LEONARD A. DUNN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse First Degree Felony cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED on the authority of Key v. State, 452 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 459 So. 2d 1041 (Fla.1984); Scott v. State, 465 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
SHARP, C.J. and COBB and COWART, JJ., concur.
COWART, Judge.
Following our affirmance of January 21, 1988, appellant moved for rehearing stating that in affirming his sentence of 50 years imprisonment this court overlooked section 775.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides that a person convicted of a life felony after October 1, 1983, may be punished by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years and that his sentence was, therefore, illegal.
Appellant was not convicted of a “life felony” punishable under section 775.-082(3)(a), Florida Statutes. Appellant was convicted of second degree murder (§ 782.-04(2), Fla.Stat.) which constitutes a “felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life.” This special category is not a “life felony” punishable under section 775.-082(3)(a), Florida Statutes, but is a special subcategory of a felony of the first degree punishable when specially provided by statute under the second portion of section 775.082(3)(b), Florida Statutes, by “imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.” While this special category of “felony of the first degree punishable by life” is not listed in the classification of felonies under section 775.081(1), Florida Statutes1 nevertheless, it exists and is involved in this case and is not subject to the 40 year cap on “life felonies” contained in section 775.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes. Therefore, appellant’s sentence is not an illegal sentence. The Motion for Rehearing is
DENIED.
SHARP, C.J., and COBB, J., concur. . This special category is recognized on the sentencing guidelines scoresheet shown as Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.988 as "1st punishable by life.”
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (15 total)
-
Kip Sterling v. State, 584 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…y provided for by statute. Armed robbery is one such specially designated offense. Section 812.-13(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1989). By virtue of a statutory anomaly, no comparable limitation is placed on the term of years that may be imposed. Dunn v. State, 522 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). The robbery sentences as they presently exist are therefore legal. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for partial resentencing in accordance with this opinion. LEHAN, A.C.J., and THREADGILL and ALTENBERND, JJ., c…
-
Greenhalgh v. State, 582 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…ife sentence, that court is limited to a sentence no harsher than forty years. Blackshear v. State, 480 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Ironically, no such limitation is posed with respect to first degree felonies punishable by life. Dunn v. State, 522 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). It has been held elsewhere that 300 years is less than “life.” Powlowski v. State, 467 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). A fortiori, Greenhalgh’s 99 years would be a lawful sentence if his kidnapping charge was not enhanced by his…
-
Mills v. State, 642 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…abtree v. State, 624 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), rev. denied, 634 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1994); Wilson v. State, 622 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Sterling v. State, 584 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 592 So. 2d 682 (Fla.1991); Dunn v. State, 522 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). It should be noted, as was done in Crabtree, that the defendant has raised no constitutional attack on the statutory scheme as being irrational. Here, unlike in Crabtree, the statutory anomaly was created before this defendant c…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- KEY v. State, 452 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Scott v. State, 465 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)