EUGENE MCCRAY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Eugene McCray appeals a six-year probation sentence imposed after his original prison sentence was remanded. The appellate court reverses, finding that the probation sentence plus time already served exceeded the statutory maximum and violated Florida law requiring credit for time served.
The court holds that a split sentence of incarceration and probation cannot exceed the statutory maximum combined, a probation term cannot exceed the statutory maximum for incarceration, and defendants must receive credit for all time served. The trial court erred by imposing probation equal to the statutory maximum without crediting time already served. McCray is discharged on the misdemeanor charge since he already served more than the maximum sentence for that offense.
[1] When a court imposes a split sentence, the combined period of incarceration and probation may not exceed the statutory maximum.
[2] A term of probation may not exceed the statutory maximum for incarceration.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the combined period of incarceration and probation may not exceed the statutory maximum”
Establishes the core legal principle governing split sentences
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcCray was convicted of possession of less than twenty grams of cannabis (misdemeanor) and possession of cocaine (felony). The trial court imposed sen…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Split Sentence cases and more on FLexlaw
THREADGILL, Judge.
Eugene McCray appeals the six-year sentence of probation imposed after we remanded his original departure sentence on which he served time in prison. We reverse.
McCray was convicted of possession of less than twenty grams of cannabis, a misdemeanor, and possession of cocaine, a felony. The guidelines indicated a non-state prison sanction, but the court departed and sentenced him to the statutory máximums, five years imprisonment with credit for time served on the felony, and one year imprisonment on the misdemeanor to be served concurrently. Finding the reasons for departure invalid, this court remanded for resentencing.
The record reflects that at the time of resentencing McCray had already spent well over a year in prison on the sentences. The trial court resentenced him to five years probation for the felony and a consecutive term of one year probation on the misdemeanor. McCray objects that the imposition of six years probation after he has served approximately sixteen months in prison on the sentence violates the statutory maximum. We agree.
We find that the effect of the probation order entered on resentencing is that Appellant serve a split sentence of incarceration (the time already served on these offenses) and probation. The law is quite clear that when the court imposes a split sentence, the combined period of incarceration and probation may not exceed the statutory maximum. State v. Holmes, 360 So. 2d 380 (Fla.1978); Coleman v. State, 496 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
It is also clear that a term of probation is not to exceed the statutory maximum for incarceration, Watts v. State, 328 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) and that offenders sentenced to incarceration must be given credit for time served on their offenses. § 921.161(2), Fla.Stat. (1985). See also Kaye v. State, 514 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). It was thus improper for the court to sentence McCray to a term of probation equal to the statutory maximum of incarceration without allowing him credit for all time served after his adjudication and sentence.
Since McCray has already served more than the maximum sentence for the misdemeanor charge, we direct that he be discharged on that offense.
Accordingly the sentence of probation is reversed and remanded to the trial court for resentencing in accord with this decision.
Reversed and remanded.
FRANK, A.C.J., and HALL, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Baldwin v. State, 558 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…t for 1 year. The term of probation cannot exceed the maximum penalty provided by law, Williams v. State, 402 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), nor may the total penalty of probation and incarceration exceed the statutory maximum. See McCray v. State, 517 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Davis v. State, 384 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Accordingly, this cause is remanded with instructions to allow credit for time served against the term of probation. Additionally, the appellant alleges and the State does not d…
-
Delguidice v. State, 554 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)…Appellant was sentenced as an habitual offender to ten years imprisonment to be followed by two years probation. The statutory maximum, as conceded by the state, was ten years and we therefore strike the added probationary period. McCray v. State, 517 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The prior conviction relied upon to support the finding of habitual offender status was on appeal to this court, thus not final, at the time of sentencing. Reliance on it therefore constitutes reversible error. See State v. Villa…
-
Oliver v. State, 556 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…which appellant is entitled. On remand from an invalid departure sentence, appellant must have his credit for all time served and gain time on the original invalid sentence applied against his new jail and probationary sentence. See McCray v. State, 517 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); [*1248] see also State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925 (Fla.1989). FRANK, A.C.J., and HALL and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Holmes, 360 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1978)
- Watts v. State, 328 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Coleman v. State, 496 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Maurice L. Kaye, D.O. v. State, 514 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Gen. Hotel & Rest. Supply Corp. v. Skipper, 514 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)