JAMES RALPH LONG, APPELLANT,
v.
YVONNE B. LONG, APPELLEE
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In a marital dissolution appeal, the court reversed the trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony to the former wife and reduced the child support obligation, finding insufficient evidence to support the alimony award and determining the child support amount exceeded the husband's ability to pay given his obligations to children from a prior marriage.
The court reversed the rehabilitative alimony award as unsupported by evidence, reduced child support to no more than $400 per month based on James's inability to pay the higher amount given his prior support obligations, affirmed the remaining portions of the dissolution judgment, and remanded for a hearing on the modification petition regarding visitation.
[1] Rehabilitative alimony requires evidence that a spouse's earning ability suffered during the marriage or that the spouse plans to obtain additional training or education.
[2] A child support award must consider the obligor's ability to pay, including existing support obligations for children from prior marriages.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“From the testimony elicted at the hearing on the initial dissolution, it is clear that there is no basis for an award of rehabilitative alimony. There was no evidence that the wife's earning ability suffered in any way during the marriage, since she worked before, during and after the marriage.”
Establishes the legal standard and reasoning for reversing the rehabilitative alimony award
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJames Ralph Long and Yvonne B. Long divorced. The trial court awarded Yvonne $600 per month in child support, $200 per month in rehabilitative alimony…
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COBB, Judge.
James Ralph Long appeals the final judgment of dissolution which awarded the former wife, Yvonne B. Long, $600 per month in child support; $200 per month in rehabilitative alimony for 48 months; the marital home as lump-sum alimony; and restricted visitation with the parties’ two minor children.1 James also appeals the denial of his motion for modification of alimony, child support and visitation.
From the testimony elicted at the hearing on the initial dissolution, it is clear that there is no basis for an award of rehabilitative alimony. There was no evidence that the wife’s earning ability suffered in any way during the marriage, since she worked before, during and after the marriage. There was no evidence that she plans to obtain additional training or education. See McDonald v. McDonald, 429 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Poppe v. Poppe, 412 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); G’Sell v. G’Sell, 390 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Kirchman v. Kirchman, 389 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). The award of $600 per month in child support exceeds the husband’s ability to pay. This is especially apparent in light of his support obligations for two minor children from a previous marriage. Cf, Summers v. Summers, 491 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Johnson v. Johnson, 386 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 392 So. 2d 1375 (Fla.1980). Accordingly, this case is remanded with instructions to set aside the award of rehabilitative alimony and to set child support in an amount not greater than $400 per month. The remaining portions of the final judgment in the initial dissolution proceeding are affirmed.
Additionally, since the parties did not have the opportunity to fully present testimony and argument on the husband’s petition for modification in regard to visitation, the lower court is instructed to hold a hearing on that matter. REVERSED in part; AFFIRMED in part; and REMANDED.
UPCHURCH, C.J., concurs.
ORFINGER, J., concurs in part; dissents in part.
. The final order also imposed additional obligations on the husband in the form of liability for most of the couple’s debts, including an $8,000 unsecured second mortgage, as well as lump sum awards to the wife of over $2,000 and attorney’s fees of $2,500.
ORFINGER, Judge,
concurring and dissenting in part.
Perhaps, as the majority opinion suggests, there was no basis for rehabilitative alimony, but there is evidence of a disparity of earnings and that the wife does require some financial assistance which the husband has the ability to pay. This would indicate that permanent alimony would have been the more appropriate form in which to make the award, but the wife does not raise this contention. Since the evidence supports an award, I do not find an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in awarding alimony, albeit in the incorrect form. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980). In all other respects, I concur with the majority opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Fowler v. Fowler, 516 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)…for the award of rehabilitative alimony, which we reverse. There was no evidence submitted that the former wife’s earning ability suffered during the nine-month marriage or that she plans to obtain additional training or education. See Long v. Long, 505 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) and cases cited therein. However, as it is clear the trial court intended, as part of an equitable distribution, for the husband to pay the parties joint obligations to Barnett Bank and the health club, this case is remanded for…
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Mollnow v. Mollnow, 530 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…the past several years, and appellant did not assert a diminished earning capacity or suggest that she desired to pursue retraining or other employment. In these circumstances rehabilitative alimony should not have been awarded. ' See Long v. Long, 505 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Poppe v. Poppe, 412 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The court also awarded appellant all of the parties’ real estate holdings with the exception of one rental duplex. But the court’s valuation of these properties far exceeds the…
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Jablonski v. Jablonski, 538 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)…the wife, who was employed throughout the marriage, was in a much better economic status at the end of the marriage then at its commencement both in regard to income and assets. See Fowler v. Fowler, 516 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Long v. Long, 505 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); McDonald v. McDonald, 429 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); and Gersten v. Ger- [*49] sten, 433 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Secondly, from the wife’s testimony it is apparent that her plans for further training and education in…
Authorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Vernell v. Edge, Inc., 389 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Budagail S. Kirchman v. Kirchman, 389 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Johnson v. Johnson, 386 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Veroncia G'Sell v. G'Sell, 390 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Poppe v. Poppe, 412 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Jones v. State, 412 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Tippett v. State, 429 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Margeson v. G. Pierce Wood Mem'l Hosp. & the Adm'r, 491 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Summers v. Summers, 491 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)