DOROTHY MOLLNOW, APPELLANT,
v.
MARVIN A. MOLLNOW, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the Florida First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony and the division of marital property, finding that the rehabilitative alimony was inappropriate given the parties' comparable earnings and that the trial court's valuation of real estate properties exceeded the evidence presented.
The court held that rehabilitative alimony should not have been awarded because the parties had comparable earnings and appellant did not assert diminished earning capacity or desire for retraining. Additionally, the trial court should have ascribed some value to appellee's military retirement benefits as a marital asset, and the trial court's valuation of the real estate properties exceeded the record evidence.
[1] Rehabilitative alimony should not be awarded when parties have comparable earnings and the recipient does not assert diminished earning capacity or a desire for retrainin…
[2] A court should ascribe some value to military retirement benefits that accrued during the marriage, absent a reasonable basis for discrediting the evidence presented.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the court should ascribe some value to appellee's military retirement benefits, absent any reasonable basis for discrediting the evidence presented in this case. To the extent that these benefits accrued during the course of the marriage, they should generally be considered as an asset subject to equitable distribution or otherwise available as a source for payment of alimony.”
Establishes that retirement benefits earned during marriage must be valued and considered in asset distribution or alimony calculations despite trial court discretion.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for over thirty years and were both employed with comparable salaries at the time of dissolution. Appellee had vested pension…
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WENTWORTH, Judge.
Appellant seeks review of a dissolution order, challenging the division of marital property. Appellee cross-appeals, contesting the award of rehabilitative alimony to appellant. We find that rehabilitative alimony should not have been awarded, and that the court's valuation of the real estate properties does not comport with the evidence which was before the court. We therefore reverse the order as to the award of alimony and the division of marital property.
The parties had been married for over thirty years when the dissolution order was entered. They were both employed at the time of dissolution, with comparable salaries. However, appellee had vested pension rights from his employment, whereas appellant’s pension had not yet vested. Appellee was also receiving retirement benefits from his prior service as a military officer. The parties owned a marital home, three other real estate properties, and time share interests in two additional properties, as well as various other assets. Evidence was presented at the dissolution hearing as to the value of the parties’ pension rights and their real estate properties.
In distributing the marital assets the court ordered that the parties shall continue to own a rental duplex as tenants in common, and awarded appellant the marital home and the other real estate properties. Each party was awarded various other assets, including items of personal property in accordance with their stipulations. Appellant was also temporarily awarded rehabilitative alimony.
Expert testimony was presented indicating that the present value of appel-lee’s military retirement benefits is nearly half a million dollars. In dividing the parties’ assets the court suggested that this valuation was somewhat speculative and “more of a guide ... than ... real probative fact.” We recognize that the court possesses a broad range of discretion in determining how retirement benefits should be valued and treated in doing equity between the parties. See Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265 (Fla.1986); Zipperer v. Zipperer, 508 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). But the court should ascribe some value to appellee’s military retirement benefits, absent any reasonable basis for discrediting the evidence presented in this case. To the extent that these benefits accrued during the course of the marriage, they should generally be considered as an asset subject to equitable distribution or otherwise available as a source for payment of alimony. See Pas-tore v. Pastore, 497 So. 2d 635 (Fla.1986); Diffenderfer, supra.
While the court did not award appellant a share of appellee’s military retirement benefits, it did award her rehabilitative alimony. However, the parties have had comparable earnings for the past several years, and appellant did not assert a diminished earning capacity or suggest that she desired to pursue retraining or other employment. In these circumstances rehabilitative alimony should not have been awarded. ' See Long v. Long, 505 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Poppe v. Poppe, 412 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
The court also awarded appellant all of the parties’ real estate holdings with the exception of one rental duplex. But the court’s valuation of these properties far exceeds the amount established by the testimony and other record evidence. In light of this apparent discrepancy, and since alimony and the distribution of property are interdependent, we find that the lower court should reevaluate the entire award. In doing so the lower court retains discretion as to the amount and structure of the award so as to best do equity between the parties. See generally, Bomtraeger v. Bomtraeger, 521 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Zipperer, supra.
The order appealed is reversed as to the award of rehabilitative alimony and the division of marital property, and the cause is remanded.
ERVIN and BOOTH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Moon v. Moon, 594 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…ime the trial court made this statement at the conclusion of the final hearing and the entry of final judgment, some two months later. Although the trial court has a broad range of discretion in valuing a retirement account, see Mollnow v. Mollnow, 530 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), and Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265 (Fla.1986), the trial court must arrive at an appropriate figure without merely resorting to estimation. Since the record contains only the figures for the fiscal years 1987-1988…
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DeLOACH v. Ruthie Mae DeLOACH, 552 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…disagree. Military pension benefits should generally be considered as assets subject to equitable distribution or otherwise available as a source for payment of alimony to the extent that the benefits accrued during the marriage. Mollnow v. Mollnow, 530 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Zipperer v. Zipperer, 508 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). All dissolution proceedings are in chancery. § 61.011, Fla.Stat. A chancellor has the inherent right in such proceedings to adjudicate the equitable interests of the part…
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Reyes v. Nevis Reyes, 714 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…consideration of all the awards. Inasmuch as property, alimony, child support and other economic provisions of a marriage dissolution judgment are intertwined, see, e.g., Ryland v. Ryland, 605 So. 2d 138, 141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Mollnow v. Mollnow, 530 So. 2d 399, 401 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), we reverse as to all such provisions and remand for revisitation by the trial court and for new determinations which are consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART. DELL, GUNTHER and KLEIN, JJ., co…
Authorities Cited
- Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1986)
- Pastore v. Pastore, 497 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1986)
- Poppe v. Poppe, 412 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Jones v. State, 412 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Zipperer v. Zipperer, 508 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Borntraeger v. Borntraeger, 521 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Williams v. Wilshusen, 505 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Long v. Long, 505 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)