OTIS CALVIN FLOYD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Court affirmed the sexual battery conviction but reversed the sentencing departure as invalid under Florida guidelines, requiring resentencing.
A trial court may exclude evidence of a victim's consensual sexual activity with a third party when the defendant has alternative means to suggest motive for the accusation, and the defendant's failure to object waives the issue.
[1] Evidence of a victim's consensual sexual activity with a third party may be excluded when the defendant has alternative means to establish motive for the accusation, and…
[2] Sentencing departures must be supported by valid reasons under Florida sentencing guidelines.
Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial judge did permit appellant to introduce evidence that the victim had been whipped by her mother that day because she had her boyfriend in the house with her, thereby allowing appellant an opportunity to demonstrate to the jury that the victim accused her father of this crime because she was angry about being whipped”
Explaining why exclusion of the boyfriend evidence was not constitutional error when alternative evidence of motive was available
Appellant was convicted of sexual battery of his daughter. The trial court excluded evidence of the victim's consensual sexual activity with her boyfr…
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SMITH, Judge.
Appellant appeals his conviction for sexual battery of his daughter and his sentence exceeding the guidelines. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in depriving him of his constitutional right to present a defense by prohibiting him from questioning the victim about a specific instance of consensual sexual activity with her boyfriend, for which she was severely punished by her mother, on the day she reported the sexual battery to the authorities. The trial judge did permit appellant to introduce evidence that the victim had been whipped by her mother that day because she had her boyfriend in the house with her, thereby allowing appellant an opportunity to demonstrate to the jury that the victim accused her father of this crime because she was angry about being whipped. See generally, Marr v. State, 470 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), approved, 494 So. 2d 1139 (Fla.1986). We affirm this point. We further note that appellant did not object to the exclusion of the evidence concerning sexual activity by the victim with her boyfriend and in effect agreed with the trial judge’s ruling at the time it was made.
However, the two reasons given for the departure sentence are clearly invalid. Williams v. State, 492 So. 2d 1308 (Fla.1986); and Lerma v. State, 497 So. 2d 736 (Fla.1986). Accordingly, appellant must be resentenced.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for resentencing.
JO ANOS and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.
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Lewis v. State, 570 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…ree with the majority that appellant had been accorded an adequate opportunity to cross-examine on this point and develop his defense. If such had been appellant’s defense, I would agree with the majority that this court’s holding in Floyd v. State, 503 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), would be persuasive authority for the majority’s position. However, under the facts of this case, the holding in Floyd is completely inapposite. The Sixth Amendment, as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees a d…1 / 2
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Arroyo v. State, 252 So. 3d 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)
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Moore v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)…gations. Thus, the trial court did not err because Appellant adequately presented his theory of defense without contravening the statute, and Appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated. See Arroyo, 252 So. 3d at 378 (citing Floyd v. State, 503 So. 2d 956, 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)); cf. Lewis, 591 So. 2d at 923 (holding that application of rape shield law was erroneous where it interfered with defendant’s ability to develop his theory of defense). III. Williams Rule Evidence Appellant argues the trial…
Authorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 492 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1986)
- Ervin Sharp v. State, 497 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Marr v. State, 494 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1986)
- Marr v. State, 470 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)