RAYMOND BULL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Raymond Bull was convicted of escape and sentenced to 15 years in prison plus costs and a public defender's lien. The appellate court reversed the imposition of certain costs as violating the ex post facto prohibition and procedural due process requirements, but affirmed the remainder of the sentence.
The court reversed the imposition of costs under section 27.3455 as violating ex post facto protections, and reversed costs under sections 943.25(4), 943.25(8), and 960.20 due to lack of notice and opportunity to be heard. The court affirmed the $1,000 public defender's lien, but required correction of the written judgment to reflect the $1,000 amount rather than $1,005.
[1] A defendant cannot be required to pay court costs imposed by a statute that became effective after the commission of the offense, as such imposition violates ex post fact…
[2] A trial court's imposition of costs in a written judgment, without pronouncement at the sentencing hearing, may preclude a defendant from raising an ex post facto objecti…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the court announced that it was imposing $250 court costs, the appellant had no reason to know that some of the costs were being imposed pursuant to section 27.3455. He, therefore, had no reason to object to the ex post facto application of the statute as required by Johnson v. State, 495 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.”
Establishes that the appellate court would excuse the failure to preserve objection to ex post facto application of post-crime statute, striking those costs.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBull was convicted by jury of escape under Florida Statutes section 944.40. The crime occurred on June 5, 1985. The trial court sentenced him to 15 ye…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant; Raymond Bull, appeals from his judgment and sentence. We find that certain costs were improperly imposed, and we reverse the judgment as to those costs.
After a jury found the appellant guilty of the crime of escape, a violation of section 944.40, Florida Statutes (1983), the trial court sentenced appellant to fifteen years in prison and orally pronounced its intention to impose $250 court costs and a $1000 public defender’s lien upon him. The final judgment, however, indicates $1005 as the amount of the public defender’s lien imposed and reflects that the $250 costs were imposed as follows: $20 pursuant to section 960.20, Florida Statutes (1985), $2.50 pursuant to section 943.25(4), Florida Statutes (1985), $2 pursuant to section 943.-25(8), Florida Statutes (1985), and additional court costs in the sum of $225.50 which included costs authorized by section 27.-3455, Florida Statutes (1985). Appellant timely filed notice of appeal.
The appellant contends that since his crime of escape occurred on June 5, 1985, and section 27.3455 did not become effective until July 1, 1985, the trial court erred in imposing costs against him pursu ant to that statutory section. When the court announced that it was imposing $250 court costs, the appellant had no reason to know that some of the costs were being imposed pursuant to section 27.3455. He, therefore, had no reason to object to the ex post facto application of the statute as required by Johnson v. State, 495 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), in order to preserve the issue for appellate review. We, accordingly, strike the costs imposed pursuant to section 27.3455 as violating constitutional ex post facto restrictions. Bowman v. State, 495 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). We also certify the question set out in Bowman to the Florida Supreme Court as a question of great public importance.
The appellant further contends that the trial court erred by imposing the public defender’s lien and the costs upon him without notice and opportunity to be heard. The trial court’s pronouncement at sentencing that it was imposing $250 total costs upon appellant was not adequate notice and opportunity to be heard as to those costs imposed pursuant to sections 943.25(4), 943.25(8), and 960.20. Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984). We, therefore, strike those costs without prejudice to the court’s reassessing the costs after it has complied with the notice and hearing requirements of Jenkins.
We find no error, however, in the trial court’s imposition of the $1000 public defender’s lien without prior notice. The affidavit of insolvency signed by appellant included authorization for the trial court to set a fee for the services of the public defender and to impose a lien against appellant for that amount without any notice of a hearing for such purpose. This waiver dispensed with the notice and hearing requirements of section 27.56(7), Florida Statutes (1985). Dailey v. State, 501 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). The trial court, however, must correct the written judgment showing $1005 as the amount of the public defender’s lien to conform to its oral pronouncement setting the amount of the public defender’s lien at $1000. See Yates v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
We find no merit in any of the appellant’s other contentions and, accordingly, affirm the judgment and sentence in all other respects.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
SCHOONOVER and HALL, JJ., concur. RYDER, A.C.J., specially concurs.
RYDER, Acting Chief Judge,
specially concurring.
I concur with the result of this panel, but incorporate by reference my specially concurring opinion in Stone v. State, 500 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
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Bull v. State, 548 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1989)…PER CURIAM. We review Bull v. State, 507 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), to resolve conflict with McGeorge v. State, 386 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), and Gryca v. State, 315 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Petitioner was charged with escaping or attempting to escape f…
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Fazio v. State, 509 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…al court to order such costs and a waiver by defendant of his right to the notice and opportunity to be heard he now seeks. “This waiver dispensed with the notice and hearing requirements of section 27.56(7), Florida Statutes (1985).” Bull v. State, 507 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Defendant further argues that costs imposed upon him pursuant to section 27.-3455, Florida Statutes (1985), should be stricken because this statute came into existence after he committed the crimes for which he has been convicte…
Authorities Cited
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)
- Bowman v. State, 495 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Johnson v. State, 495 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- In the Interest of R.B. v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Yates v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Stone v. State, 500 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Alexander v. Adams, 501 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Dailey v. State, 501 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)