MARK GREENHALGH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Mark Greenhalgh appealed the summary denial of his motion to correct sentence, challenging a 99-year kidnapping sentence as exceeding statutory maximums. The court affirmed the denial of his retroactivity argument but reversed and remanded regarding whether his sentence exceeded applicable statutory limits based on whether the kidnapping was enhanced as a life felony due to weapon possession.
The court affirmed the denial of the motion regarding the written reasons requirement because retroactivity provisions do not apply. The court reversed and remanded regarding the sentence length, finding that if Greenhalgh was convicted of kidnapping as a first-degree felony (not enhanced as a life felony), a 99-year sentence is lawful; however, if convicted of kidnapping as a life felony due to weapon possession, he is limited to 40 years and must be resentenced.
[1] A requirement that sentencing reasons be provided in writing contemporaneously with sentencing does not apply retroactively.
[2] A sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum constitutes fundamental error and may be raised at any time.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a sentence that exceeds the maximum allowed by statute is fundamental error which can be raised at any time”
Establishes that Greenhalgh's claim about exceeding statutory maximums is not waived and must be addressed on remand
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGreenhalgh was sentenced to 99 years for kidnapping, representing a considerable departure from sentencing guidelines. On direct appeal, he challenged…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Life Felony cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Mark Greenhalgh appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct sentence. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The sentences under review represent a considerable departure from the sentencing guidelines recommendation. On direct appeal Greenhalgh questioned the sufficiency of the reasons provided in support of this departure. This court affirmed without opinion. Greenhalgh v. State, 529 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The first issue raised in the present motion concerns the trial court’s alleged failure to provide those reasons in writing contemporaneously with sentencing. This point is clearly without merit, for the cases which impose this requirement do not apply retroactively. Ree v. State, 565 So. 2d 1329 (Fla.1990).
Greenhalgh also claims that his 99-year sentence for kidnapping exceeds the statutory maximum. This point highlights a statutory anomaly with regard to the punishment of certain serious felony offenses.
Ordinarily kidnapping is a first degree felony “punishable by a term of years not exceeding life.” § 787.01(2), Fla.Stat. (1989). However, Greenhalgh alleges that he was charged with and convicted of a life felony because he was armed at the time of the kidnapping. See § 775.087(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989). A life felony committed after October 1, 1983, is punishable “by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years. § 775.082(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1989). In other words, whenever a court sentencing a life felony opts for a term of years in lieu of a life sentence, that court is limited to a sentence no harsher than forty years. Blackshear v. State, 480 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Ironically, no such limitation is posed with respect to first degree felonies punishable by life. Dunn v. State, 522 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). It has been held elsewhere that 300 years is less than “life.” Powlowski v. State, 467 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). A fortiori, Greenhalgh’s 99 years would be a lawful sentence if his kidnapping charge was not enhanced by his possession of a weapon.
The trial court’s order does not address the merits of this particular claim. Instead, the court found that this issue could have been litigated on plenary appeal and was therefore waived. However, a sentence that exceeds the maximum allowed by statute is fundamental error which can be raised at any time. Reynolds v. State, 429 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). We are therefore compelled to reverse for further proceedings regarding this one issue. After remand the trial court should determine, by examining the charging instrument or jury verdict forms, whether the kidnapping charge was enhanced to a life felony because of the use of a weapon. If not, the sentence as it now exists is lawful and need not be corrected. Any order to this affect should be accompanied by the appropriate attachments from the record. If, on the other hand, Greenhalgh was charged with and convicted of a life felony, he must be resentenced.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
SCHOONOVER, C.J., and CAMPBELL and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (15 total)
-
Betancourt v. State, 804 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2001)…that court is limited to a sentence no harsher than forty years. Ironically, no such limitation is posed with respect to first degree felonies punishable by life. It has been held elsewhere that 300 years is less than 'life.’ " Greenhalgh v. State, 582 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (citations omitted). . The Third District noted that the First District had rendered other decisions inconsistent with its reasoning in Eady but had not expressly receded from the Eady holding. See Brown v. State, 24 Fla. L.…
-
Peters v. State, 128 So. 3d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…efore, within this time period, “whenever a court sentencing a life felony opts for a term of years in lieu of a life sentence, that court is limited to a sentence no harsher than foriy years.” Peters, 658 So. 2d at 1176 (citing Greenhalgh v. State, 582 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)) (emphasis added). A “statutory anomaly” arises, however, when this sentencing scheme is evaluated under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Graham, which held that “[t]he Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life…
-
Stephens v. State, 627 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…ms v. State, 500 So. 2d 501 (Fla.1986), receded from on other grounds, Quarterman v. State, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla.1988). A sentence that exceeds the maximum allowed by statute is fundamental error which can be raised at any time. Greenhalgh v. State, 582 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). The sexual batteries for which the appellant was adjudicated guilty are life felonies, punishable by a term of imprisonment for life or a term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years. Section 775.082(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987). Whe…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- REE v. State, 565 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1990)
- Reynolds v. State, 429 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Dunn v. State, 522 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
- Powlowski v. State, 467 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
- Blackshear v. State, 480 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Fla. Comm'n on Offender Review v. Johnson (Fla. 1st DCA 2026)