BISMARK DIAZ AND BIS D. CORP., APPELLANTS,
v.
WILLIAM J. PIQUETTE, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1986-10-28
No. 86-51
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUB-BART and JORGENSON, JJ.
496 So. 2d 239 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1986) Caution
Cited by 29 cases

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Synopsis

In a legal malpractice case, the court reversed a summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, holding that the limitations period for a malpractice claim arising from loss at trial does not begin to run until the adverse judgment is affirmed on appeal, not from the initial trial loss.


Holding

The limitations period for a malpractice claim based on loss at trial does not commence until the adverse judgment is affirmed on appeal, making the appellants' action timely commenced and the summary judgment improper.


Headnotes

[1] The statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim arising from the loss of a case at trial does not begin to run until an adverse judgment is affirmed on appeal.

[2] The accrual of a cause of action for legal malpractice is contingent upon the establishment of redressable harm.

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Key Quotes

“the period for commencing an action on appellants' claim for alleged legal malpractice resulting in the loss of their case at trial did not begin to run until the adverse judgment was affirmed on appeal”

States the core holding regarding when the statute of limitations period commences for legal malpractice claims.

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellants Bismark Diaz and Bis D. Corp. brought a legal malpractice claim against attorney William J. Piquette, alleging he caused them to lose their…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

We reverse the summary judgment entered below on limitations grounds upon the determination that the period for commencing an action on appellants' claim for alleged legal malpractice resulting in the loss of their case at trial did not begin to run until the adverse judgment was affirmed on appeal.1 In so ruling, we follow the square recent holding in Richards Enterprises v. Swafford, 495 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); strong indications in other Florida decisions that this is the rule, see Chapman v. Garcia, 463 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Birnholz v. Blake, 399 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); and the better reasoned authority in other jurisdictions. Bowman v. Abramson, 545 F.Supp. 227 (E.D.Pa.1982); Amfac Distribution Corp. v. Miller, 138 Ariz. 152, 673 P. 2d 792 (1983); see also Northwestern Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Osborne, 573 F.Supp. 1045 (E.D.Ky.1983).

Most important, since it is plain that no claim would even have existed if the temporary results of the attorney’s conduct had been reversed on appeal, this decision is in accordance with the salutary concomitant principles that premature, possibly useless, litigation should be discouraged and that no cause of action should therefore be deemed to have accrued until the existence of redressable harm has been established. Birnholz v. Blake, 399 So. 2d 375; Moore v. Morris, 429 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting), rev’d, 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla.1985).

Since, under this holding, the instant action was timely commenced, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further consistent proceedings.

. See Diaz v. Rodriguez. 384 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (29 total)

  • Peat v. Lane, 565 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1990)
    …Marwick might have been negligent; however, if the tax court did not uphold the deficiency, the Lanes would not have a cause of action against Peat Marwick for accounting malpractice. 540 So. 2d at 924 (citations omitted) (quoting Diaz v. Piquette, 496 So. 2d 239, 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied, 506 So. 2d 1042 (Fla.1987)). The question to be resolved is whether the commencement of the limitations period in an accounting malpractice action relating to income tax preparation occurs with the receipt of…
    1 / 2
  • Bierman v. Miller, 639 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
    …deral suit are decided, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law. No cause of action for legal malpractice “should be deemed to have accrued until the existence of redressa-ble harm has been established.” Diaz v. Piquette, 496 So. 2d 239, 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev. denied, 506 So. 2d 1042 (Fla.1987). See also Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So. 2d 1323, 1325 (Fla.1990) (cause of action for legal malpractice does not accrue until actionable error by attorney determined),…
  • …CA 1981). It has also held that in circumstances such as those disclosed by this record, until there was a final determination by the appellate court that the appellant’s option had expired the statute had not commenced to run. See Diaz v. Piquette, 496 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Chapman By and Through Chapman v. Garcia, 463 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Therefore for the reasons stated, the summary judgment for the defendants be and the same is hereby reversed and the matter is returned to the trial c…

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