REINMAN, INCORPORATED, APPELLANT,
v.
PREFERRED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Reinman, Inc. appealed a declaratory judgment that its insurer, Preferred Mutual, had no duty to defend or indemnify a products liability claim. The court reversed, holding that ambiguous exclusionary language in the insurance contract and unresolved factual issues regarding reliance on the agent's representations precluded summary judgment.
The court held that the trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings because: (1) the policy's key exclusionary terms were ambiguous and undefined, presenting a factual issue requiring extrinsic evidence; (2) the insured's well-pleaded allegations regarding reliance on the agent's representations must be accepted as true and cannot be disputed on a motion for judgment on the pleadings; and (3) the insurer's duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify and arises if any allegations in the underlying complaint potentially fall within coverage.
[1] Insurance contract terms that are ambiguous, meaning they are doubtful as to meaning or capable of having more than one meaning, may be explained by extrinsic evidence.
[2] The absence of a definition for key terms in an insurance policy, such as "Completed Operations Hazard" and "Products Hazard," presents an issue of fact regarding coverag…
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where particular words or phrases used in insurance contracts are "ambiguous," that is, doubtful as to meaning or capable of having more than one meaning, extrinsic evidence may be introduced to explain the ambiguity.”
Establishes the rule that ambiguous insurance contract language permits extrinsic evidence and precludes judgment as a matter of law.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJavier Caban sued Reinman for injuries from a diving belt allegedly manufactured defectively by Reinman, based on strict liability, negligence, and br…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Products Hazard Exclusion cases and more on FLexlaw
FERGUSON, Judge.
Javier Caban, in another action, brought suit against Reinman for injuries allegedly caused by a diving belt manufactured by Reinman. The complaint was based on theories of strict liability, negligence and breach of implied warranty. Reinman made a demand on Preferred Mutual, its insurer, for a defense of the claim and indemnity. Preferred refused and brought this action for a Declaratory Judgment. Reinman filed an answer and counterclaim alleging, inter alia, that the contract was ambiguous or did not exclude products liability coverage. Reinman brings this appeal from a judgment which declares that on the pleadings there was neither coverage nor a duty to defend.
The trial court based its ruling on a provision in the insurance agreement which excludes coverage for “bodily injury or property damage included within the Completed Operations Hazard or the Products Hazard,’’ notwithstanding that the technical terms are of uncertain meaning. Where particular words or phrases used in insurance contracts are “ambiguous,” that is, doubtful as to meaning or capable of having more than one meaning, extrinsic evidence may be introduced to explain the ambiguity. Significantly, the contract provides no definition of the terms “Completed Operations Hazard” and “Products Hazard.” The absence of a definition of the key terms presents an issue of fact. See Friedman v. Virginia Metal Prods. Corp., 56 So. 2d 515 (Fla.1952); Hoffman v. Terry, 397 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
The question is not new. In a similar case it was held that the insurer was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law where a clause in the liability insurance contract excluding coverage for “products-completed operations” did not define the terms. See Nixon v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 290 So. 2d 26 (Fla.1973).
On another point, Reinman alleged in its pleadings that it relied on the representations of the insurer’s agent that full and complete protection would be provided and that the insurer and its agent negligently failed to provide such coverage. When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court can only look to the pleadings and must take all material allegations of the opposing party as true. Shay v.
First Fed. of Miami, Inc., 429 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The movant’s disputations of the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, on the agency issue, are irrelevant. See N.E. at West Palm Beach v. Horowitz, 471 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (improper to consider defenses or the sufficiency of the evidence which a party is likely to produce in reviewing whether pleadings state cause of action).
Finally, the duty of an insurer to defend the insured is governed by the allegations made in the complaint against the insured and is more extensive than the duty to indemnify. Keller Indus, v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 429 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). If some of the allegations in the pleadings bring the claim within the policy’s coverage, as is easily the case here, the insurer has a duty to defend. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Applestein, 377 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Looking only to the pleadings and accepting the nonmoving party’s allegations therein as true, Shay, 429 So. 2d 64, the insurer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings should have been denied.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Williams v. Essex Ins. Co., 712 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…her it was intended to be a “primary” or an “excess” one. Therefore, the parties are entitled to offer extrinsic evidence as to the intent of the insurer and the insured at the time the policy was purchased. Reinman, Inc. v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 513 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). “Generally, interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law, to be decided by the court.” Lee v. Montgomery, 624 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). However, “[wjhere the terms of the [policy] are disputed and reaso…
-
Grove Towers, Inc. v. Davis Eng'rs, P.A., 529 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…summary judgment.” Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Steve Hull Chevrolet, Inc., 513 So. 2d 218, 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); see Langner v. Charles A. Binger, Inc., 503 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); see also Reinman, Inc. v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 513 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Reversed and remanded. . The insurer provided coverage if either a claim was made or a lawsuit was filed within the policy period.…
-
Sydelle Ruderman v. Wash. Nat'l Ins. Corp., 671 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2012)…construction is the rule apposite.” Id. at 942. This position has been the basis for many Florida state trial and appeals courts looking to extrinsic evidence to resolve policy ambiguities. See, e.g., Reinman, Inc. v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 513 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 3rd Dist.Ct. App.1987). With the Excelsior line of cases in mind, Washington National offered in District Court extensive extrinsic evidence to explain the marketing of the Policy and to show the understanding of various of the insureds—both…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Arrow Prop. Ins. Adjusters, Inc. v. People's Tr. Ins. Co., 357 So. 3d 182 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024)
- Fed. Ins. Co. v. Allan H. Applestein & the Allan H. Applestein Found. Tr. & Robert Mackin, 377 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Hoffman v. Terry, 397 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Ira Shay & Shalev Corp. v. First Fed. OF Miami, Inc., 429 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Keller Indus., Inc. v. Emp'rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 429 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- N.E. AT W. Palm Beach, Inc. v. Horowitz, 471 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Nixon v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 290 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1973)