HENRY LEE WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
ESSEX INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
This case concerns whether an insurance policy is primary or excess coverage. The appellate court reversed a summary judgment, finding the policy ambiguous and requiring extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent.
Yes, the insurance policy is ambiguous regarding its primary or excess nature. Therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate, and extrinsic evidence is needed to determine the parties' intent.
[1] An insurance policy is ambiguous when its terms are reasonably susceptible to more than one construction regarding whether it is primary or excess coverage.
[2] When the terms of an insurance policy are disputed and reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, an issue of fact is presented as to the parties' intent, whic…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Having carefully examined the documents which comprise the policy, we conclude that the policy is ambiguous on the issue of whether it was intended to be a “primary” or an “excess” one.”
Establishes the appellate court's finding of ambiguity in the insurance policy.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant claimed underinsured motorist coverage under a policy issued by appellee to a third party. The core dispute was whether the policy was prima…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant seeks review of an adverse summary judgment entered in a declaratory judgment action filed by appellee. Appellant had claimed that he was entitled to underin-sured motorist coverage pursuant to an insurance policy issued by appellee to a third party. The determinative issue was whether the insurance policy was a “primary” or an “excess” one. The trial court first concluded that “there [wa]s no ambiguity in the policy and therefore, no reason to seek extrinsic evidence.” It then held that, based upon the unambiguous language of the policy, it was an “excess,” rather than a “primary,” one. Accordingly, it denied appellant’s motion for summary judgment, and granted appellee’s.
Having carefully examined the documents which comprise the policy, we conclude that the policy is ambiguous on the issue of whether it was intended to be a “primary” or an “excess” one. Therefore, the parties are entitled to offer extrinsic evidence as to the intent of the insurer and the insured at the time the policy was purchased. Reinman, Inc. v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 513 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). “Generally, interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law, to be decided by the court.” Lee v. Montgomery, 624 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). However, “[wjhere the terms of the [policy] are disputed and reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, an issue of fact is presented as to the parties’ intent which cannot properly be resolved by summary judgment.” Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Steve Hull Chevrolet, Inc., 513 So. 2d 218, 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Moreover, in such a case, it is error to enter summary judgment construing the contract, notwithstanding that the case would be tried before the same judge. Morton v. Morton, 307 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 324 So. 2d 90 (Fla.1975).
The summary final judgment entered in favor of appellee is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.
WEBSTER and LAWRENCE, JJ. and SHIVERS, DOUGLASS B., Senior Judge, concur.
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Kiln PLC v. Advantage Gen. Ins. Co., Ltd., 80 So. 3d 429 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…evidence may be appropriate. See, e.g., Castillo v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 971 So. 2d 820, 823 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (permitting use of extrinsic evidence to interpret ambiguous provision in homeowners’ insurance policy); Williams v. Essex Ins. Co., 712 So. 2d 1232, 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (remanding for review of extrinsic evidence regarding whether parties’ intended policy to be “primary” or “excess” where policy was ambiguous on matter). Ambiguous policies are often simply construed against the insurer, as…
Authorities Cited
- Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Steve Hull Chevrolet, Inc., 513 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Morton v. Emil Morton, 307 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- LEE v. Montgomery, 624 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Roberts v. State, 324 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1975)
- Reinman v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 513 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)