RANDALL C. KNIGHT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1987-05-14
No. 86-1516
DAUKSCH, J., concurs., UPCHURCH, C.J., dissents without opinion.
506 So. 2d 1182 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1987) Caution
Cited by 18 cases

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Synopsis

Randall Knight appeals his conviction for sexually abusing his stepdaughter, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss charges based on excessively vague timeframes in the information. The appellate court reversed convictions on two counts due to indefinite time allegations violating Florida criminal procedure rules requiring charges to state the time of offenses as definitely as possible.


Holding

The trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss counts one and two because the information failed to state the time of those offenses as definitely as possible as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140. The court found no error regarding count three, whose timeframe was narrowed. The judgments on counts one and two were reversed and the case remanded for resentencing on count three.


Headnotes

[1] A criminal information must allege the time of the commission of an offense as definitely as possible, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(d)(3).

[2] A trial court errs in denying a motion to dismiss an information that alleges offenses over indefinite and overly broad time periods, preventing a defendant from preparin…

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Key Quotes

“Each count of an indictment or information upon which the defendant is to be tried shall contain allegations stating as definitely as possible the time and place of the commission of the offense charged”

Sets forth the controlling procedural requirement under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(d)(3) that the trial court violated

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Facts & Procedural History

Knight was charged with two counts of sexual battery upon a child under age twelve and one count of sexual activity while in a position of familial au…

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Opinion of the Court
COBB, Judge.

COBB, Judge.

Randall Knight appeals from a judgment and sentence imposed after he was found guilty by a jury of charges that he sexually abused his stepdaughter. The amended information charged Knight with two counts of sexual battery upon a child under the age of twelve in violation of section 794.-011(2), Florida Statutes, and one count of sexual activity while in position of familial authority in violation of section 794.-041(2)(b). The information alleged that the first sexual battery occurred between January 1, 1977 and December 31, 1980; the second sexual battery occurred between January 1, 1981 and February 11, 1984; and the third offense occurred between February 12, 1984 and December 31, 1984.

Knight filed several motions in limine as well as a motion to dismiss on grounds of vagueness, alleging an inability to prepare a defense since the information did not allege specific dates. More specifically, Knight argued that he would not be able to prepare an alibi defense or otherwise defend himself due to the wide time period involved. Knight also argued that he would possibly be exposed to a double jeopardy violation since the dates were not specific enough. The trial court declined to require the state to narrow the four-year period for count one and the over-three-year period for count two, first by denying the motion to dismiss and then by denying a motion for statement of particulars. The time frame for the third count was later narrowed to between October 1, 1984 and December 31, 1984.

The victim was able to recall before trial incidents in relation to her grade in school, but the state made no attempt to correlate the first two counts in the information to this testimony. The state’s failure distinguishes this case from cases where the state did amend the information to provide more specific times. See State v. Belton, 468 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (statement of particulars narrowed time span from 20 to 6 days); State v. Bandi, 338 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. denied, 344 So. 2d 323 (Fla.1977) (time frame narrowed from ten months to three months).

The information should have stated the time of the offenses more definitely, as is required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140, which provides:

(d)(3) Time and place. Each count of an indictment or information upon which the defendant is to be tried shall contain allegations stating as definitely as possible the time and place of the commission of the offense charged in the act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together, provided the court in which the indictment or information is filed has jurisdiction to try all of the offenses charged.

The trial court erred in denying the defense motion to dismiss counts one and two of the information. We find no error in regard to count three. No reported Florida case has ever upheld such indefinite time periods in an information, and to do so eviscerates the rule quoted above. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments pertaining to counts one and two of the information, and remand for resentencing on count three.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

DAUKSCH, J., concurs.

UPCHURCH, C.J., dissents without opinion.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Jones, 539 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
    …ty to allege within a narrower time frame but did not. In that case, there was no finding by the trial court, as there was here, that the state was unable to more narrowly frame the time in which the offenses occurred. Similarly, in Knight v. State, 506 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), there was no finding that the state made a good faith effort to narrow the eight-year time frame alleged. The court did find that the state had specific testimony of the victim which would have enabled it to narrow the time fram…
  • State v. Theriault, 590 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
    …eposition. . The state argues that Tingley v. State, 549 So. 2d 649 (Fla.1989), approving Tingley v. State, 495 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) overruled our prior decisions of Goble v. State, 535 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) and Knight v. State, 506 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). Because of our holding, we are not required to address this argument, but we do note that Tingley involved an information where the offenses were set forth in time periods of less than a year and were amended by way of a subsequ…
  • Goble v. State, 535 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
    …er, 1983.” The state later filed a statement of particulars which reiterated that the offenses occurred “sometime be [*707] tween 5-1-81 and 12-31-83 on various and diverse occasions”. A factually similar situation was presented in Knight v. State, 506 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). In that case, Knight was charged with two counts of capital sexual battery on his stepdaughter, the first occurring within a stated four year time frame and the second within a time frame of just over three years. The trial cour…

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