HOWARD CURTIS YATES, SR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1987-07-09
No. 87-574
UPCHURCH, C.J. and SHARP, J., concur.
509 So. 2d 1249 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1987) Positive Treatment
Cited by 22 cases

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Synopsis

Defendant Yates appealed the denial of collateral relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, challenging a sentencing provision that reserved judicial jurisdiction to review parole determinations for one-half of his sentence. The court held that the statute in effect at sentencing—which limited such retention to one-third of the maximum sentence—controlled, making the trial court's retention period illegal, and reversed in part to reduce it accordingly.


Holding

The court held that the retention period in effect at the time of sentencing controls, not the period in effect when the crime was committed. Because the 1983 amendment limited retention to one-third, the trial court erred in reserving jurisdiction for one-half. Additionally, although the issue could have been raised on direct appeal, sentencing errors that could result in illegal incarceration periods may be raised in Rule 3.850 proceedings.


Headnotes

[1] The statutory period for retention of jurisdiction over a defendant's parole determination at sentencing is governed by the law in effect at the time of sentencing, provi…

[2] A sentencing error resulting in incarceration for a period longer than legally permitted may be raised in a collateral proceeding under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure…

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Key Quotes

“the retention period in effect at the time of sentencing controls”

Establishes the controlling legal principle that determines which statutory version of the retention period applies to sentencing

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Facts & Procedural History

Defendant Yates was sentenced to a prison term with the trial court reserving jurisdiction to review any parole determination during the first one-hal…

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Opinion of the Court
ORFINGER, Judge.

ORFINGER, Judge.

Defendant appeals from a summary denial of his claim for relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. He contends first, that the portion of his sentence in which the trial court reserved jurisdiction to review any parole determination during the first one-half of his sentence, was constitutionally infirm because at the time of sentencing the statute permitted retention of jurisdiction for no more than one-third of his sentence. See § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat. (1983).

At the time defendant committed the crime for which he was sentenced, the statute authorized retention of jurisdiction for up to one-half of the maximum sentence, but at the time of sentencing, the 1983 amendment to the statute had become effective and it reduced the maximum retention period to one-third. The supreme court has held that the retention period in effect at the time of sentencing controls. Mills v. State, 462 So. 2d 1075 (Fla.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 911, 105 S.Ct. 3538, 87 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985).1 Thus the retention of jurisdiction for one-half of defendant’s sentence was error. The State argues that because the issue of wrongful retention of jurisdiction could have been raised on direct appeal, it may not be raised in a collateral proceeding under Rule 3.850. The State is correct in asserting that this contention could have been raised on direct appeal, but it seems to us that any sentencing error which could result in a defendant’s incarceration for a longer period than is permitted by law can also be raised in a Rule 3.850 proceeding. See Reynolds v. State, 429 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). See also Styles v. State, 465 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (where sentence is alleged to be illegal because retention of jurisdiction is in excess of the period allowed by law, relief is available by direct appeal or Rule 3.850 motion). The rule itself permits an attack on a sentence imposed in violation of law.

Appellant’s final point is without merit. By pleading guilty, he waived any infirmities in the form of the information not fatal to its sufficiency to charge an offense. See Lends v. Mayo, 127 Fla. 488, 173 So. 346 (1937); Metchik v. State, 286 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (attacking an information for vagueness comes too late after a plea of guilty).

The order denying relief is reversed in part and the cause is remanded with directions to reduce the period of retention of jurisdiction to a term not exceeding one-third of defendant’s maximum sentence. In other respects, the order is affirmed.

REVERSED in part, AFFIRMED in part, and REMANDED.

UPCHURCH, C.J. and SHARP, J., concur. . Mills held that an amendment to the statute which increased the retention period from one-third to one-half of the maximum sentence was procedural, ánd that the statute in effect at the time of sentencing controlled, so long as the earlier retention statute was in effect when the crime was committed. Perhaps an increased retention period could not now be sustained in the light of Miller v. Florida, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987), but it is unlikely that Miller would proscribe a decreased retention period which is to the defendant's advantage, and not his disadvantage.


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Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Timothy v. Summers, 747 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
    …y time. Although defendant’s 3.850 motion was inartfully drafted to allege ineffective assistance of counsel, he clearly established an illegal sentence which must be corrected. See Hayes v. State, 598 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Yates v. State, 509 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). We reverse and remand for the trial court to resentence defendant on the second degree murder conviction. As to the other grounds raised in the 3.850 motion, the order denying relief is affirmed. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN…
  • Hayes v. State, 598 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
    …y appeal, a sentence that exceeds the maximum allowed by statute constitutes fundamental error which can be raised at any time, citing Reynolds v. State. To the same effect, see Debose v. State, 580 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) and Yates v. State, 509 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). All persons in prison under a sentence for the commission of a crime are there because the judicial system declared they did not follow and obey the law but, to the contrary, they did an illegal act. Certainly in imposing the s…
  • Ozell Debose, Jr. v. State, 580 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
    …ed after Taylor. Therefore, appellant was entitled to have Taylor applied to his case, if it was applicable. See Crews v. State, supra. The State acknowledges that case law out of this court supports the above reading of Rule 3.850. Yates v. State, 509 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (notwithstanding the State’s claim that the issue was waived because it could have been raised on direct appeal, “[I]t seems to us that any sentencing error which could result in defendant’s incarceration for a longer period than…

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