GEORGE B. CRIDLAND, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1988-03-29
No. 87-1611
Before HENDRY and HUBBART and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
522 So. 2d 538 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1988) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Cridland appeals his resentencing to 22 years imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of 3 years for second-degree murder with a firearm. The court affirms, rejecting challenges to both the sentencing guidelines calculation and the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence.


Holding

The sentencing guidelines calculation was proper; scoring 21 points for victim injury in a second-degree murder case was correct, and any error in scoring prior misdemeanor convictions was harmless because even a five-point reduction would keep the defendant within the 17-22 year sentencing category. A three-year mandatory minimum sentence for carrying a firearm may be constitutionally imposed upon conviction for second-degree murder with a firearm.


Headnotes

[1] A harmless error in scoring prior misdemeanor convictions does not invalidate a sentence if the corrected score still falls within the applicable sentencing guidelines ra…

[2] A three-year mandatory minimum sentence for carrying a firearm is constitutionally permissible when based on a conviction for second-degree murder with a firearm.

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Key Quotes

“It was perfectly proper to score twenty-one points for victim injury (death) in this second-degree murder with a firearm conviction; and the error of scoring six points for certain prior misdemeanor convictions was entirely harmless because (a) one point was clearly called for based on the defendant's one prior misdemeanor conviction, and (b) the reduction of five points from the total points scored still places the defendant within the 17-22 year sentencing category.”

Establishes the court's reasoning that any sentencing guidelines calculation error was harmless.

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Facts & Procedural History

Following a prior appellate decision (Cridland v. State, 499 So.2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)), the trial court resentenced the defendant to 22 years impri…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Following our decision in Cridland v. State, 499 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), the trial court resentenced the defendant within the sentencing guidelines to twenty-two years imprisonment with a minimum mandatory sentence of three years imprisonment for carrying a firearm. The defendant appeals his sentence as being unlawfully imposed. We affirm.

First, the defendant complains that the scoring of points to determine the 17-22 year sentencing guidelines range was in error.

We disagree. It was per fectly proper to score twenty-one points for victim injury (death) in this second-degree murder with a firearm conviction; and the error of scoring six points for certain prior misdemeanor convictions was entirely harmless because (a) one point was clearly called for based on the defendant’s one prior misdemeanor conviction, and (b) the reduction of five points from the total points scored still places the defendant within the 17-22 year sentencing category. Indeed, the defendant upon remand actually asked the trial court to sentence him within the sentencing guidelines of 17-22 years imprisonment (R.ll-13).

We reject all of the defendant’s arguments which retreat from this position upon this appeal. See, e.g., State v. Whitfield, 487 So. 2d 1045 (Fla.1986); Farnam v. State, 516 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Parker v. State, 478 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Hendry v. State, 460 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Moore v. State, 469 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 489 So. 2d 1130 (Fla.1986); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(b)(4); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(7).

Second, the defendant complains that it was unconstitutional to impose a three-year mandatory minimum sentence for carrying a firearm under Section 775.-087, Florida Statutes (1985), based on his conviction for second-degree murder with a firearm. We reject this contention because (a) the jury convicted the defendant of second-degree murder with a firearm based on ample evidence adduced at trial, and (b) a three-year mandatory minimum sentence may be constitutionally imposed under the above statute in these circumstances. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 369 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1979); Blanton v. State, 388 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), rev. denied, 399 So. 2d 1140 (Fla.1981); Carter v. State, 464 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 2d DCA); aff'd, 479 So. 2d 117 (Fla.1985).

The sentence under review below is, therefore, in all respects

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Louie Anthony Sellers v. State, 578 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
    …the corrected score nevertheless places the defendant in the same guidelines cell, the error is considered harmless. E.g., Guardado v. State, 562 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Huggins v. State, 537 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Cridland v. State, 522 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). However, when the deletion of improperly included points in the guidelines score results in a reduction of one or more cells, the sentence should be vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing upon a properly calculated score…
  • Brown v. Crane, Phillips, Thomas & Metts, P.A., 585 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
    …ntained in medical literature cannot be used to cross-examine a witness unless the literature is established to be a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. Call v. Tirone, 522 So. 2d 538, 534 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (citations omitted). From the record before this court, we cannot say this error was harmless. Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. RYDER, A.C.J., and LEHAN, J., concur.…
  • Monzon v. State, 627 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
    …proved, 586 So. 2d 340 (Fla.1991); Guardado v. State, 562 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), rev. den. 576 So. 2d 287 (Fla.1990); Huggins v. State, 537 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Kelly v. State, 546 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Cridland v. State, 522 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Leopard v. State, 491 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).…

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