JAMES MICHAEL LONGO, APPELLANT,
v.
ROSE LONGO, N/K/A ROSE KREBS, APPELLEE
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James Longo appeals from a trial court order denying his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The appellate court dismisses the appeal as untimely because Longo failed to file his notice of appeal within 30 days of the order's rendition, and a motion for rehearing does not toll that deadline for interlocutory orders.
The appeal is dismissed as untimely. Although nonfinal orders denying motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction are generally appealable, the notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the order's rendition. A motion for rehearing, which is only authorized for final orders and judgments, does not toll the 30-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal from an interlocutory order.
[1] A nonfinal order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction is generally appealable.
[2] A notice of appeal for an interlocutory order must be filed within 30 days from the date of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Generally, a nonfinal order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person is appealable. Fla.R. App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)©; Fibreboard Corp. v. Ward, 455 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). However, in order to invoke the right of appellate review on an interlocutory basis, the party seeking review must file a notice of appeal within 30 days from the date of the rendition of the order to be reviewed.”
Establishes the general appealability of interlocutory orders denying motions to dismiss but requires strict compliance with the 30-day filing deadline.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court issued an order denying Longo's motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction on April 27, 1987. Longo filed a motion for reh…
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NIMMONS, Judge.
Longo appeals from a nonfinal order denying his motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction. Sua sponte, we dismiss the appeal because our review of the appendix filed with appellant’s brief reveals that we are without jurisdiction.
The order denying appellant’s motion to dismiss was rendered April 27, 1987. Thereafter, appellant filed a motion for rehearing. The trial court denied the motion for rehearing on May 22. Appellant filed his notice of appeal on June 17, 1987.
Generally, a nonfinal order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person is appealable. Fla.R. App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)©; Fibreboard Corp. v. Ward, 455 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). However, in order to invoke the right of appellate review on an interlocutory basis, the party seeking review must file a notice of appeal within 30 days from the date of the rendition of the order to be reviewed. Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(b).
The appeal in the present case is untimely because, as indicated above, the notice of appeal was not filed until 51 days after the rendition of the subject order. Although appellant’s motion for rehearing was filed within 30 days from rendition of the subject order, such motion did not toll the time for filing the notice of appeal. Fla.R.App.P. 9.020(g) provides:
(g) Rendition * * * Where there has been filed in the lower tribunal an authorized and timely motion for new trial or rehearing, to alter or amend, for judgment in accordance with prior motion for directed verdict, notwithstanding verdict, in arrest of judgment, or a challenge to the verdict, the order shall not be deemed rendered until disposition thereof. (e.s.)
Motions for rehearing are governed by Fla. R.Civ.P. 1.530 which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Jury and Non-Jury Actions. A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or a part of the issues. On a motion for a rehearing of matters heard without a jury, including summary judgments, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony and enter a new judgment.
(b) Time for Motion. A motion for new trial for rehearing shall be served not later than 10 days after the return of the verdict in a jury action or the date of filing of the judgment in a non-jury action. A timely motion may be amended to state new grounds in the discretion of the court at any time before the motion is determined, (e.s.)
Rule 1.530 has consistently been construed to authorize rehearings only on orders and judgments which are final in nature. Potucek v. Smeja, 419 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Austin Carpet Ser vice, Inc., 382 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Motions for rehearing directed to interlocutory orders are not authorized under the rules and therefore do not toll the time for the filing of notice of appeal. Wagner v. Bieley, Wagner & Associates, Inc., 263 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1972); Hubert v. Division of Administration, State Department of Transportation, 425 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Potucek v. Smeja, 419 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Smith v. Weede, 433 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
It should be noted that dismissal of this appeal does not bar future appellate review of the issue sought to be raised herein. However, such review must await the normal avenue of appeal after final disposition of the case in the trial court. See Wagner v. Bieley, Wagner & Associates, Inc., 263 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1972); Fibreboard Corp. v. Ward, 455 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
DISMISSED.
MILLS and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
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Griffis v. State, 593 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…850 which expressly provides for rehearing motions. In the absence of clear authorization for a motion for rehearing, the motion did not postpone [*309] rendition of the order. See In the Interest of E.P., 544 So. 2d 1000 (Fla.1989); Longo v. Longo, 515 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). It therefore follows that the notice of appeal filed on June 18, 1991, was untimely as to the order of February 27, and this court lacks jurisdiction of this cause. Accordingly, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. WIGG…
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Deal v. Deal, 783 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…agner, 263 So. 2d at 3 (quoting Home News Publ’g Co. v. U-M Publ’g, Inc., 246 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)). Rule 1.530 has been consistently construed to authorize rehearings only of orders and judgments which are final in nature. Longo v. Longo, 515 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Gordon v. Barley, 383 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Austin Carpet Serv., Inc., 382 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); see also Potucek v. Smeja, 419 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). We conclude, th…
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McLEVY v. Charlynne A. McLEVY, 791 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…PER CURIAM. DISMISSED. See Longo v. Longo, 515 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Potucek v. Smeja, 419 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Fla. R.App. P. 9.130(a)(5). ERVIN, BOOTH and ALLEN, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wagner v. Bieley, 263 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972)
- Potucek v. Smeja, 419 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Smith v. Weede, 433 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Hubert v. Division OF Administration, 425 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Fibreboard Corp. v. Ward, 455 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Fla. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Austin Carpet Serv., Inc., 382 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)