ALBERTO RAMOS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Alberto Ramos appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief, claiming he entered a guilty plea based on an understanding that his sentence would run concurrently with a pending sentence in another county. The appellate court reverses and remands, finding that the trial court should have held a hearing to determine whether a concurrent sentence plea bargain existed.
The trial court must examine the record to determine whether Ramos was promised concurrent sentences in connection with his Pinellas plea. If the promise cannot be determined from the existing record, an evidentiary hearing is necessary. If a concurrent sentence plea bargain existed and Ramos was not informed of the impossibility of coordination, he is entitled to either withdraw his plea or have his sentence modified to run concurrently with the Hillsborough sentence.
[1] A defendant may be entitled to withdraw a guilty plea if the plea was entered based on the mistaken assumption that the sentence would be served concurrently with a sente…
[2] A trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing on a motion for postconviction relief if the existing record does not conclusively refute the defendant's claims regardi…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Appellant herein agreed to plead on the mistaken assumption that his Florida sentence would be served concurrently with time imposed in New Jersey. Since he did not receive the sentence for which he originally bargained and was not informed of the impossibility of carrying out that sentence, the interests of justice mandate that he be given the opportunity to withdraw his plea.”
Establishes the legal standard from Richardson v. State that applies when a defendant pleads based on a concurrent sentence understanding that cannot be fulfilled.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRamos entered a guilty plea in Pinellas County with the understanding that his sentence would be served concurrently with any sentence he might receiv…
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FRANK, Judge.
Alberto Ramos appeals from the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief. We reverse and remand to the trial court.
Ramos asserts that he entered a plea of guilty in Pinellas County to felony charges with the understanding the sentence would be served concurrently with any sentence he might receive on charges pending in Hillsborough County. The Hillsborough charges were not disposed of until some six months after the plea in Pinellas County. Contrary to Ramos’ expectation, no provision was made for concurrent time in either the Pinellas or the Hillsborough judgments.
Ramos has styled his pleading a “motion to correct sentence” and has asked for specific performance of the Pinellas plea agreement. A Hillsborough sentence did not exist when Ramos entered his Pinellas plea, and because the Pinellas court had no authority to compel the court in Hillsbor-ough to impose any specific sentence, it appears at first blush that the trial court did not err in summarily denying his motion. Ramos’ claim, however, is not absolutely foreclosed. The facts in this case, as they are presented to us by Ramos, are sufficiently similar to those in Richardson v. State, 432 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), to warrant further consideration of this matter by the trial court. In Richardson the defendant, desirous of “get[ting] on back to New Jersey,” conditioned his plea upon a sentence concurrent with an expected sentence for parole violation in that state. New Jersey, however, declined to act on the parole violation and Richardson remained incarcerated in Florida. We held:
Appellant herein agreed to plead on the mistaken assumption that his Florida sentence would be served concurrently with time imposed in New Jersey. Since he did not receive the sentence for which he originally bargained and was not informed of the impossibility of carrying out that sentence, the interests of justice mandate that he be given the opportunity to withdraw his plea.
Richardson, 432 So. 2d at 751.
Thus, upon remand the trial court is directed to examine the files and records in this case to determine, if possible, whether Ramos was promised concurrent sentences in connection with his Pinellas plea. If that question cannot be answered from the record an evidentiary hearing will be necessary. If the existing record discloses no plea bargain, however, the court may again deny Ramos’ motion attaching to its order whatever evidence there is to support that conclusion. If on the other hand Ramos has correctly described the plea agreement, and he was not told of the impossibility of coordinating the Pinellas and Hillsborough sentences, the court is to allow him an opportunity to withdraw his plea. The court, alternatively, is empowered to vacate the original sentence and impose the same term with the added provision that it be served concurrently with the sentence he received in Hillsborough County. Either party aggrieved by the contemplated action of the trial court may achieve appellate review upon the timely filing of a notice of appeal.
Reversed.
RYDER, A.C.J., and LEHAN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Turner v. State, 689 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…d and was not informed of the impossibility of carrying out that sentence, the interests of justice mandate that he be given an opportunity to withdraw his plea[s].” Richardson v. State, 432 So. 2d 750, 751 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Accord Ramos v. State, 513 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).1 Before closing, we take this opportunity to caution trial courts against making specific representations to defendants re- [*1111] garding when their sentences will terminate in order to induce a plea, especially when the repre…
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Knight v. State, 611 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…s claim. The court finds that any request for a sentence running concurrent with the parole violation would have been “fruitless,” since a court cannot order a sentence to run concurrent with another sentence that does not yet exist. Ramos v. State, 513 So. 2d 1097 (Fla.2d DCA 1987); Richardson v. State, 432 So. 2d 750 (Fla.2d DCA 1983). However, this fact does not rule out the possibility that Knight, and perhaps his attorney, acted under the incorrect assumption that concurrent sentences were possible. “Sinc…
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Bailey v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)…e into being and the nature of Even if Bailey's allegedly agreed-upon sentence were legally impossible to implement, his arguments in grounds one and two state a facially sufficient claim that his plea was involuntary as set forth in Ramos v. State, 513 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Under Ramos, if Bailey's allegations concerning his plea and sentence are not conclusively refuted by the record, he would be entitled to withdraw his plea or to have the court vacate his sentence and reimpose the same ter…
Authorities Cited
- Ellis Richardson v. State, 432 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)