GENERAL HOTEL & RESTAURANT SUPPLY CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
DANIEL H. SKIPPER, RESPONDENT

Fla. 2d DCA | 1987-11-06
No. 87-2248
RYDER, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and HALL, JJ., concur.
514 So. 2d 1158 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1987) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

General Hotel & Restaurant Supply Corporation sought a writ of certiorari to challenge a trial court order compelling discovery of documents it claimed were trade secrets. The appellate court found the trial court failed to properly analyze the trade secret claim and remanded for the court to determine whether the documents qualify as trade secrets and, if so, whether the respondent demonstrated reasonable necessity for their disclosure.


Holding

The trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by granting the motion to compel production without determining whether the documents constitute trade secrets or requiring respondent to show reasonable necessity for the materials. The case is remanded for the trial court to first determine if the documents are trade secrets, and if so, require respondent to demonstrate reasonable necessity and ensure adequate protective measures.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must determine whether documents constitute trade secrets before ordering their disclosure.

[2] If documents are found to be trade secrets, the requesting party must demonstrate their reasonable necessity before disclosure can be ordered.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“If the court found that the documents were not trade secrets, it appears from the order and the record that such determination was made without a review of the materials.”

Establishes that the trial court improperly granted the motion without reviewing the allegedly privileged materials to determine trade secret status.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

During litigation over breach of an oral contract and fraud, respondent requested production of certain documents. Petitioner objected on the grounds …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari from the trial court’s order granting discovery of certain materials for which petitioner claims trade secret privilege. We grant the petition.

During the course of a lawsuit based on breach of an oral contract and fraud, re spondent requested production of certain documents. Petitioner objected to the production request on two grounds. First, that the documents are trade secrets and thus privileged pursuant to section 90.506, Florida Statutes (1985) and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(b). Second, that the lawsuit is in essence an accounting action and proof of liability must be established prior to permitting discovery on damages. Respondent’s motion to compel production was granted by the trial court.

We find no departure from the essential requirements of law in the trial court’s determination that the lawsuit is for breach of oral contract rather than accounting. However, the order fails to indicate why the motion to compel production was granted and makes no determination as to whether or not the documents are trade secrets. If the court found that the documents were not trade secrets, it appears from the order and the record that such determination was made without a review of the materials. Becker Metals Corp. v. West Florida Scrap Metals, 407 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1981). If the court found the materials were trade secrets, it failed to require the respondent to show the reasonable necessity for such items. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cooey, 359 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).

Accordingly, we find that there has been a departure from the essential requirements of law that will result in a material injury that is irreparable on appeal and grant the petition. On remand, the trial court shall first determine whether the documents constitute trade secrets. If so, the respondent must then show the reasonable necessity for the documents. If the court grants disclosure, it must take adequate measures to protect the interests of the petitioner, the parties, and justice. § 90.506, Fla. Stat. RYDER, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and HALL, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Rare Coin-It, Inc. v. I.J.E., Inc., 625 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
    …t determine whether the requested production constitutes a trade secret; if so, the court must require the party seeking production to show reasonable necessity for the requested materials. General Hotel & Restaurant Supply Corp. v. Skipper, [*1279] 514 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Eastern Cement Corp. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 512 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cooey, 359 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). If production is then ordered, the court must set forth its fi…
  • Lovell Farms, Inc. v. Levy, 641 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
    …ause for either an in camera inspection of the documents which the employer claims would establish the existence of a trade secret, or an evidentiary hearing which may include expert testimony. See General Hotel & Restaurant Supply Corp. v. Skipper, 514 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). If the employer establishes the existence of a trade secret, the court must then determine whether the former employee used the specific trade secret at his new place of employment. § 542.33(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (Supp. 1990). Furthe…
  • McCRAY v. State, 517 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
    …atutory maximum for incarceration, Watts v. State, 328 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) and that [*771] offenders sentenced to incarceration must be given credit for time served on their offenses. § 921.161(2), Fla.Stat. (1985). See also Kaye v. State, 514 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). It was thus improper for the court to sentence McCray to a term of probation equal to the statutory maximum of incarceration without allowing him credit for all time served after his adjudication and sentence. Since McCray has a…

Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw