LUIS ALBERTO FONTE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Luis Alberto Fonte appealed the denial of his petition for writ of prohibition challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to discharge two driving under the influence charges on speedy trial grounds. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Fonte waived his statutory speedy trial rights by requesting a continuance to obtain counsel, and that this did not violate his constitutional right to counsel.
The court held that a defense continuance waives speedy trial time provisions without requiring an inquiry into fault, and that requiring a defendant to choose between waiving speedy trial rights and obtaining counsel does not violate constitutional rights.
[1] A defendant's request for a continuance waives the speedy trial period, regardless of fault.
[2] The speedy trial rule is a procedural device, not a constitutional right.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it is axiomatic that a defense postponement waives speedy trial time provisions without requiring an inquiry into fault”
Establishes the bright-line rule that defense continuances automatically waive speedy trial rights regardless of circumstances or fault.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFonte was arrested and arraigned twice on separate DUI charges. At the first arraignment, the trial court made no inquiry into his indigency or abilit…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Waiver Of Speedy Trial cases and more on FLexlaw
JORGENSON, Judge.
We affirm the order of the circuit court denying Fonte’s petition for writ of prohibition. Fonte had been arrested and arraigned on two occasions on two separate charges of driving under the influence. At the first arraignment, the trial court made no inquiry as to Fonte’s indigency or ability to retain counsel. At the second arraignment, the trial court stated, “If you want to hire a lawyer, do so, it’s up to you.”
Fonte’s trial on both charges was set for June 11, 1986, a date within the applicable statutory speedy trial period.1 On that date, the state for the first time certified that Fonte could face incarceration if convicted. Fonte stated that he was not ready for trial and desired a continuance so that he could seek counsel. The trial court granted Fonte’s request for a continuance. On June 25, 1986, a public defender was appointed.
On August 21,1986, Fonte filed a motion to discharge both cases on the ground that the speedy trial periods had expired. The trial court denied the motion and found that Fonte had waived the speedy trial period by requesting a continuance. Fonte pled nolo contendere with a reservation of right to appeal the denial of his motion to discharge. Fonte then petitioned the circuit court acting in its appellate capacity for a writ of prohibition to restrain the trial court from further exercising any jurisdiction in these cases. The circuit court denied Fonte’s petition upon a holding that the defense continuance rendered the speedy trial period inapplicable and that Fonte’s constitutional right to counsel was not infringed by the defense continuance.
We agree with the circuit court that, on these facts, Fonte waived his right to speedy trial. While this situation could have been avoided if the state had been more punctilious in certifying jail time prior to trial, it is axiomatic that a defense postponement waives speedy trial time provisions without requiring an inquiry into fault. Blackstock v. Newman, 461 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 467 So. 2d 999 (Fla.1985); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(3). “The speedy trial rule is a procedural device only and not a constitutional right.” Blackstock, 461 So. 2d at 1022. We reject Fonte’s claim that he was placed in the untenable position of choosing between his constitutional right to a speedy trial2 and his constitutional right to counsel. See Franklin v. State, 473 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st DCA) (no constitutional violation where de fendant was required to choose between waiver of speedy trial rights and competency evaluation), modified on other grounds, 473 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st DCA), appeal dismissed, Owens v. State, 478 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1985). But cf. State ex rel. Johnson v. Edwards, 233 So. 2d 393 (Fla.1970) (continuance could not be deemed waiver of defendant’s right to speedy trial where defendant moved for change of venue due to prejudicial pretrial publicity and defendant had made three demands for trial).
For the foregoing reason, we affirm the order denying Fonte’s petition for writ of prohibition.
Affirmed.
. The speedy trial rule is set forth in Fla.R.Crim. P. 3.191 as follows:
Rule 3.191. Speedy Trial
(a)(1). Speedy Trial Without Demand. Except as otherwise provided by this Rule, and subject to the limitations imposed under (b)(1) and (b)(2), every person charged with a crime by indictment or information shall be brought to trial within 90 days if the crime charged be a misdemeanor, or within 175 days if the crime charged is a felony....
. While there exists both a statutory and a constitutional right to a speedy trial, the latter right is not implicated in Fonte’s case. The constitutional speedy trial period is measured by tests of reasonableness and prejudice, not specific numbers of days. Blackstock v. Newman, 461 So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 467 So. 2d 999 (Fla.1985).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Naveira, 873 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2004)…dimension.” State v. Bivona, 496 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla.1986). As opposed to the right provided in the rule, “[t]he constitutional speedy trial period is measured by tests of reasonableness and prejudice, not specific numbers of days.” Fonte v. State, 515 So. 2d 1036, 1038 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). As the court found in Blackstock v. Newman, 461 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), discussing a related issue: By this decision, we do not force appellant to choose between two sixth amendment rights, the right to a spee…
-
Albert Banks v. State, 691 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…nal procedure rule 3.191(a). State v. Frazee, 617 So. 2d 350, 351 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); J.B. v. Korda, 436 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Colby v. [*492] McNeill, 695 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 604 So. 2d 487 (Fla.1992); Fonte v. State, 515 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), rev. denied, 525 So. 2d 878 (Fla.1988); Blackstock v. Newman, 461 So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 3rd DCA), rev. denied, 467 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1985); State v. Fraser, 426 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 436 So. 2d 98 (Fla.1983…
-
State v. Born-Suniaga, 219 So. 3d 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…imension.” State v. Bivona, 496 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1986). As opposed to the right provided in the rule, “[t]he constitutional speedy trial period is measured by tests of reasonableness and prejudice, not specific numbers of days.” Fonte v. State, 515 So. 2d 1036, 1038 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Id. at 308. Because Naveira was demanding the rule-based speedy trial, the procedural aspects of the rule, including the recapture period, circumscribed his exercise of his right, which he could waive by requestirig a…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State of Fla. ex rel. James A. Johnson v. Honorable Warren H. Edwards, 233 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1970)
- Blackstock v. The Honorable Robert H. Newman, 461 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Martin v. Hoover, 473 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)