WILLIE LEE LAWYER, PETITIONER,
v.
FRED C. CRAWFORD, AS DIRECTOR OF THE DADE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION AND THE HONORABLE ARTHUR I. SNYDER, AS JUDGE OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENTS

Fla. 3d DCA | 1987-11-17
No. 87-2704
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HENDRY and HUBBART, JJ.
517 So. 2d 36 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1987)

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Synopsis

Willie Lee Lawyer challenged his denial of pre-trial release in an armed robbery case where the trial judge applied a blanket policy refusing bond in all armed robbery cases regardless of individual circumstances. The Florida appellate court held that judges must exercise individualized discretion in bail decisions and granted mandamus relief requiring reconsideration of Lawyer's bond application on its merits.


Holding

No. Trial courts are required to exercise discretion in bail decisions by considering the entire factual background of each case, and cannot apply categorical blanket policies that foreclose individualized consideration of a defendant's amenability to bond.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must exercise its discretion regarding pre-trial release in life felony cases by considering the entire factual background.

[2] A blanket policy of denying pre-trial release in all armed robbery cases, regardless of individual circumstances, is impermissible.

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Key Quotes

“the trial court is required in any life felony case to exercise its discretion as to whether bail should or should not be allowed upon consideration of the entire factual background”

Establishes the controlling legal standard from State v. Arthur requiring individualized discretionary analysis in bail decisions

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Facts & Procedural History

Lawyer was charged with armed robbery in a case where the proof was evident and the presumption great. At a bond hearing, the trial judge refused to c…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

The trial judge declined to consider testimony relating to the defendant Lawyer’s amenability to bond, because of an acknowledged blanket policy that he would not grant pre-trial release, regardless of the defendant’s circumstances, in any armed robbery case in which, as here, the proof is evident and the presumption great.1 This was clearly impermissible. Under State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717, 719 (Fla.1980), the trial court is required in any life felony case to exercise its discretion as to whether bail should or should not be allowed upon consideration of the entire factual background. See Glosson v. Solomon, 490 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (improper to deny pre-probation hearing release in every case as matter of policy); see also Chambers v. State, 491 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (same).

Accordingly, the instant petition for ha-beas corpus is treated as one for mandamus. We grant the writ and direct the trial court forthwith to hear, consider and determine the petitioner’s application for pre-trial release on its merits.

Mandamus granted.2

. The following appears in the transcript of the ‘bond hearing”: THE COURT: I don t care what their ties to the community are. If you tell me it’s really a strong-arm robbery, then I would like to hear what the Arthur Hearing has to say.

But since you are waiving that, that’s your problem or business, whatever you want to call it.

If the State is willing to stipulate to a bond, I have no problem with that. They have voiced their objection to it.

I have no reason to give a bond. The ties to the community mean absolutely nothing. They do not affect the victim being robbed at gunpoint.

If you tell me there is some question as to that, then it’s a different ball game.

MR. SINGER: If I’m reading you correctly, then you are saying that an armed robbery situation where the proof is evident, the presumption great, you would not set a bond regardless of any other circumstance, regarding ties to the community or showing that he would appear for trial?

Is that correct?

THE COURT: If that’s what you want me to say, I’ll say it exactly the way you say it, with an exclamation point and say not only that, but that I have never done it in the past and I will never do it in the future, okay?

You tell me that the proof is evident and the presumption great, the law gives me the discretion, I can’t consider it discretionary at all.

As far as I’m concerned, my discretion has been well thought out in the past, in the future and armed robbers are not entitled to bond.

It's my discretionary desire that they stay in jail because I know as a matter of fact that if armed robbers are convicted, there is a minimum mandatory of three years in the State Penitentiary.

So, their being in jail for a little while doesn’t affect me giving up their rights in any way whatsoever. . Rehearing is dispensed with.


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