PHYLLIS INGAGLIO AND CHERYL TILLBERG, APPELLANTS,
v.
KRAEER FUNERAL HOME, INC., APPELLEE
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Phyllis Ingaglio and Cheryl Tillberg appealed a summary judgment granted to Kraeer Funeral Home in their emotional distress and breach of contract claims arising from the improper preparation of their deceased relative's remains. The court reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the funeral home's conduct constituted tortious interference with dead bodies and breach of contract.
The court reversed summary judgment on both counts. For Count II (breach of contract), the trial court erred in dismissing this cause of action. For Count I (emotional distress/tortious interference with dead bodies), genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the funeral home's conduct exhibited malice or an entire want of care or great indifference from which a jury could imply malice.
[1] A cause of action for tortious interference with dead bodies exists under Florida law.
[2] Damages for pain, suffering, and mental anguish in Florida are not recoverable absent physical impact or injury, unless the conduct was willful, wanton, or malicious.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under Florida law, damages for pain, suffering, and mental anguish cannot be recovered absent some impact or physical injury unless willful, wanton, or malicious behavior is shown.”
Establishes the threshold requirement for recovering emotional distress damages in Florida—plaintiff must show either physical injury or malicious, willful, or wanton conduct
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants Ingaglio and Tillberg arranged with Kraeer Funeral Home to have their deceased relative's remains removed from his residence and prepared f…
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GUNTHER, Judge.
Plaintiffs/appellants appeal the summary final judgment and the order denying the plaintiffs’ motion for rehearing and clarification of summary judgment. We reverse.
Plaintiffs claim damages for emotional distress caused by viewing the deceased’s remains in the alleged “horrible condition” created by Funeral Home (Count I), and breach of contract (Count II).
Appellants, Phyllis Ingaglio and Cheryl Tillberg (plaintiffs), were respectively the spouse and daughter of the deceased Richard P. Ingaglio. Plaintiffs made arrangements with appellee, Kraeer Funeral Home (Funeral Home), to have the deceased’s remains removed from the residence and prepared to be shipped to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for viewing and burial.
Plaintiffs first viewed the deceased’s remains in Philadelphia. According to plaintiffs, deceased’s remains were in a horrifying condition. The clothing was not altered to fit. The cosmetics were applied in unnatural colors. The deceased’s hair and moustache were colored orange. One eye bulged out and was improperly closed. Deceased’s mouth was left open. Also, depositions of employees of the Pennsylvania Burial Company contained testimony that the deceased’s remains had not been properly prepared and had decomposed because of inadequate embalming by Funeral Home.
Funeral Home employees claimed that the deceased’s remains were prepared properly and denied any wrongdoing. Funeral Home was granted a summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs could not recover under Florida law for mental and emotional distress alone. We reverse.
Appellee acknowledges that the trial court erred in dismissing Count II, the breach of contract action. Accordingly, we reverse summary judgment as to Count II.
As to Count I, we disagree that Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 468 So. 2d 903 (Fla.1985) and Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla.1985) extinguished the cause of action for tortious interference with dead bodies. Plaintiffs pleaded a cause of action for tortious interference with dead bodies. Under Florida law, damages for pain, suffering, and mental anguish cannot be recovered absent some impact or physical injury unless willful, wanton, or malicious behavior is shown. Sherer v. Rubin Memorial Chapel, Ltd., 452 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Malicious behavior can be implied or imputed from an entire want of care or great indifference to others. Sherer at 575.
The issue in the instant case is whether the record reveals sufficient facts from which a jury could imply or impute malice to Funeral Home. We conclude the record does contain genuine issues of material fact as to whether Funeral Home’s conduct exceeded all bounds reasonably tolerated by society from which the jury could imply malice for the entire want of care or great indifference by Funeral Home. Accordingly we reverse summary judgment as to Count I.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
GLICKSTEIN and DELL, JJ., concur.
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Gonzalez v. Metro. Dade Cnty. Pub. Health Tr., 626 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…claimant has suffered no physical impact. E.g., Baker v. Florida Nat’l Bank, 559 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 570 So. 2d 1303 (Fla.1990); Kirker v. Orange County, 519 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Ingaglio v. Kraeer Funeral Home, Inc., 515 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Smith v. Telophase Nat’l Cremation Soc’y, Inc., 471 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Ponton v. Scarfone, 468 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied 478 So. 2d 54 (Fla.1985); Sherer v. Rubin Mem. Chapel, Ltd., 452 So. 2d 574 (Fla.…
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Williams v. Boyd-Panciera Fam. Funeral Care, Inc. (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)…th Tr., 651 So. 2d 673, 675 (Fla. 1995); Kendron v. SCI Funeral Servs. of Fla., LLC, 230 So. 3d 636, 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017); Brady v. SCI Funeral Servs. of Fla., Inc., 948 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Ingaglio v. Kraeer Funeral Home, Inc., 515 So. 2d 428, 429 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Whether conduct is sufficiently willful or wanton or outrageous is typically a question of law. See Matsumoto v. Am. Burial & Cremation Servs., Inc., 949 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). We conclude that the trial co…
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Williams v. Boyd-Panciera Fam. Funeral Care, Inc. (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)…h Tr., 651 So. 2d 673, 675 (Fla. 1995); Kendron v. SCI Funeral Servs. of Fla., LLC, 230 So. 3d 636, 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017); Brady v. SCI Funeral Servs. of Fla., Inc., 948 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Ingaglio v. Kraeer Funeral Home, Inc., 515 So. 2d 428, 429 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Whether conduct is sufficiently willful or wanton or outrageous is typically a question of law. See Matsumoto v. Am. Burial & Cremation Servs., Inc., 949 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). We conclude that the trial co…
Authorities Cited
- Walton D. Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985)
- Brown v. Cadillac Motor CAR Division, 468 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1985)
- Sherer v. Rubin Mem'l Chapel, Ltd., 452 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)