SHELDON VIDIBOR D/B/A EASTERN SHORES MOBILE VILLAGE, APPELLANT,
v.
TOM ADAMS, ET AL., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A mobile home park owner appeals from an order denying him attorney's fees after mobile home tenants voluntarily dismissed their suit challenging his rent increases. The court holds that a defendant becomes the "prevailing party" entitled to attorney's fees under Florida Statute 723.068 when plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their lawsuit, and reverses the lower court's denial of fees.
A party in Vidibor's position "prevails" when plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their suit against him, making him entitled to reasonable attorney's fees as the prevailing party under section 723.068. The statutory language is mandatory and requires an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party absent circumstances under section 723.037(6) involving refusal to mediate or arbitrate, which are not present here.
[1] A party prevails in a lawsuit under Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, when the opposing party voluntarily dismisses their suit or is dismissed with prejudice.
[2] A voluntary dismissal of a lawsuit by plaintiffs does not prevent the defendant from being considered the prevailing party for the purpose of attorney's fees.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the prevailing party is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee”
Establishes the statutory entitlement to attorney's fees for the prevailing party under section 723.068
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTenants of Eastern Shores Mobile Village filed a declaratory judgment suit on January 1, 1985, challenging rent increases imposed by owner Vidibor sin…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Mediation cases and more on FLexlaw
SHARP, Judge.
Vidibor appeals from an order denying him attorney’s fees from the tenants of mobile home lots in Eastern Shores Mobile Village after they voluntarily dismissed their suit against him. The tenants, appel-lees herein, filed a suit for declaratory relief on January 1, 1985, which challenged the legality of rent increases imposed by Vidibor since 1980. In 1986, the court dismissed some of the tenants on the ground they failed to respond to discovery sought by Vidibor. After Vidibor filed a motion to tax costs, the rest of the tenants took a voluntary dismissal, without prejudice. We reverse.
Pursuant to section 723.068, Florida Statutes (1985), attorney’s fees are specifically available to “the prevailing party”:
Except as provided in s. 723.037, in any proceeding between private parties to enforce provisions of this chapter, the prevailing party is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee.
Section 723.037(6) provides that upon proper request, a party shall not be entitled to attorney’s fees if that party refuses to agree to mediate or arbitrate. But no contention is made in this case that anyone requested mediation or arbitration.
We think the language in section 723.068 is mandatory, and that if there is a “prevailing party,” the court must award attorney’s fees.1 A party in the position of Vidibor “prevails” when plaintiffs who have brought suit under Chapter 723 voluntarily dismiss their suit against him, or are dismissed with prejudice.2 We reject the view of our sister court in Simmons v. Schimmel, 476 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1985), review denied, 486 So. 2d 597 (Fla.1986), that a party taking a voluntary dismissal can do so for strategic reasons and thereby prevent the other party from being determined to be the “prevailing party.” However, we hasten to note there is nothing in this record to support appellees’ contention that they dismissed for “strategic” reasons.
We therefore reverse the appealed order and remand for a determination and award of a reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to section 723.068.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
UPCHURCH, C.J. and COWART, J., concur. . Cf. § 713.29, Fla.Stat. (1985); Stuart Plaza, Ltd. v. Atlantic Coast Development Corp. of Martin County, 493 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Dolphin Towers Condo. Assoc. v. Del Bene, 388 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Gordon v. Warren Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 340 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
. Hatch v. Dance, 464 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Gordon v. Warren Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 340 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); cf. Dolphin Tower Condo Ass’n, Inc. v. Del Bene, 388 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
-
Alhambra Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Adnan Asad, 943 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…(applying attorney’s fee provision of mechanics’ lien statute and recognizing that Stuart Plaza “stated the correct rule”); Lion Oil Co. v. Tamarac Lakes, Inc., 232 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970) (applying mechanic’s lien statute); Vidibor v. Adams, 509 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (involving section 723.068, Florida Statutes (1985)); Century Constr. Corp. v. Koss, 559 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (involving contractual provision); Landry v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 731 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…1 / 2
-
Rose Printing Co., Inc. v. Wilson, 602 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…Mega Bank v. Telecredit Serv. Center, 592 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); and Goldstein v. Richter, 538 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). But see, Dam v. Heart of Florida Hosp., Inc., 536 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); and Vidibor v. Adams, 509 So. 2d 973, 974 (Fla. 5th [*604] DCA 1987) (rejecting Simmons). Because the fee award in this case flows from the parties’ agreement to treat fees as taxable costs, and not from a statute awarding attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, Simmons and its progen…
-
Holiday Square Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Konstantinos Tsetsenis, 820 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…as the “prevailing party,” if attorney’s fees are provided for by the declaration. Prescott v. Anthony, 803 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Casarella, Inc. v. Zaremba Coconut Creek Parkway Corp., 595 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Vidibor v. Adams, 509 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). However, the Tsetsenises argue the provision in the declaration does not apply to the Association because it took no action to enforce any of the “restrictions, conditions, covenants, reservations, liens and charges” of the decl…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Stuart Plaza, Ltd. v. Atl. Coast Dev. Corp. OF Martin Cnty., 493 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Simmons v. Lawrence Schimmel, M.D., 476 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Gordon v. Warren Heating & AIR Conditioning, Inc., 340 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Dolphin Towers Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. DEL Bene, 388 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Press v. Press, 340 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Hatch v. Dance, 464 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- In re The Forfeiture OF 1979 Porsche 911 Targa, 464 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)