ARTHUR J. YOUNG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Arthur Young appeals his convictions for trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy, arguing the trial court improperly imposed above-guideline sentences based on invalid factors. The appellate court affirms the convictions but vacates the sentences, finding two of the three stated reasons for departure were inherent components of the crime and thus improper bases for sentencing enhancement.
The appellate court affirmed Young's convictions but vacated his sentences and remanded for resentencing. Two of the three reasons for departure were invalid because they were inherent components of the trafficking crime itself. The second reason (the professional manner in which the crime was committed) appeared valid, but the court was not confident that the trial court would have departed based solely on that factor.
[1] A trial court may not depart from sentencing guidelines based on factors inherent in the crime for which a defendant has been convicted.
[2] The professional nature of a criminal scheme can be a valid reason for departing from sentencing guidelines.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Nearly every person convicted of trafficking in cocaine in the amount present in this case could be considered a professional drug dealer. Therefore, the trial court's first reason for departure is invalid as it is an inherent component of the crime for which he was convicted.”
Establishes that characteristics inherent to the crime cannot serve as valid grounds for sentencing departure
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceYoung was convicted of trafficking in cocaine in a quantity greater than 200 grams, conspiracy to traffic in cocaine in a quantity greater than 200 gr…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Inherent Component Of Crime cases and more on FLexlaw
RYDER, Judge.
Young appeals his convictions and sentences for trafficking in cocaine in a quantity greater than 200 grams, conspiracy to traffic in cocaine in a quantity greater than 200 grams and possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia. He raises several points on appeal, but we find merit in only one. Accordingly, we affirm his convictions but vacate his sentences and remand for resentencing.
The trial court listed three general reasons for departure which can be summarized as follows: defendant is a professional drug dealer; the crime was part of a professional, well-organized scheme of criminal activity; and the crime involved numerous persons other than the defendant. At the conclusion of his written reasons for departure, the trial judge wrote, “the guidelines do not contemplate any of the three factors enumerated above and, accordingly, any one of which would justify going beyond the guidelines.” Our review of the existing case law convinces us that two of the three reasons for departure listed by the trial judge are invalid. The first and third reasons given by the trial court are inherent in the crime of which appellant was convicted. Nearly every person convicted of trafficking in cocaine in the amount present in this case could be considered a professional drug dealer.
Therefore, the trial court’s first reason for departure is invalid as it is an inherent component of the crime for which he was convicted. State v. Mischler, 488 So. 2d 523, 526 (Fla.1986).
The trial court’s third reason for departure, the fact the crime involved other persons, is also an inherent component of the crime of trafficking in cocaine. The state’s theory at trial was not that appellant merely possessed the cocaine, but that he sold, manufactured and/or delivered the cocaine. It is axiomatic that sale or delivery involves other persons.
Therefore, the trial court’s third reason for departure is invalid. Our review of the record in general, and the written reasons for departure in specific, do not give us the confidence to say that the trial court would have departed for the sole remaining reason.
The trial court’s second reason for departure appears to be valid. The professional manner in which a crime is committed has been found to be a valid reason for departure. Brown v. State, 480 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Dickey v. State, 458 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), implicitly overruled on other grounds by Hendrix v. State, 475 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 1985).
Our confidence in the trial court’s statement that any of the factors alone would justify departure is undermined by the type of evidence introduced at trial. The state introduced “ Williams rule”1 evidence of other similar criminal activity. While we find no error in the introduction of that evidence, as shown by our affirmance of appellant’s convictions, it appears from the record that the trial court may have unintentionally allowed the “Williams rule” evidence to influence his written reasons for departure. It is clear that the trial court is not allowed to use evidence of criminal activity of which appellant is neither charged nor convicted in departing from the guidelines. Sloan v. State, 472 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), modified in part on other grounds, 491 So. 2d 276 (Fla.1986); Banzo v. State, 464 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
When “Williams rule” evidence is admitted, the trial court must be very careful to avoid this problem. We are not convinced by either the record or the state’s brief that the trial court would have departed for the one valid reason. Casteel v. State, 498 So. 2d 1249 (Fla.1986).
One matter remains. It appears that a scrivener’s error occurred in transcribing appellant’s credit for time served. Upon remand, appellant’s sentence should be corrected to include “credit for all of the time he spent in the county jail before sentence.” § 921.161(1), Fla.Stat. (1985). Kronz v. State, 462 So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. 1985).
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
DANAHY, C.J. and HALL, J., concur. . Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
-
Hernandez v. State, 575 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1991)…d 694 (Fla.1988); Gray v. State, 522 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Hoyte v. State, 518 So. 2d 975 (Fla.2d DCA 1988); Downing v. State, 515 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), quashed in part on other grounds, 536 So. 2d 189 (Fla.1988); Young v. State, 502 So. 2d 1347 (Fla.2d DCA 1987); Roberts v. State, 500 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Williams v. State, 497 So. 2d 716 (Fla.3d DCA 1986), review denied, 506 So. 2d 1043 (Fla.1987); Lewis v. State, 496 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Mullen v. State, 483 So. 2d…
-
Hoyte v. State, 518 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…ed that “perfume or something” had been placed inside the fiberglass container presumably to mask the smell of the marijuana. The professional manner in which a crime is committed has been held to be a valid reason for departure. See Young v. State, 502 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (the crime of trafficking in cocaine was part of a well organized scheme); Brown v. State, 480 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (the crime was committed in a professional manner); Dickey v. State, 458 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…1 / 2
-
Michael Banks v. State, 509 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)…hat it also includes the knowing possession of an amount in excess of 100 pounds of cannabis, but not more restrictive. Therefore a defendant’s status as a “drug dealer” in a “trafficking” case is an invalid reason for departure. See Young v. State, 502 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). None of the reasons listed by the trial judge for departing from the recommended guidelines sentence are clear and convincing. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction, vacate the sentence, and remand for resen-tencing within the r…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959)
- Hendrix v. State, 475 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 1985)
- State v. Mischler, 488 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1986)
- Williams v. Florida, 361 U.S. 847 (U.S. 1959)
- White v. Illinois, 361 U.S. 847 (U.S. 1959)
- Casteel v. State, 498 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1986)
- Kronz v. State, 462 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1985)
- Winford Lee Dickey v. State, 458 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Sloan v. State, 472 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Banzo v. State, 464 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)