STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT NOLAN GRIFFIN, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed a trial court's order dismissing a cocaine possession charge against Robert Griffin. The appellate court held that constructive possession requires proof of knowledge and control that cannot be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage, reversed the dismissal, and remanded for trial.
The trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss because the ultimate facts of the defendant's knowledge of the drug's presence and ability to control it are issues that must be resolved by a jury, not at the motion to dismiss stage.
[1] A defendant may be convicted of constructive possession of a controlled substance if the drugs are found in an area of joint occupancy and the defendant has knowledge of…
[2] Knowledge of the presence of a controlled substance and the ability to control it, for purposes of constructive possession, cannot be inferred but must be established by…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An accused may be convicted of possession of a controlled substance under the theory of "constructive possession" where drugs are found on the premises in the joint possession of the accused and the accused has knowledge of the presence of the substance and the ability to maintain control over it.”
Establishes the legal standard for constructive possession requiring knowledge and control
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice responded to a hotel room disturbance and unpaid phone bill complaint. The room was rented by someone other than Griffin, but four people inclu…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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THREADGILL, Judge.
The state seeks review of the trial court’s order granting Griffin’s motion to dismiss a charge of possession of cocaine pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4). We reverse.
The motion alleged that the cocaine was found in a hotel room which had been rented by someone other than Griffin and that two other guests had been allowed to leave the room uncharged. The motion also alleged that, although Griffin was in joint occupancy of the room, there was no evidence of cocaine on his person or of his knowledge of the presence of cocaine in the room. The state traversed the motion alleging that the cocaine was in plain view.
At the hearing on the motion, the following evidence was presented. Ronald Grace, co-owner of the hotel, had requested police assistance with the occupants of the room for a disturbance and an unpaid phone bill. Mr. Pete had registered for the room, but four people, including Griffin, were staying in the room. Officer Flint responded to the call and was informed by Grace that Griffin had run up the unpaid phone bill. Upon entering the room, Officer Flint observed items of drug paraphernalia, including two plastic baggies with the comers trimmed off, cocaine residue, two or three razor blades, and a metal item used to keep rock cocaine. Four people, including Griffin, and an infant were in the room when Flint entered. Griffin stated he had been living in the room. The court granted the motion to dismiss. The state appealed.
An accused may be convicted of possession of a controlled substance under the theory of “constructive possession” where drugs are found on the premises in the joint possession of the accused and the accused has knowledge of the presence of the substance and the ability to maintain control over it. Giddens v. State, 443 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Such facts will not be inferred, but must be established by proof consisting either of evidence establishing actual knowledge by the accused or evidence of incriminating statements and circumstances from which a jury might lawfully infer knowledge. Giddens; Taylor v. State, 319 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Spataro v. State, 179 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); Frank v. State, 199 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967).
The state’s traverse stating that cocaine residue was in plain view, together with incriminating statements by Griffin, raise the issue of Griffin’s knowledge of the presence of the drug and his ability to control it. These were ultimate facts which cannot be appropriately resolved by a motion to dismiss. Cummings v. State, 378 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
The order of dismissal is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
HALL, A.C.J., and UPCHURCH, Jr., FRANK D., Associate Judge, concur.
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Edmond J. Duhart v. State, 561 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…la.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 964, 101 S.Ct. 2036, 68 L.Ed.2d 342 (1981); Treverrow v. State, 194 So. 2d 250 (Fla.1967); State v. Fernandez, 546 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Garcia v. State, 521 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); State v. Griffin, 512 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); State v. Perez, 438 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).…
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Acosta v. State, 518 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See State v. Griffin, 512 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). [*1309] 2.Workers’ Compensation @=>1983…
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Planes v. Heinrich, 552 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)…based upon the alleged use of the automobile in the commission of the felony possession of cocaine. There was a material issue of fact as to whether appellant had the requisite knowledge that the cocaine was in the automobile. See State v. Griffin, 512 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). The so-called “cross-appeal” filed by the sheriff was actually an appeal from a ruling in a prior forfeiture case involving appellant and the same automobile and is dismissed as untimely. Reversed and remanded for proceedings…
Authorities Cited
- Frank v. State, 199 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)
- Spataro v. State, 179 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Cent. & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist. v. Deadwyler, 319 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Cummings v. State, 378 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Odessa D. Taylor v. State, 319 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Giddens v. State, 443 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)