IVA M. JOHNSON, ETC., APPELLANT,
v.
SENTRY INSURANCE, A MUTUAL COMPANY, ETC., APPELLEE
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A party's subjective intent to avoid probate does not overcome the objective legal presumption of ownership created by a title certificate.
An insurance policy excluded uninsured motorist benefits for the death of the insured's son if the son owned a car. The son's name was on a car's titl…
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COWART, Judge.
A mother, appellant, was the insured in an insurance policy, issued by appellee insurance company, which excluded her from recovering uninsured motorist benefits for the death of her son (caused by an uninsured motorist) if the son were the owner of a car at the time of his death. The certificate of title to another certain motor vehicle listed the mother and her son as owner, thereby creating a presumption that the son was an owner of that car. To avoid summary judgment on these facts the mother, by affidavit and deposition, stated, in effect, that she caused the son's name to be placed on the title certificate of the second vehicle, not to cause him to be an owner of the car, but to cause title to pass to him without probate in the event of her death.1 This is the exact converse of the situation in Johnson v. DeAngelo, 448 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) where the mother, in order to avoid vicarious liability for damages caused by her son’s operation of a jointly titled vehicle, presented evidence of her subjective intent, reason, and motive for her name being on a title certificate. The purely subjective intent of the mother in Johnson, that she not be the owner for the purposes of being held legally responsible, was held insufficient to overcome the objective legal presumption there, and the mother’s intent here, that the deceased son not be the owner in so far as that adversely affected her uninsured motorist coverage, is likewise insufficient. The summary judgment in favor of the insurer and against the insured is
AFFIRMED.
UPCHURCH, C.J., and SHARP, J., concur. . This is the classic reason given by a spouse in a domestic relations case to avoid an equitable distribution of separate property which was originally "separate" property but which has, after (or soon before) marriage, been transferred to joint names. See the dissent in Marsh v. Marsh, 399 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), quashed, 419 So. 2d 629 (Fla.1982).
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Bowen v. Taylor-Christensen, 98 So. 3d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)…is ambiguous and could have been clarified by Appellee. All of this discussion ignores that it was Appellee’s burden to overcome the legal presumption that the title document accurately reflects the identity of the owner(s). Johnson v. Sentry Ins., 510 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 5th DCA1987). We attribute no significance to the limited record. The issue on appeal is a narrow one. The rules contemplate that lawyers will send only those portions of the record that are necessary for review of the issues on appeal. See F…
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GEICO Indem. Ins. Co. v. Reed, 13 So. 3d 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…B & G, a security company he operated from his home. The 1999 Ford van was titled and registered in Barton Reed’s name alone. Generally, a name on a certificate of title to a motor vehicle creates a presumption of ownership. Johnson v. Sentry Ins., 510 So. 2d 1219, 1220 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). However, “[t]he name on the title is not the litmus test for determining who owns a vehicle for insurance purposes.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hartzog, 917 So. 2d 363, 364-65 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Laurie Reed filed…
Authorities Cited
- Marsh v. Laurel J. Ising Marsh, 419 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1982)
- Johnson v. Deangelo, 448 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- In re the Marriage of Laurel J. Ising Marsh v. Marsh, 399 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)