FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY COMPANY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
M. L. GUILFORD, DEFENDANT IN ERROR

Fla. | 1932-02-26
104 Fla. 370 Florida Supreme Court (1932) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 143 So. 446 · 140 So. 199
Cited by 17 cases
Opinion of the Court
Per Curiam.

Per Curiam.

—The judgment herein is reversed on the authority of F. E. C. Ry. Co. vs. Townsend, this day filed.

Reversed.

Buford, C.J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell, Brown and Davis, J.J., concur.

On Rehearing as to Damages.

Per Curiam.

—The facts of this case will be found stated in the opinion hereinbefore filed on February 26, 1932, reported in 104 Fla. 362, 140 So'. 196, also in the opinion on rehearing filed July 8, 1932, 104 Fla. 371, 142 So. 909, whereby the question of damages -was ordered reconsidered. For companion ease, see F. E. C. Ry. Co. vs. Townsend, 104 Fla. 370, 140 So. 199, and opinion in the same on rehearing filed this date.

In this case Clarence Guilford, a son of M. L. Guilford the defendant in error, was killed in a railroad crossing accident. The deceased boy was a passenger in the car with another boy, Francis Melville Townsend, who was injured in the same accident, but escaped death. The recovery allowed in this case lo the father was $12,000.00 for the death of his son under the circumstances indicated. *371The boy was 19 years old at the time of his death, was healthy, strong and robust, and was a student in High School. He was unmarried and lived with his father, the defendant in error.

From a further consideration of the evidence, it appears that a recovery by the father of the deceased boy for $3000.00 would not be so excessive, that we would refuse to allow a verdict for that sum to stand. Therefore under authority of De La Vallina vs. De La Vallina, 90 Fla. 905, 107 So. 339, while the amount of a proper verdict cannot be worked out with mathematical precision, a verdict for $3000.00 for the wrongful death inflicted in this case may be allowed to' stand, in view of the fact that the deceased boy was not the driver of the automobile at the time it was struck by the train.

It is therefore ordered that if the defendant in error will remit $9000.00 of the recovery had by him, the judgment will stand affirmed for the remainder of $3000.00 as of its original date, otherwise it will stand reversed for a new trial in accordance with our opinion and judgment of February 26, 1932.

Affirmed on condition of remittitur of $9000.00.

Buford, C.J., and 'Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell and Davis, J.J., concur.

Brown, J. (Dissenting)'—I am inclined to think the original order of reversal should stand.

Other
Per Curiam.

On Rehearing as to Damages.

Per Curiam.

—The facts of this case will be found stated in the opinion hereinbefore filed on February 26, 1932, reported in 104 Fla. 362, 140 So'. 196, also in the opinion on rehearing filed July 8, 1932, 104 Fla. 371, 142 So. 909, whereby the question of damages -was ordered reconsidered. For companion ease, see F. E. C. Ry. Co. vs. Townsend, 104 Fla. 370, 140 So. 199, and opinion in the same on rehearing filed this date.

In this case Clarence Guilford, a son of M. L. Guilford the defendant in error, was killed in a railroad crossing accident. The deceased boy was a passenger in the car with another boy, Francis Melville Townsend, who was injured in the same accident, but escaped death. The recovery allowed in this case lo the father was $12,000.00 for the death of his son under the circumstances indicated. The boy was 19 years old at the time of his death, was healthy, strong and robust, and was a student in High School. He was unmarried and lived with his father, the defendant in error. From a further consideration of the evidence, it appears that a recovery by the father of the deceased boy for $3000.00 would not be so excessive, that we would refuse to allow a verdict for that sum to stand. Therefore under authority of De La Vallina vs. De La Vallina, 90 Fla. 905, 107 So. 339, while the amount of a proper verdict cannot be worked out with mathematical precision, a verdict for $3000.00 for the wrongful death inflicted in this case may be allowed to' stand, in view of the fact that the deceased boy was not the driver of the automobile at the time it was struck by the train.

It is therefore ordered that if the defendant in error will remit $9000.00 of the recovery had by him, the judgment will stand affirmed for the remainder of $3000.00 as of its original date, otherwise it will stand reversed for a new trial in accordance with our opinion and judgment of February 26, 1932.

Affirmed on condition of remittitur of $9000.00.

Buford, C.J., and 'Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell and Davis, J.J., concur. Brown, J. (Dissenting)'—I am inclined to think the original order of reversal should stand.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 104 Fla. 362 (Fla. 1932)
    …killed. T’ownsend was badly injured. The jury awarded $18,000 damages to Townsend who was the driver of the car and who was only injured (not killed) while another jury awarded $12,000.00 damages in another trial (See F. E. C. Ry. Co. vs. Guilford, 104 Fla. 370, 140 Sou. Rep. 199) for the death of the boy who was merely a passenger in the ear. Our view of this case is that any recovery of damages by Townsend, the driver of the ear, who was merely injured by the collision, in excess of $1000.00 is excessiv…
  • Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Guilford, 104 Fla. 370 (Fla. 1932)
    …ruary 26, 1932, reported in 104 Fla. 362, 140 So'. 196, also in the opinion on rehearing filed July 8, 1932, 104 Fla. 371, 142 So. 909, whereby the question of damages -was ordered reconsidered. For companion ease, see F. E. C. Ry. Co. vs. Townsend, 104 Fla. 370, 140 So. 199, and opinion in the same on rehearing filed this date. In this case Clarence Guilford, a son of M. L. Guilford the defendant in error, was killed in a railroad crossing accident. The deceased boy was a passenger in the car with another…
  • Bartlett & Sons Co. v. Pan-American Studios, Inc., 144 Fla. 531 (Fla. 1940)
    …e filed is limited to twenty days, whether or not an appeal lies. But see Grace v. Hendricks, 103 Fla. 1158, 140 So. 790; Chisholm v. Chisholm, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694; and Sawyer v. Gustason, 96 Fla. 6, 118 So. 57; Knight v. Raffel, 104 Fla. 421, 140 So. 199, allowing motions to vacate though filed after the time for appeal had expired. It has been said that after the entry of final decree and the time for rehearing has expired, before the decree can be set aside on any ground, there must be instituted…

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