); Prusaski v. State, 522 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)(per curiam); State v. Wassel, 502 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); State v. Belien, 379 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Homer v. State, 358 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 886 (Fla.1978). In this case, the circuit court entered prohibition against the prosecution of a D.U…
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State v. Brown, 527 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…be by any other litigant — as an appeal from a final order or judgment. Art. V, § 4, Fla. Const.; Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(b). Our decisions have implicitly recognized this. See, e.g., State v. Phillips, 520 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); State v. Wassel, 502 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied. . In its response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the State too proceeds on the premise that this is an appeal in a criminal case. Conceding that express authoriza…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State of Fla. ex rel. Isaac Don Butler & Gerald Nickles v. Honorable Ralph O. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971)
- Weinstein v. Heyman, 379 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Hernandez v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 358 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Homer v. State, 358 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)