FREDDIE SPANN, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Freddie Spann Jr. appeals his cocaine trafficking conviction, arguing the traffic stop that led to the drug discovery was pretextual. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that a lawful traffic stop is valid even if the officer suspected criminal activity, and the subsequent consent search was lawful.
The court held that a lawful investigatory stop for a traffic violation is not invalidated by the officer's suspicion of criminal activity, and stopping a person suspected of criminal activity for a minor traffic infraction is not an unlawful pretextual stop. The trial court's finding that the stop was made solely for the observed traffic violation was supported by evidence, and the consent search that followed was lawful.
[1] A traffic stop is lawful when an officer observes a vehicle weaving over the center line.
[2] A lawful investigatory stop for a traffic violation is not invalidated by the fact that an officer would not have stopped a defendant but for the suspicion that the defen…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A lawful investigatory stop for a traffic violation is not invalidated by the fact that an officer would not have stopped a defendant but for the suspicion that the defendant was involved in criminal activity.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard that pretextual motivation does not invalidate an otherwise lawful traffic stop
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn March 21, 1986, a state trooper stopped an automobile rented to and occupied by the defendant on the Florida Turnpike after observing the vehicle w…
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ORFINGER, Judge.
The defendant appeals from a judgment and sentence, entered by the trial court below after the jury found him guilty of trafficking in cocaine. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
On March 21, 1986, at 7:50 A.M., an automobile rented to the defendant and in which defendant was riding as a passenger at the time, was stopped on the Florida Turnpike by a state trooper, after the trooper had observed the vehicle weave over the center line “at least three times” while traveling at about 40 miles an hour. When the driver got out of the car, the trooper observed contraband on the floor of the car. After consent to search was given, subsequent investigation disclosed marijuana and cocaine in the glove compartment and armrest of the car. The defendant argues that the stop for the alleged traffic violation was a pretext, because the violation was minimal, and that the real reason the trooper stopped the car was because he suspected it might contain drugs. The trial court found that the trooper had observed a traffic violation and that this was a lawful basis for the stop.
Defendant acknowledges our holdings in Esteen v. State, 503 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) and State v. Irvin, 483 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 491 So. 2d 279 (Fla.1986), where we rejected the “pretextual stop” analysis of United States v. Smith, 799 F. 2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986), but asks us to reexamine those cases and adopt the reasoning of Smith. There is no evidence in this record that the trooper suspected the defendant and his traveling companions of any criminal activity. So far as this record is concerned, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding of a stop solely for a traffic violation. But even if we accept the defendant’s contention, that the officer suspected criminal activity, our supreme court has very recently held that:
“A lawful investigatory stop for a traffic violation is not invalidated by the fact that an officer would not have stopped a defendant but for the suspicion that the defendant was involved in criminal activity.” State v. Ogburn, 483 So. 2d 500, 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Moreover, stopping a person suspected of further criminal activity for a minor traffic infraction for which any citizen could be stopped is not an unlawful pretext stop. Bascoy v. State, 424 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
Hansbrough v. State, 509 So. 2d 1081 (Fla.1987).
Although not specifically referring to Es-teen and Irvin, Hansbrough would appear to sustain the principle which we adopted there. The trial court found that defendant’s car was stopped because of a traffic violation, and the evidence supports that conclusion. The stop was thus valid and the consent search which followed was lawful.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur.
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State v. Daniel, 665 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1995)…the trial court must accept that theory as fact, even if the theory is based entirely on the arresting officer’s testimony. State v. Carter, 563 So. 2d 728, 728 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Any other ruling is plain error. . The opinions in Spann v. State, 512 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), and Esteen v. State, 503 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), were disapproved sub silentio by Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla.1988). The Fifth District has so recognized. Monroe v. State, 543 So. 2d 298, 299 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…
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State v. Fernandez, 526 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…State, 521 So. 2d at 1097. In these circumstances, that standard is conclusively met by the very fact that the officers, without any other reason for the stop, in fact effected it. See Hansbrough v. State, 509 So. 2d 1081 (Fla.1987); Spann v. State, 512 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Esteen v. State, 503 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); State v. Irvin, 483 So. 2d at 463. Hence, the stop was neither more than nor less than a simple one for violation of a traffic law and was therefore permissible as a matter of…
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Parker v. State, 641 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…eing driven erratically. Parker claims he was stopped merely because he was a black man driving north in Brevard County. This was a factual dispute decided adversely to Parker. See Esteen v. State, 503 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Spann v. State, 512 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). Once stopped, Parker does not contest that he consented to the search. He urges, however, that he was coerced into giving his consent because he was detained in cold weather (he was wearing a short-sleeved shirt) for nearly an h…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hansbrough v. State, 509 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1987)
- United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986)
- Esteen v. State, 503 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- State v. Irvin, 483 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Bascoy v. State, 424 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Ecir Pardillo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 424 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Sentry Ins. A Mut. Co. v. Czinner, 483 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- State v. Ogburn, 483 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)