JERRY L. KNIGHT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jerry Knight appealed the summary denial of his postconviction motion, alleging his 1991 no-contest plea was involuntary based on false promises about concurrent sentencing. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that Knight deserved an opportunity to withdraw his plea or have his sentences restructured if he was actually promised concurrent sentences that proved impossible.
Knight's plea may have been involuntary if he was promised concurrent sentences that were impossible to carry out. The trial court must determine whether the record conclusively rebuts Knight's assertion that he was promised all concurrent sentences; if not, an evidentiary hearing is necessary, and Knight should be allowed to withdraw his plea or the sentences should be restructured.
[1] A no contest plea may be deemed involuntary if the defendant was assured of concurrent sentences that were not possible due to a prior, reinstated sentence.
[2] A court cannot order a sentence to run concurrent with a sentence that does not yet exist.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Since [defendant] did not receive the sentence for which he originally bargained and was not informed of the impossibility of carrying out that sentence, the interests of justice mandate that he be given the opportunity to withdraw his plea.”
Establishes that a defendant is entitled to withdraw a plea if the promised sentencing arrangement was impossible and he was not informed of that impossibility.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKnight was on parole from a 1977 sentence when he committed three offenses in 1991. He alleges he was assured that sentences for the three new crimes …
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PER CURIAM.
Jerry Knight appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief. We reverse.
Though the motion is couched m terms of ineffective assistance of counsel, Knight actually complains that his 1991 no contest plea was involuntary. Knight was on parole from a 1977 sentence when he committed the three offenses involved in this case. He alleges that he was assured any sentences for these three crimes would run concurrently with one another and with any reincarceration stemming from the parole violation. In fact the 1991 sentences are concurrent, but no provision was made for concurrent time with the 1977 case. The earlier sentence, once reinstated, is therefore, deemed consecutive. See § 921.16(1), Fla.Stat. (1991). The trial court’s order fails to refute Knight’s claim. The court finds that any request for a sentence running concurrent with the parole violation would have been “fruitless,” since a court cannot order a sentence to run concurrent with another sentence that does not yet exist. Ramos v. State, 513 So. 2d 1097 (Fla.2d DCA 1987); Richardson v. State, 432 So. 2d 750 (Fla.2d DCA 1983). However, this fact does not rule out the possibility that Knight, and perhaps his attorney, acted under the incorrect assumption that concurrent sentences were possible. “Since [defendant] did not receive the sentence for which he originally bargained and was not informed of the impossibility of carrying out that sentence, the interests of justice mandate that he be given the opportunity to withdraw his plea.” Richardson, 432 So. 2d at 751 (emphasis added).
After remand the trial court should reexamine the files and records in this case to determine whether anything therein conclusively rebuts Knight’s assertion that he was promised all concurrent sentences. If so the trial court may again deny the motion, attaching to its order whatever documentation it has relied upon. If not, an evidentiary hearing may be necessary to resolve Knight’s motion. If Knight indeed was promised concurrent time, the court should allow him to withdraw his plea if he so desires. Alternatively, the court is empowered to vacate the sentences in the 1991 case and reimpose the same terms with the added provision that they run concurrent to the reinstated 1977 sentence. Ramos.
Reversed.
HALL, A.C.J., and THREADGILL and BLUE, JJ., concur.
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Pearson v. Moore, 767 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…ge effectuated. If these allegations are true, the state presumably took no appeal because it recognized it was bound by a contract on which it had no intention to renege. Cf. Taylor v. State, 710 So. 2d 636, 637 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Knight v. State, 611 So. 2d 602, 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). DOC cannot undo a bargain the state attorney’s office has struck. At issue is the separation of powers between the judicial and executive branches. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 603 So. 2d 93, 94 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). There, w…
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Smith v. State, 718 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…ily based on counsel’s erroneous advice that defendant would be eligible for gain-time and provisional sentencing credits and that his sentences would be concurrent, whereas defendant actually received consecutive prison sentences); Knight v. State, 611 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (interests of justice mandated that defendant be given opportunity to withdraw his plea of no contest, where he did-not receive sentences for which he originally bargained, i.e., concurrent rather than consecutive sentences, and h…
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Obaya v. State, 723 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…that an evidentiary hearing was necessary. Moreover, if it is impossible for the agreed sentence to be carried out under state law, then the defendant has a right to withdraw his plea. See Brod v. State, 437 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1983); Knight v. State, 611 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (“Since [defendant] did not receive the sentence for which he originally bargained and was not informed of the impossibility of carrying out that sentence, the interests of justice mandate that he be given the opportunity to withd…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ellis Richardson v. State, 432 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Ramos v. State, 513 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)