VINCENT WEST, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Vincent West, a juvenile tried as an adult for armed robbery, appealed his conviction and adult sentence. The appellate court affirmed the conviction but vacated and remanded the sentence because the trial court failed to make written findings addressing all six statutory criteria required for imposing adult sanctions on a juvenile.
The trial court did not reversibly err in denying cross-examination because the witness had successfully completed the pretrial intervention program two years before trial, eliminating any possibility of reactivating charges and thus making the prior program participation irrelevant to credibility. However, the sentence must be vacated and remanded because the trial court failed to make written findings addressing all six statutory criteria required for imposing adult sanctions, specifically the criterion regarding the child's sophistication and maturity.
[1] Cross-examination of a state's witness regarding participation in a juvenile pretrial intervention program is not permissible when the witness has successfully completed…
[2] A trial court commits reversible error when sentencing a juvenile as an adult if it fails to make written findings of fact addressing each of the six statutory criteria f…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It was not error to deny cross-examination of the state's principal witness concerning his previous participation in a juvenile pretrial intervention program.”
Establishes that the denial of cross-examination was proper because the witness had completed the program years earlier with no possibility of reactivation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVincent West, a juvenile, was tried and convicted as an adult of armed robbery. At trial, the court denied West's request to cross-examine the state's…
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WEBSTER, PETER D., Associate Judge.
Appellant, a juvenile, was tried as an adult and convicted of armed robbery. He raises two issues on appeal. The first contention is that the trial court committed reversible error when, during the trial, it refused to allow cross-examination of the state’s principal witness regarding his participation in a juvenile pretrial intervention program. The second contention is that the trial court committed reversible error when it sentenced appellant as an adult, because it failed to comply with Section 39.111(6)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (1985).
It was not error to deny cross-examination of the state’s principal witness concerning his previous participation in a juvenile pretrial intervention program. Appel lant correctly cites Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), for the proposition that it is reversible error to deny cross-examination of a key state witness who is on juvenile probation at the time of trial, when such cross-examination is intended to establish bias or self-interest arising from fear of prosecution or a desire to curry favor. Likewise, in Thornes v. State, 485 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), the court held that it was reversible error not to allow cross-examination intended to establish that a key state witness “was then actively involved in a pretrial intervention program administered under the state attorney’s office” (485 So. 2d at 1359).
However, these and similar cases are distinguishable because, here, it is undisputed that the witness had successfully completed the pretrial intervention program some two years before the trial.
Thus, there was no possibility at the time of trial that the charges against the witness might be reactivated. Because there was no possibility that the charges might be reactivated, the fact that the witness had, some two years earlier, successfully completed a pretrial intervention program had no bearing on his credibility and was, therefore, irrelevant.
Section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes (1985), mandates that when sentencing a juvenile who has been tried and convicted as an adult, the court consider the suitability or nonsuitability of adult sanctions. Subpart (c) of that Section requires that the determination of suitability of adult sanctions be based upon six listed criteria; and subpart (d) requires that a decision to impose adult sanctions be in writing and include “a specific finding of fact and the reasons for the decision to impose adult sanctions,” with reference to the six criteria listed in subpart (c). In this case, the trial court entered a written “Order of Sentence” which included findings addressing four of the six criteria, and the sentencing transcript reflects some consideration of a fifth.
However, nowhere is there any written indication that the trial court considered and made a finding as to “[t]he sophistication and maturity of the child, as determined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of living.” § 39.111(6)(c)4., Fla.Stat. (1985). Numerous decisions have held that it is reversible error not to make findings addressed to each of the six criteria. See, e.g., Posey v. State, 501 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Christy v. State, 489 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Cooper v. State, 465 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Upshaw v. State, 464 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
Accordingly, the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded with directions that the trial court resen-tence appellant. If the trial court again decides to sentence appellant as an adult, it should enter a written order which includes findings of fact addressing each of the six criteria contained in Section 39.111(6)(c).
CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED; and REMANDED with directions.
HERSEY, C.J., and WALDEN, J., concur.
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Martin v. State, 547 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…ere is no indication in the transcript that the trial court considered subsection (c)(4): “[t]he sophistication and maturity of the child, as determined by home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of living.” In West v. State, 503 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), the trial court’s written order on adult sanctions addressed four of the six criteria, and the sentencing transcript indicated consideration of a fifth criterion. However, the appellate court reversed and remanded for resentenci…
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Brown v. State, 524 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)…cision on the first point — is meritorious. This court has held that it is reversible error not to make specific written findings of fact addressing each of the statutorily dictated criteria in deciding to impose adult sanctions. See West v. State, 503 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). In the instant case, the trial court entered a written “Order of Sentence” stating that “the court has fully reviewed the criteria set forth in Chapter 39 and based upon those criteria, this Court finds that the defendant is not…
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Hammonds v. State, 543 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…e, 407 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); (2) the trial court did not make specific findings of fact addressing each of the statutorily dictated criteria in deciding to impose adult sanctions. State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.1984); West v. State, 503 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Brown v. State, 524 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); and (3) the order is deficient in that the findings made therein were merely conclusions without facts supporting their application. We would caution trial judges that under s…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1974)
- Posey v. State, 501 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Thornes v. State, 485 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Cooper v. State, 465 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Christy v. State, 489 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Akrivos v. State, 464 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Grady Upshaw v. State, 464 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)