B.H., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1987-04-07
No. 85-1344
Before HUBBART and DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
505 So. 2d 14 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1987) Caution
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The appellate court reversed an order withholding adjudication of delinquency for a juvenile found to have obstructed an officer without violence. The court held that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the juvenile, and therefore, his actions did not constitute obstruction.


Holding

No, the police did not have a reasonable, founded suspicion to detain the juvenile. Therefore, the juvenile's actions of walking away and refusing to cooperate did not constitute obstruction of justice.


Headnotes

[1] A police officer's mere presence at a shopping plaza in response to a report of a disturbance does not, in itself, provide a reasonable, founded suspicion that any offens…

[2] An officer's unsupported conclusion that an individual is "involved" in an undescribed disturbance does not constitute a reasonably founded suspicion that the individual…

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Key Quotes

“the summoning of the police to a shopping plaza in reference to “a disturbance in the parking lot area” did not, of itself, give them a reasonable, founded suspicion, based on objective facts, that any offense had been, was being, or was about to be committed”

Establishes the lack of initial reasonable suspicion for police intervention.

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Facts & Procedural History

Police were called to a shopping plaza regarding a disturbance. An officer concluded the juvenile was "involved" without articulating a reason. The ju…

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Opinion of the Court
DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.

DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.

The order under review withheld adjudication of delinquency and placed the appellant in community control under HRS supervision upon a finding by the trial court that the appellant had obstructed without violence an officer in the execution of a lawful duty, namely, the officer’s investigation of the.offense of disorderly conduct.

We reverse the order with directions to enter a judgment of acquittal upon the holdings that (1) the summoning of the police to a shopping plaza in reference to “a disturbance in the parking lot area” did not, of itself, give them a reasonable, founded suspicion, based on objective facts, that any offense had been, was being, or was about to be committed; (2) even if, arguendo, there existed any reasonable, founded suspicion, based on objective facts, concerning some offense, an officer’s conclusion that the appellant was “involved” in the undescribed “disturbance,” unsupported by any articulated reason for the conclusion, does not constitute a reasonably founded suspicion that the appellant had violated, was violating, or was about to violate any law; (3) the foregoing propositions being so, there was no basis for a temporary detention of the appellant under pTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and the appellant’s actions of walking away from the police officers, ignoring their directions to return, and refusing to answer their questions or to cooperate in their investigation cannot constitute obstruction of justice. C.K. v. State, 487 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).

While “[tjhere is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets[,] [ajbsent special circumstances, the person approached may not be detained or frisked but may refuse to cooperate and go on his way.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 33, 88 S.Ct. at 1886, 20 L.Ed.2d at 913 (White, J., concurring).

Those special circumstances — a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity — are simply not present here.

Reversed with directions.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Yarusso v. State, 942 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
    …sting,” we note that when there is no basis for a temporary detention of the individual under Terry, a citizen’s act of walking away from a police officer cannot, as a matter of law, constitute resisting or obstructing an officer. See B.H. v. State, 505 So. 2d 14, 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). This court has repeatedly held that the simple act of fleeing from officers, without more, does not constitute resisting or obstructing an officer. See, e.g., J.J.N. v. State, 696 So. 2d 804, 805 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); F.E.C. v.…
  • In the Interest of R.S. v. State, 531 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
    …sisting an Officer, In the Absence of Actual Force, 44 ALR 3d 1008 (1972), including this court’s decision in English v. State, 293 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); compare Johnson v. State, 433 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). See also, B.H. v. State, 505 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); and C.K. v. State, 487 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). REVERSED. SMITH, C.J., and JOANOS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. . Appellant lives with his mother at the apartment complex. . Jacobson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1282, 1285 (Fla.1985)…
  • Carter v. State, 516 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
    …onduct giving rise to “reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the area” and thus does not justify his arrest for loitering and prowling. D.A. v. State, 471 So. 2d 147,154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see B.H. v. State, 505 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Although a police officer is entitled to rely on the contents of a BOLO when “the victim himself made the original report [and] the source of the information is deemed reliable,” Franklin v. State, 374 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 3d…

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