BILLY JOE KIRKLAND, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a police investigation does not constitute an "other proceeding" under the hearsay exception in Florida Statutes § 90.801(2)(a), and therefore a sworn statement given to police cannot be admitted as substantive evidence merely because it may be reliable. The Court quashed the First District Court of Appeal's decision affirming Kirkland's conviction for burglary with assault.
A police investigation does not constitute an "other proceeding" under § 90.801(2)(a), and therefore a sworn statement given to police cannot be admitted as substantive evidence regardless of its reliability. The bright-line rule prohibiting such admission applies uniformly without exception.
[1] A sworn statement given to police during an investigation does not qualify as a statement made in an "other proceeding" under section 90.801(2)(a), Florida Statutes.
[2] A police investigation is not an "other proceeding" as contemplated by section 90.801(2)(a), Florida Statutes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a police investigation is not an "other proceeding" as contemplated by section 90.801(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)”
Establishes the bright-line rule that police investigations cannot qualify as proceedings under the hearsay exception statute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMs. Bass was badly beaten in her apartment and gave a sworn complaint to police identifying Kirkland as the assailant. At trial, when called by the st…
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GRIMES, Justice.
We review Kirkland v. State, 495 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), as being in direct conflict with State v. Delgado-Santos, 497 So. 2d 1199 (Fla.1986). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
Ms. Bass was badly beaten in her apartment. Thereafter, she gave a sworn complaint to the police that Kirkland was the assailant. When called by the state to testify at the trial, she denied remembering the facts as set forth in the complaint, and she was declared an adverse witness. Over Kirkland’s objection, her sworn complaint was received in evidence under section 90.801(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), for purposes of impeachment and as substantive evidence. The jury found Kirkland guilty of burglary with an assault.
In deciding if the complaint was admissible as substantive evidence, the district court of appeal considered whether the sworn statement was executed at an “other proceeding” within the meaning of section 90.801(2)(a), which reads:
(2) A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is:
(a) Inconsistent with his testimony and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition;
The court declined to adopt the bright line rule of Delgado-Santos v. State, 471 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), which held that no process of police questioning could qualify as a proceeding under the statute. Rather, the court held that a sworn statement given to the police could under some circumstances be admitted where it was shown to be reliable. The court concluded that Ms. Bass’ statement which was given by her in the hospital on the day following the assault was sufficiently reliable to qualify as one given in an “other proceeding.”
This holding is directly contrary to our recent opinion in State v. Delgado-Santos in which we approved the bright line rule of the Third District Court of Appeal in Delgado-Santos v. State. At the same time we disapproved the rationale of Robinson v. State, 455 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), upon which the district court had relied to affirm Kirkland’s conviction. We reiterate that a police investigation is not an “other proceeding” as contemplated by section 90.801(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985). Accord Tisdale v. State, 498 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Therefore, the fact that Ms. Bass’ statement may have been more reliable than the one given by the defendant’s accomplice in State v. Delgado-Santos is irrelevant.
We quash the decision below and remand for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
McDonald, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
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Citator
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State v. Smith, 573 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1990)…right-line rule that a law enforcement investigative interrogation conducted by the police, even if under oath, is not an “other proceeding” pursuant to section 90.801(2)(a). Accord Dudley v. State, 545 So. 2d 857, 859 (Fla.1989); Kirkland v. State, 509 So. 2d 1105 (Fla.1987). This Court adopted as its own the three-part rationale of the district court’s opinion in Delgado-Santos, concluding that section 90.801(2)(a) was intended to be a very narrow provision. First, it looked to the history and interpretatio…1 / 2
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Ellis v. State, 622 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1993)…o. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), review denied, 471 So. 2d 43 (Fla.1985), interviews under oath by Internal Review Service officers, United States v. Day, 789 F. 2d 1217 (6th Cir.1986), or sworn statements made to obtain a warrant. Kirkland v. State, 509 So. 2d 1105 (Fla.1987). In Delgado-Santos and again in State v. Smith, 573 So. 2d 306 (Fla.1990), this Court conducted an extensive analysis of the history and purpose of paragraph (a) of subsection 90.801(2), Florida Statutes. We noted that the rule “was inte…
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Kaysie B. Dudley v. State, 545 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1989)…ion, asserting he gave this statement in another proceeding. The question is not controlled by Diamond, but by our decision in State v. Delgado-Santos, 497 So. 2d 1199 (Fla.1986), approving 471 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Accord Kirkland v. State, 509 So. 2d 1105 (Fla.1987). In Delgado-Santos, we held that this type of law enforcement investigation and inquiry was not an “other proceeding” under the code and, consequently, section 90.801(2)(a) did not apply. There is no question that the state presented and…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Delgado-Santos, 497 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1986)
- Delgado-Santos v. State, 471 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Jasper Tisdale v. State, 498 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Robinson v. State, 455 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Montgomery v. Cribb, 495 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)