THOMAS F. GEPFRICH, APPELLANT/CROSS APPELLEE,
v.
MARJORIE LOIS GEPFRICH, APPELLEE/CROSS APPELLANT, AND QUALITY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 1987-07-29
No. 4-86-0771
GLICKSTEIN and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
510 So. 2d 369 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1987) Negative Treatment
Cited by 15 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony and child support, nor in requiring the husband to maintain life insurance to secure these obligations.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony and child support when there is extensive evidence to support its findings regarding the needs of the paye…

[2] A trial court may order a party to maintain a life insurance policy to the extent necessary to protect an award of alimony, even if the alimony obligation terminates upon…

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

The husband appealed a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, challenging the awards for alimony, child support, and a requirement to maintain lif…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
STONE, Judge.

STONE, Judge.

This is an appeal from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the wife alimony and child support beyond his ability to pay, and in requiring that he maintain life insurance to secure the payment of rehabilitative alimony.

The parties, both 41 years old, were married for ten and a half years, and had one minor child. The children of their prior marriages are emancipated. The wife has a degree in education, but her teaching certificate has expired, as she has not worked out of the home for several years. The husband is a builder, whose 50% interest in a construction business was valued by the court at $550,000. His income is well in excess of $100,000 per year, and in addition, he regularly has drawn funds from the business, which he characterizes as loans. He has numerous other business benefits, including pension and profit sharing plans.

The couple’s lifestyle has reflected the husband’s success. In addition to his one-half interest in a yacht, the trial court found noteworthy the fact that the husband was driving a new Porsche at the commencement of the action, and a new Mercedes worth $60,000 at the time of its conclusion. He also owned several condominium units and a Winnebago camper. The parties lived in an expensive home, encumbered by a large mortgage. Substantially all of their assets were acquired during the marriage.

The trial court made findings as to the needs of the wife and child, directing the husband to pay child support of $1,500 per month, and rehabilitative alimony of $3,500 per month for seven years, terminable upon the wife’s remarriage or the death of either party. As partial equitable distribution of the assets accumulated during the marriage, the wife was awarded as lump sum alimony the husband’s interest in the marital home, plus $270,000, payable in installments over three years. The husband was ordered to maintain life insurance equal to the outstanding balance of the lump sum and rehabilitative alimony. The trial court specifically rejected the wife’s request that the husband’s assets be encumbered to secure these obligations, in order that he might have “maximum flexibility.” The husband retained all of his interest in his business, yacht, automobile, Winnebago, personal property, real property other than the home, and in his pension and profit sharing plans.

The husband contends that the award exceeds both his ability to pay and the wife’s needs. See Parham v. Parham, 385 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Blum v. Blum, 382 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). However, in this case there was extensive evidence to support the findings of the trial court. It may well prove difficult for the husband to meet all of his obligations out of current income. However, we need not speculate as to what sales or financing arrangements he will have to make in order to compensate the wife for her share of their property. The scheme and time chosen by the court leaves these options to the husband. We cannot say that this result constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Tronconi v. Tronconi, 466 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1985); Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980).

The husband also contends that the trial court erred in requiring him to maintain life insurance benefits payable to the wife in a sum equal to his outstanding support obligations, because these obligations terminate upon his death. See Linn v. Linn, 464 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (in absence of obligation from husband to wife which survives the death of husband, it is error to require the husband to maintain life insurance for wife’s benefit). He does not contest the insurance provision for the child support or lump sum alimony.

Section 61.08(3), Florida Statutes, effective January 1, 1985, provides in part:

To the extent necessary to protect an award of alimony, the court may order any party who is ordered to pay alimony to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy ...

There is no reason to limit the provisions of this section to lump sum alimony, or circumstances where the wife’s rights do not terminate upon death, as suggested by the husband.

In Clark v. Clark, 509 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), this court authorized the trial judge, under the above statute, to secure the permanent periodic alimony award to the wife with life insurance in order to protect the alimony. In Sobelman v. Sobelman, 490 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), a distinction was recognized between an order that a spouse maintain life insur- anee as a form of post mortem alimony, and an order that the spouse do so as security to protect the alimony awarded. See also Kooser v. Kooser, 506 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (section 61.08(3) contemplates a factual setting in which there exists a need for security or protection of other alimony awarded the spouse). In this case it is clear that the purpose of the life insurance was to protect the alimony and support provisions of the judgment. Therefore there was no abuse of discretion in directing that the insurance be maintained.

With respect to the cross appeal issues, we find no abuse of discretion.

The final judgment is affirmed.

GLICKSTEIN and WALDEN, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Longo v. Longo, 533 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
    …dependent on a former spouse for support is consistent with the public policy of protecting the income or assets of families, as is reflected in the homestead laws or elsewhere in chapter 61, Florida Statutes. In my opinion, Gepfrich v. Gepfrich, 510 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), Clark v. Clark, 509 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), and the result in Benson v. Benson, 503 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), are consistent with Fiveash v. Fiveash, 523 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), which I would adopt. We shoul…
    1 / 2
  • Fiveash v. Fiveash, 523 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
    …party ... to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy or bond, or to otherwise secure such alimony award — ” But see Sobelman v. Sobelman, 516 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Dwyer v. Dwyer, 513 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Gepfrich v. Gepfrich, 510 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). By requiring appellant to maintain a life insurance policy that will pay appellee alimony upon appellant’s death, appellant’s estate is not forced to pay postmortem alimony, for it is the insurance company to which appellant ha…
  • Sobelman v. Goldie Sobelman, 516 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
    …curity for the payment of permanent periodic alimony. We agree with our sister court that there is no reason to limit the provisions of section 61.08(3), Florida Statutes (1985), to securing the payment of lump sum alimony. See Gepfrich v. Gepfrich, 510 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). The statute itself does not contain such a limitation. We, accordingly, hold that the court can order a spouse to maintain a life insurance policy which secures the payment of any arrear-age in the payment of permanent periodic…

Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw