RICHARD RAMSEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Richard Ramsey appeals his conviction for escape, challenging the imposition of certain court costs and a public defender's lien. The court partially reverses, striking costs imposed under a statute that became effective after his crime (violating ex post facto protections) and striking costs imposed without adequate notice and hearing.
The court struck costs imposed under section 27.3455 as an ex post facto violation. The court struck costs imposed under sections 943.25(4), 943.25(8), and 960.20 as imposed without adequate notice and hearing, though without prejudice to reassessment after compliance with notice requirements. The court upheld the $750 public defender's lien, holding that the affidavit of insolvency waived the notice requirement, but required correction of the written judgment to reflect $750 (not $755).
[1] Costs imposed pursuant to a statute that became effective after the commission of the offense violate constitutional ex post facto restrictions.
[2] A defendant must have notice and an opportunity to be heard before certain costs can be imposed, unless the defendant waives such notice and hearing.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the court announced that it was imposing $250 court costs, the appellant had no reason to know that some of the costs were being imposed pursuant to section 27.3455. He, therefore, had no reason to object to the ex post facto application of the statute as required by Johnson v. State...in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.”
Establishes that lack of specificity in cost pronouncements excuses a defendant's failure to object to ex post facto violations
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRamsey was convicted by jury of escape under section 944.40, Florida Statutes. He was sentenced to ten years in prison and the trial court orally anno…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Richard Ramsey, appeals from his judgment and sentence. We find that certain costs were improperly imposed, and we reverse the judgment as to those costs.
After a jury found the appellant guilty of the crime of escape, a violation of section 944.40, Florida Statutes (1983), the trial court sentenced appellant to ten years in prison and orally pronounced its intention to impose $250 court costs and a $750 public defender’s lien upon him. The final judgment, however, indicates $755 as the amount of the public defender’s lien imposed and reflects that the $250 costs were imposed as follows: $20 pursuant to section 960.20, Florida Statutes (1985), $2.50 pursuant to section 943.25(4), Florida Statutes (1985), $2 pursuant to section 943.-25(8), Florida Statutes (1985), and additional court costs in the sum of $225.50 which included costs authorized by section 27.-3455, Florida Statutes (1985). Appellant timely filed notice of appeal.
The appellant contends that since his crime of escape occurred on June 5, 1985, and section 27.3455 did not become effective until July 1, 1985, the trial court erred in imposing costs against him pursuant to that statutory section. When the court announced that it was imposing $250 court costs, the appellant had no reason to know that some of the costs were being imposed pursuant to section 27.3455. He, therefore, had no reason to object to the ex post facto application of the statute as required by Johnson v. State, 495 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), in order to preserve the issue for appellate review. We, accordingly, strike the costs imposed pursuant to section 27.3455 as violating constitutional ex post facto restrictions. Bowman v. State, 495 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). We also certify the question set out in Bowman to the Florida Supreme Court as a question of great public importance.
The appellant further contends that the trial court erred by imposing the public defender’s lien and the costs upon him without notice and opportunity to be heard. The trial court’s pronouncement at sentencing that it was imposing $250 total costs upon appellant was not adequate notice and opportunity to be heard as to those costs imposed pursuant to sections 943.25(4), 943.25(8), and 960.20. Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984). We, therefore, strike those costs without prejudice to the court’s reassessing the costs after it has complied with the notice and hearing requirements of Jenkins.
We find no error, however, in the trial court’s imposition of the $750 public defender’s lien without prior notice. The affidavit of insolvency signed by appellant included authorization for the trial court to set a fee for the services of the public defender and to impose a lien against appellant for that amount without any notice of a hearing for such purpose. This waiver dispensed with the notice and hearing requirements of section 27.56(7), Florida Statutes (1985). Dailey v. State, 501 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). The trial court, however, must correct the written judgment showing $755 as the amount of the public defender’s lien to conform to its oral pronouncement setting the amount of the public defender’s lien at $750. See Yates v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
We find no merit in any of the appellant’s other contentions and, accordingly, affirm the judgment and sentence in all other respects.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
SCHOONOVER and HALL, JJ., concur. RYDER, A.C.J., specially concurs.
specially concurring.
I concur with the result of this panel, but incorporate by reference my specially concurring opinion in Stone v. State, 500 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
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Harriel v. State, 520 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1988)…PER CURIAM. We have for review Harriel v. State, 508 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), because of express and direct conflict with Ramsey v. State, 507 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), and Webber v. State, 497 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), approved, 509 So. 2d 926 (Fla.1987). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. The district court held that the petitioner could…
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Campbell v. State, 526 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…es that he reserved the right to notice and a hearing regarding such an assessment, the trial court should not have assessed these fees without notice and hearing. See § 27.56(7), Fla. Stat. (1987); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.720(d). See also, Ramsey v. State, 507 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). We, accordingly, strike the assessment of attorney’s fees from the sentencing order without prejudice to the trial court’s ability to reassess these fees after complying with the requirements of proper notice and hearing. See Sha…
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Ramsey v. State, 549 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1989)…PER CURIAM. We have for review Ramsey v. State, 507 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), to resolve conflict with McGeorge v. State, 386 So. 2d [*673] 29 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), and Gryca v. State, 315 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. This Court recently addressed th…
Authorities Cited
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)
- Bowman v. State, 495 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Johnson v. State, 495 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- In the Interest of R.B. v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Yates v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Stone v. State, 500 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Alexander v. Adams, 501 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Dailey v. State, 501 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)