LEROY SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Leroy Smith appealed his sexual battery conviction, challenging the trial court's denial of a defense challenge for cause against a prospective juror. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the juror's statements demonstrated bias and inability to be impartial, requiring her removal for cause.
Yes. The trial court committed reversible error in denying the defense challenge for cause against Ms. Alfonso. Her statements established a reasonable doubt concerning her ability to render an impartial verdict, and she should have been excused for cause. This error was harmful because the defendant was forced to waste a peremptory challenge on her, exhausting all peremptory challenges and being denied an additional challenge to which he was entitled.
[1] A prospective juror who expresses an inability to set aside strong personal views about a crime, despite later stating they might be able to, should be excused for cause.
[2] A defendant is harmed by the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause if they are forced to use a peremptory challenge on that juror, exhaust all peremptory challenges,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Plainly, a reasonable doubt was established on this record concerning Ms. Alfonso's ability to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence, and the said juror should have been excused for cause.”
Establishes the legal standard for removing a juror for cause based on demonstrated bias
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring voir dire in a sexual battery trial, prospective juror Ms. Alfonso stated she would 'nail them to the max' if her fifteen-year-old daughter wer…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the defendant Leroy Smith from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered against him for sexual battery based on an adverse jury verdict. We reverse and remand for a new trial based on the following briefly stated legal analysis.
First, the trial court committed reversible error in denying a defense challenge for cause made at trial against a prospective juror, Ms. Alfonso. This juror, during voir dire of the jury, stated that as the mother of a fifteen-year-old daughter,
“If she will be in a situation like that, I will nail them to the max. I won’t want to hear any side, no story. Rape is something violent. The man is stronger than a woman....”
(T. 116). When asked if she could put her feelings aside, she responded, “I don’t think so. There’s no way_ I think it is one of the worst crimes.” (T. 117). She also stated that “Yes, definitely,” (T. 119) she would have a problem listening to testimony about a rape. She finally said, in response to questions by the court and the prosecuting attorney, the following:
“THE COURT: You're being honest. That’s what we’re looking for. Is there anybody in the first row that feels that way?
Ms. Alfonso, do you feel you can put any strong views—
MS. ALFONSO: Maybe not a strong one. I think it is one of the worst crimes.
MR. BAGLEY: It may be one of the worst crimes, but can you put aside that particular view for the purpose of this trial and listen to the facts in this case and apply the law as his Honor may instruct you as to what the law is and hold the State to that burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed? Can you go in the jury room at the end of the trial and come up to a decision and reach this decision in this case?
MS. ALFONSO: I think I could.”
(T. 117-18) (emphasis added). Plainly, a reasonable doubt was established on this record concerning Ms. Alfonso’s ability to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence, and the said juror should have been excused for cause. See Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 23-24 (Fla.1959); Robinson v. State, 506 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Anriemme v. State, 501 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), rev. denied, 506 So. 2d 1043 (Fla.1987). Moreover, the defendant was clearly harmed by this error as (1) he was forced to exercise an unnecessary peremptory challenge on Ms. Alfonso, (2) he thereafter exhausted all of his allotted peremptory challenges, and (3) he was denied an additional peremptory challenge, to which he was clearly entitled, having been improperly forced to waste one of his peremptory challenges on Ms. Alfonso. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 477 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla.1985); Jefferson v. State, 489 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 494 So. 2d 1153 (Fla.1986); see also Viera v. State, 490 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Leon v. State, 396 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 407 So. 2d 1106 (Fla.1981).
Second, we find it unnecessary to determine whether the defendant properly preserved for appellate review the admissibility of the testimony of Detective Fabian concerning a telephone conversation he had with the defendant because a new trial is required, in any event, based on the above reversible error in denying the defense challenge for cause against the juror Ms. Alfonso. Suffice it say, however, that the above testimony of Detective Fabian was clearly inadmissible — indeed, the state makes no effort to defend its admissibility — and therefore the trial court should not admit same upon the new trial which we are ordering in this cause. See Bates v. State, 422 So. 2d 1033, 1034 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Sias v. State, 416 So. 2d 1213, 1217 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 424 So. 2d 763 (Fla.1982); Albright v. State, 378 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Andrews v. State, 172 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965).
The final judgment of conviction and sentence under review is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
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Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Price v. State, 538 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…er? We have acknowledged that it is error for a court to force a party to exhaust his peremptory challenges on persons who should be excused for cause since it has the effect of abridging the right to exercise peremptory challenges. Smith v. State, 516 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); see Leon v. State, 396 So. 2d at 205, citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965). See also Jefferson, 489 So. 2d at 212; Anderson v. State, 463 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied, 475 So.…
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Davis v. State, 656 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…ng the juror for cause. In Coney, the juror’s responses during voir dire demonstrated a preconceived belief that “a victim in a case such as this would only tell the truth.” See also White v. State, 579 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Smith v. State, 516 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Where a juror demonstrates a strong bias for or against the credibility of one side or another, which he or she is unsure can be put aside, a challenge for cause should be granted. The underlying common principle is that “a juror…
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Salazar v. State, 564 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…ial court erred in failing to excuse Ms. Evans for cause where a reasonable doubt existed as to her ability to be impartial. See Imbimbo v. State, 555 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Price v. State, 538 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Smith v. State, 516 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). This error harmed the defendant since (1) he was forced to exercise a peremptory challenge against Ms. Evans when she should have been excused for cause; (2) he exhausted all of his allotted peremptory challenges; and (3) he wa…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959)
- Hill v. State, 477 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1985)
- Leon v. State, 396 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Sias v. State, 416 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Andrews v. State, 172 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- Jefferson v. State, 489 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Auriemme v. State, 501 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Bates v. State, 422 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Elwood Lamar Albright v. State, 378 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Easau Robinson v. State, 506 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)