ABDOLHOSSAIN HAGHAYEGH AND GHOLAMOSSAIN HAGHAYEGH, APPELLANTS,
v.
CLIFFORD P. CLARK, JR., CLARK AND DICK, P.A. AND CLARK, DICK AND LANCASTER, P.A., APPELLEES
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Appellants sued their attorneys for legal malpractice after the attorneys failed to timely record a notice to exercise an option on land, causing the option to lapse. The trial court dismissed the malpractice suit as time-barred under Florida's two-year statute of limitations, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the statute of limitations did not commence until the damages were ascertained, which occurred only upon final appellate determination that the option had expired.
The malpractice action was not time-barred. The statute of limitations for legal malpractice does not commence to run until the amount of damages is ascertained. In circumstances involving the lapse of legal rights, the statute does not begin to run until there is a final determination by an appellate court that the right has been lost.
[1] The statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim does not commence to run until the amount of damages is ascertained.
[2] In legal malpractice actions arising from the failure to timely exercise an option, the statute of limitations does not commence to run until a final appellate determinat…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the amount of damages, if any, are ascertained”
Establishes the fundamental principle governing when the statute of limitations period begins in malpractice cases.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants contracted to purchase land with an option to do so. The appellees, their attorneys, failed to record the notice of intention to exercise t…
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BARKDULL, Judge.
The appellants sued the appellees for legal malpractice for failing to record in due time a notice of intention to exercise an option on land that the appellants had contracted to purchase. The notice was recorded two days late and in a previous suit1 the court confirmed that by the failure to timely file the notice of intention, the option lapsed. This decision was affirmed by this court on May 21, 1985. The time for filing the notice of intention to exercise expired on September 4,1979. The instant action was commenced on June 13, 1984 and the trial court ruled that it was time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations. § 95.11(4)(a), Fla.Stat. (1985).
We reverse and find that the trial court erred in ruling that the statute of limitations had expired. This court has previously held that the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the amount of damages, if any, are ascertained. Airport Sign Corp. v. Dade County, 400 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Birnholz v. Blake, 399 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). It has also held that in circumstances such as those disclosed by this record, until there was a final determination by the appellate court that the appellant’s option had expired the statute had not commenced to run. See Diaz v. Piquette, 496 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Chapman By and Through Chapman v. Garcia, 463 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
Therefore for the reasons stated, the summary judgment for the defendants be and the same is hereby reversed and the matter is returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
. During the pendency of this matter (which attempted to excuse the delay in the filing of the notice of intention and therefore permit the option to be exercised) the parties entered into an agreement in which the clients agreed not to institute a malpractice action until the matter of the validity of the option was resolved. In exchange, the attorneys agreed to waive the defense of statute of limitations. It was contended in the trial court in the present action, that because the clients instituted the instant action prior to the final appellate review of the prior action, that this voided the agreement and permitted the attorneys to plead the statute of limitations. This argument is without merit as we find the period proscribed by the statute of limitations had never expired and therefore there was no consideration in the first instance for the agreement.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Peat v. Lane, 565 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1990)…ying legal proceeding has been completed on appellate review because, until that time, one cannot determine if there was any actionable error by the attorney. See Zakak v. Broida & Napier, P.A., 545 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Haghayegh v. Clark, 520 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Diaz v. Piquette, 496 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied, 506 So. 2d 1042 (Fla.1987); Richards Enters., Inc. v. Swofford, 495 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), cause dismissed, 515 So. 2d 231 (Fla.1987); Adams v. Sommers…
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Segall v. Segall, 632 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…So. 2d 748, 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (in cases such as Peat, Marwick that involve “litigational malpractice,” [*78] or errors committed in course of litigation, existence of redressable harm not determined until appeal complete); Haghayegh v. Clark, 520 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (statute of limitations for attorney malpractice begins to run when amount of damages ascertained; where trial court decision is appealed, claim for malpractice arises upon af-firmance). Where a party’s loss results from judicial…
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Sawyer v. Earle, 541 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)…ound that Diaz concerned an attorney who had lost a case at trial. The court reaffirmed its holding in Diaz that in such an instance there could be no claim until the trial loss was made final on appeal. Breakers at 986. See also Haghayegh v. Clark, 520 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (statute of limitations does not begin to run until there is a final determination of the case in which the alleged malpractice occurs). In this case, Sawyer’s underlying cause of action is predicated upon Earle’s allegedly negli…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Stanford Birnholz v. Blake, 399 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Chapman v. Jorge Garcia, M.D., 463 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Eligio Barrios & Goldstone Co., N.V. v. Duran, 496 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Bismark Diaz & Bis D. Corp. v. Piquette, 496 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Airport Sign Corp. v. Dade Cnty. & Richard Judy, 400 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)