BRANLEY MCCARTNEY, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Branley McCartney appeals his conviction for robbery with a weapon, raising three evidentiary issues: exclusion of psychiatric testimony about diminished mental capacity, exclusion of psychiatric history testimony, and exclusion of evidence of his lack of prior criminal record. The court affirms the conviction, finding no merit in any of the three points.
The trial court did not err in any respect. First, the excluded questions were properly precluded because Dr. Miller was not asked specific diminished criminal responsibility questions related to the intent to steal element, no proffer of excluded testimony was made, and Dr. Miller testified generally about the defendant's impairment anyway. Second, exclusion of psychiatric history testimony was harmless error at worst, as Dr. Miller provided no legal defense. Third, testimony about lack of prior criminal record was plainly inadmissible as substantive evidence of character.
[1] A defendant cannot establish diminished mental capacity to negate specific intent for a crime if the psychiatrist is not asked specific questions related to the intent el…
[2] The exclusion of testimony regarding a defendant's psychiatric history is harmless error if the witness provides no legal defense and the excluded testimony does not affe…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Dr. Miller was never asked specific diminished criminal responsibility questions related to the intent to steal element of the robbery charge”
The court's rationale for rejecting the defendant's first point on appeal—that the trial court properly excluded certain psychiatric testimony because it was not tailored to the specific legal defense of diminished capacity for the robbery charge.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBranley McCartney was convicted of robbery with a weapon. At trial, the defendant sought to present psychiatric testimony from Dr. Miller, a psychiatr…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the defendant Bran-ley McCartney from a final judgment of conviction and sentence for robbery with a weapon. The defendant raises three points on appeal; we find no merit in these points and affirm.
First, the defendant complains that the trial court erred in sustaining the state’s objections to defense questions of its witness Dr. Miller, a psychiatrist, concerning (1) whether the defendant could exercise “normal judgment,” without medication, given the stress he was under at the time of the offense in the instant case, and (2) the defendant’s general mental state. It is urged that these questions were designed to show that the defendant — although legally sane — had a diminished mental capacity which prevented him from entertaining a specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property, an essential element of robbery.
We reject this point because (1) Dr. Miller was never asked specific diminished criminal responsibility questions related to the intent to steal element of the robbery charge below, (2) the general questions which were asked and precluded below were not followed by a proffer of testimony as to what Dr. Miller would have testified, and (3) Dr. Miller gave general testimony, in any event, concerning the defendant’s impairment of “judgment” and mental state in answer to other questions propounded by defense counsel. See Zuber v. State, 500 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Johnson v. State, 494 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); see also Gurganus v. State, 451 So. 2d 817 (Fla.1984).
Second, the defendant complains about being unable to establish part of his psychiatric history through Dr. Miller’s testimony. Dr. Miller testified that the defendant was legally sane, although mentally ill, and gave no diminished criminal responsibility testimony as to the specific intent to steal element in the robbery for which the defendant was charged. We are frankly at a loss to understand how the complained-of exclusion of testimony, even if error, in any way injured the defendant. This witness provided no legal defense whatever to the defendant — and the exclusion of a certain portion of his testimony relating to the defendant’s psychiatric history was, at best, a harmless error. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla.1986) (question in harmless error analysis is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict); Zuber v. State, 500 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Third, there is no merit to the defendant’s claim that any error — much less reversible error — was presented by the trial court’s refusal to allow the defendant to prove that he had no prior criminal record as substantive evidence of the defendant’s good character. Plainly, such testimony was inadmissible in evidence. Wrobel v. State, 410 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
The final judgment of conviction and sentence under review is, therefore, in all respects
Affirmed.
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Torrence Lawton v. State, 538 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…minal record as proof of his good character, and (2) impeaching certain of the state’s witnesses with juvenile delinquency adjudications. This is so because it is clear that the above evidence is patently inadmissible in Florida. McCartney v. State, 510 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Bishop v. State, 438 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); § 90.610(1)(b), Fla.Stat. (1987). Finally, the trial court properly departed from the sentencing guidelines in imposing the sentences below based on an unscored first-degree mu…
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Hall v. State, 634 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…ate now argues that we should allow the same type of testimony for Deputy Carpenter that has repeatedly been found inadmissible for criminal defendants and deceased victims. See Sanchez v. State, 445 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984); McCartney v. State, 510 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). The case law against the use of this type of testimony is applicable equally to state witnesses as well as to defense witnesses. See [*1127] generally Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence §§ 90.404(1), 90.609 & 90.610 (1992 ed.)…
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Powell v. State, 680 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986); Jacobs v. Wainwright, 450 So. 2d 200 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 545, 83 L.Ed.2d 433 (1984); McCartney v. State, 510 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).…
Authorities Cited
- State v. DiGUILIO, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)
- Gurganus v. State, 451 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1984)
- Wrobel v. State, 410 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Art Crawford, Jr. v. State, 494 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Zuber v. State, 500 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)