HECTOR A. TORRES AND JUANA TORRES, APPELLANTS,
v.
STEVEN WARREN SELL AND UNIVERSAL AUTO SALVAGE, INC., APPELLEES
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Hector Torres appealed a directed verdict entered in favor of Steven Sell and Universal Auto Salvage after a car accident. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court erred in directing a verdict because whether a sudden emergency existed and whether the defendant reacted prudently are questions of fact for the jury, not the court.
The court held that the trial court erred in directing a verdict. The presence or absence of a sudden emergency situation and whether a defendant reacted prudently to such an emergency are questions of fact ordinarily to be decided by the jury, not the court as a matter of law.
[1] The presence or absence of a sudden emergency situation is a question of fact ordinarily to be decided by the jury.
[2] Whether a party reacted prudently to a sudden emergency is a question of fact for the jury.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The presence or absence of a sudden emergency situation is a question of fact ordinarily to be decided by the jury.”
Establishes that emergency doctrine does not provide a basis for directed verdict; it is a jury question.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHector Torres' automobile collided with a vehicle driven by Steven Sell, who was working for Universal Auto Salvage at the time. Sell and Universal ar…
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PER CURIAM.
Juana and Hector Torres appeal from the entry of a final judgment for the appellees, Steven Sell and Universal Auto Salvage, Inc. (Universal). We reverse.
This appeal arises out of an action for damages which Hector Torres sustained when his automobile collided with another vehicle which was driven by Steven Sell. The defendants below, Sell and Universal, for whom Sell was working at the time of the accident, maintained that the collision resulted from the slippery road conditions and the unexpected actions of an unidentified third vehicle. They further contended that this created an emergency situation and, therefore, they were not liable as a matter of law. The trial court directed a verdict for Sell and Universal on this theory after all the evidence was presented and then entered a final judgment based upon the verdict.
We agree with appellants’ contention that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for Sell and Universal. The presence or absence of a sudden emergency situation is a question of fact ordinarily to be decided by the jury. Scott v. City of Opa Locka, 311 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Darr v. Aglin, 279 So. 2d 62, 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Young v. Taylor, 212 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968); see also Schubowsky v. Hearn Food Store, Inc., 261 So. 2d 162, 162 (Fla.1972) (Ervin, J„ dissenting). So, too, is the issue of whether, under the circumstances, the defendant reacted to the situation in a prudent manner. Cleveland v. City of Miami, 263 So. 2d 573 (Fla.1972); Darr, 279 So. 2d at 64; Dixon v. Thompson, 217 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969).
The law is well settled that:
[a] motion for a directed verdict should be granted only when the court, after viewing the evidence and testimony in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ... concludes that the jury could not reasonably differ as to the existence of a material fact or inference and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
City of Hialeah v. Rehm, 455 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (citations omitted), review denied, 462 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1985); see also Rodi v. Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc., 62 So. 2d 355 (Fla.1952); Yarbrough v. Ball U-Drive System, Inc., 48 So. 2d 82 (Fla.1950); Forshee v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 370 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Darr, 279 So. 2d at 63. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Torreses, we find that the jury could have reasonably differed as to either one or all of the Torreses’ contentions that: 1) no emergency situation was presented; 2) Sell’s actions contributed to the situation; or 3) Sell did not react in a prudent manner once faced with the sudden emergency. Consequently, we find that it was error for the trial court to have substituted its judgment for that of the trier of the facts. See, e.g., Dixon, 217 So. 2d at 888; cf. Darr, 279 So. 2d at 64 (error for trial court to enter a post trial judgment in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict where the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, supported the non-moving party’s contention that he reacted prudently to a sudden emergency). Accordingly, the judgment under review is Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
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Westchester Exxon v. Marcelo Valdes and Maribel Valdes, 524 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…nst this standard, it is clear, as a matter of law, that Westchester breached no duty owed to Valdes. Where a jury could not reasonably differ as to the existence of a material fact or inference, a directed verdict should be granted. Torres v. Sell, 502 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla.3d DCA 1987); City of Hialeah v. Rehm, 455 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla.3d DCA 1984), rev. denied, 462 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1985). The omissions alleged in Valdes’s complaint — the absence of a water faucet at the self-service island, the presence of…
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LA Villarena, Inc. v. Acosta, 597 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…343A cmt.f, illus. 5 (1990) (owner of building is liable to business invitee where sole means of access to building is slippery). For these reasons, we find that the trial court properly denied the motion for a directed verdict. See Torres v. Sell, 502 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (directed verdict should only be granted where jury could not reasonably differ as to existence of material fact). The second issue in this case is the admissibility of the surveillance tape prepared by La Villarena during the tr…
Authorities Cited
- Yarbrough v. Ball U-Drive Sys., 48 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1950)
- Rodi v. Fla. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 62 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1952)
- The City OF Hialeah v. Rehm, 455 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Cleveland v. City OF Miami, 263 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1972)
- Forshee v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 370 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Hewrett F. Dixon and Gerri Dozier Dixon v. Joice M. Thompson and Wayne H. Thompson, 217 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)
- Schubowsky v. Hearn Food Store, Inc., 261 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 1972)
- Darr v. Aglin, 279 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Donald R. Young with Will annexed of the Estate of Russell Wesley Young v. Taylor, 212 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)
- Scott v. City OF OPA Locka, 311 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)