GEORGE MARSHALL GOBLE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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George Marshall Goble appeals his convictions for two counts of sexual battery, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the amended information. The court reversed, finding that the information's vague time period (May 1, 1981 to December 31, 1983) violated Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140 by failing to state the time of the offenses with sufficient definiteness.
The court held that the information was fatally defective because it failed to state the time of the offenses "as definitely as possible" as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(d)(3). The indefinite time period violated the rule and prevented adequate preparation of a defense. The trial court erred in denying Goble's motion to dismiss.
[1] An information charging a defendant with a crime must allege the time of the offense as definitely as possible, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(d)(3)…
[2] A criminal information that alleges offenses occurred within a broad, indefinite time frame, such as "between the 1st day of May, 1981 and the 31st day of December, 1983,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The information should have stated the time of the offenses more definitely, as is required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140”
Establishes the governing procedural rule that requires definite statement of the time of offenses charged
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGoble was charged with two counts of sexual battery alleged to have occurred "between the 1st day of May, 1981 and the 31st day of December, 1983." Th…
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DANIEL, Judge.
Goble appeals his convictions for two counts of sexual battery raising as his primary point on appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the amended information filed against him. Goble contends that the information and the subsequent statement of particulars were fatally defective in that they failed to provide a sufficiently definite time period in which the crimes were alleged to have occurred thus making it impossible to prepare a defense and exposing him to double jeopardy. We agree and reverse.1
The amended information charged Goble with two counts of sexual battery which were alleged to have occurred “between the 1st day of May, 1981 and the 31st day of December, 1983.” The state later filed a statement of particulars which reiterated that the offenses occurred “sometime be tween 5-1-81 and 12-31-83 on various and diverse occasions”.
A factually similar situation was presented in Knight v. State, 506 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). In that case, Knight was charged with two counts of capital sexual battery on his stepdaughter, the first occurring within a stated four year time frame and the second within a time frame of just over three years. The trial court denied Knight’s motion to dismiss for vagueness and then denied his motion for a statement of particulars. Knight was later convicted. On appeal, we reversed Knight’s conviction, explaining as follows:
The information should have stated the time of the offenses more definitely, as is required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140, which provides:
(d)(3) Time and place. — Each count of an indictment or information upon which the defendant is to be tried shall contain allegations stating as definitely as possible the time and place of the commission of the offense charged in the act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together, provided the court in which the indictment or information is filed has jurisdiction to try all of the offenses charged.
The trial court erred in denying the defense motion to dismiss counts I and II of the information. No reported Florida case has ever upheld such indefinite time periods in an information, and to do so eviscerates the rule quoted above.
506 So. 2d at 1183.
The state says little to distinguish the factual situation here from Knight relying instead on a plea that “in the interest of some modicum of justice ... the decision of the trial court should simply be affirmed.” We understand and sympathize with the plight of the prosecutor but to accept the easy way and simply affirm would eviscerate not only the applicable rule of criminal procedure set out above but also a system of criminal jurisprudence which has, for the most part, withstood the test of time for more than two hundred years in this country.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and sentences and direct that Goble be discharged.
REVERSED.
DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur. . Having determined this point on appeal in Goble’s favor, it is unnecessary to consider the other two points raised by him.
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State v. Theriault, 590 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…to this date did appellee attempt to take the victim’s deposition. . The state argues that Tingley v. State, 549 So. 2d 649 (Fla.1989), approving Tingley v. State, 495 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) overruled our prior decisions of Goble v. State, 535 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) and Knight v. State, 506 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). Because of our holding, we are not required to address this argument, but we do note that Tingley involved an information where the offenses were set forth in time periods…
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State v. Dell'orfano, 592 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…le 3.140(o) quoted above and added that our affirmance was without prejudice to the right of the state to obtain a new indictment upon more certain time periods. The trial court in this case relied upon DeBianchi, and also considered Goble v. State, 535 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), State v. Garcia, 511 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), and Knight v. State, 506 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), in concluding that a dismissal of an information under these circumstances is required. Although we would not normally…
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Pagan v. State, 599 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…hich was confined to a three month period, was sufficiently particularized. Where three months was affirmed in Knight, affirmance is appropriate for the two month time period at issue in the present case. The defendant also relies on Goble v. State, 535 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), but that case involved a two and one-half year period of time — not the two month period in the present case. See State v. Jones, 539 So. 2d at 536-37. For the reasons stated, the convictions and sentences are affirmed. * The…
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- Knight v. State, 506 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)