GREGORY EUGENE DIXON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Dixon appealed sentences for battery on a law enforcement officer, resisting arrest with violence, and battery, arguing the trial court improperly departed from sentencing guidelines. The appellate court agreed that the trial court's stated reasons for departure—including the defendant's testimony credibility, familiarity with the criminal justice system, and premeditation—were impermissible under Florida law, and remanded for resentencing within guidelines.
The trial court's reasons for departing from sentencing guidelines are impermissible. Specifically: (1) the defendant's false testimony cannot support departure; (2) the defendant's age and familiarity with the system is too vague and, to the extent it suggests disrespect for the system, is invalid; and (3) premeditation and criminal intent cannot support departure because intent is an essential element of the charged offenses.
[1] A trial court's belief that a defendant lied on the witness stand is an impermissible basis for departing from sentencing guidelines.
[2] A defendant's age or familiarity with the criminal justice system is too broad and ambiguous to serve as a sufficient basis for sentencing guidelines departure.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The first reason given above — the trial court's belief that the defendant lied on the witness stand at trial — is, without question, an impermissible basis for a sentencing guidelines departure.”
Establishes that a defendant's false testimony cannot be used as grounds for departing from sentencing guidelines.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGregory Eugene Dixon was convicted by jury of battery on a law enforcement officer (four years), resisting arrest with violence (four years), and batt…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the defendant Gregory Eugene Dixon from sentences of (1) four years imprisonment for battery on a law enforcement officer [§ 784.07, Fla.Stat. (1983)], (2) four years imprisonment for resisting arrest with violence [§ 843.01, Fla.Stat. (1983) ], and (3) one year imprisonment for battery [§ 784.03, Fla.Stat. (1983) ] — the second and third sentences to run concurrently. These sentences were imposed upon an adverse jury verdict following a trial at which the defendant testified that he did not commit the offenses for which he was charged. The trial court departed from the sentencing guidelines in imposing the sentences appealed from as the guidelines called for a total prison sentence of three years — rather than the total prison sentence of four years imposed in this case.
The defendant contends, and we agree, that the written reasons given by the trial court for departing from the sentencing guidelines constitute impermissible reasons for said departure. These reasons are as follows:
“[1. Defendant] lied on the stand.
[2. Defendant] is not a youngster [and] is fully acquainted with the system.
[3. Defendant] had plenty of time to think before hitting the police officers.
[4.] P[olice] 0[fficer] tried to persuade him [defendant] for about 15 minutes to go peacefully to no avail.”
The first reason given above — the trial court’s belief that the defendant lied on the witness stand at trial — is, without question, an impermissible basis for a sentencing guidelines departure. Ricardo v. State, 481 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 494 So. 2d 1152 (Fla.1986); Beauvais v. State, 475 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). The second reason given above— that defendant was not a “youngster” and was “fully acquainted with the system” — is far too broad, ambiguous, and lacking in factual detail to constitute a sufficient basis for a sentencing guidelines departure, see Hendrix v. State, 475 So. 2d 1218 (Fla.1985); moreover, to the extent that the reason may mean to convey a lack of respect by the defendant for the criminal justice system, such a reason is an invalid basis for a sentencing guidelines departure. Scott v. State, 488 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). The third and fourth reasons given above — that the defendant “had plenty of time to think before hitting the police officers,” and that the police officer attempted for fifteen minutes to persuade the defendant “to go peacefully to no avail” — are nothing more than statements that the defendant had a settled criminal intent to commit the offense for which he was convicted. Because a criminal intent is an essential element of all the offenses for which the defendant stands convicted, these reasons cannot constitute a sufficient basis for a sentencing guidelines departure. See State v. Mischler, 488 So. 2d 523, 525 (Fla.1986); Rago v. State, 498 So. 2d 584, 585 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Knowlton v. State, 466 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 476 So. 2d 675 (Fla.1985); Carney v. State, 458 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), approved, 476 So. 2d 165 (Fla.1985).
The sentences under review are reversed and the Cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to resentence the defendant within the sentencing guidelines.
Reversed and remanded.
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Pedro F. Bernal, M.D. v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg., 517 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…se of a criminal charge may not provide a ground for an increased sentence or an upward deviation from the sentencing guidelines are analogous and most persuasive.2 City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So. 2d 197, 205 (Fla.1985); Dixon v. State, 513 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Beauvais v. State, 475 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Evrard v. State, 502 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Spivey v. State, 481 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). The other ground asserted, which refers to the alleged seriousness of…
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Williams v. State, 545 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…order finding that “defendant’s behavior and prior criminal record shows an escalating pattern of violence.” These reasons are either invalid — lack of respect for the law, see Robinson v. State, 530 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Dixon v. State, 513 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Scott v. State, 488 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); but see Brown v. State, 535 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); see also Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 501 (Fla.1986); Coleman v. State, 521 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), or unsuppo…
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Brown v. State, 587 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…, and hence may be properly viewed as already embodied in the guidelines recommended sentence range.” We believe that premeditation is likewise an inherent component of the offense of threatening to discharge an explosive device. Cf. Dixon v. State, 513 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (settled criminal intent improper basis for departure sentence for battery on law enforcement officer, resisting arrest with violence and battery); Melton v. State, 501 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (“calculated manner” in which o…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hendrix v. State, 475 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 1985)
- State v. Mischler, 488 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1986)
- State v. Carney, 476 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1985)
- State v. Enmund, 476 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1985)
- Carney v. State, 458 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Knowlton v. State, 466 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Juvenal Pina v. Pina, 475 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Scott v. State, 488 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Rago v. State, 498 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Ricardo v. State, 481 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)