DAVID JACOBS AND BRIAN CULLEN, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendants Jacobs and Cullen challenged their ten-year sentences for cocaine trafficking as illegal because they exceeded sentencing guidelines. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the sentences, holding that the plea agreement constituted a valid reason for departure from the guidelines.
The ten-year sentences are legal and not illegal departures from sentencing guidelines because the plea agreement constitutes a valid reason for departure, and the trial court articulated clear and convincing reasons for the sentence enhancement.
[1] A plea agreement can constitute a clear and convincing reason for a trial court to depart from presumptive sentencing guidelines.
[2] A sentence exceeding presumptive guidelines is permissible when the trial court articulates clear and convincing reasons for the enhancement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although the trial court imposed sentences greater than the presumptive sentences, it enunciated clear and convincing reasons for enhancing the sentences.”
Establishes the legal standard that departures above presumptive sentences require clear and convincing reasons.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendants were initially charged with trafficking in cocaine in excess of 400 grams, which carried mandatory minimum sentences of fifteen years. As p…
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BASKIN, Judge.
Defendants Jacobs and Cullen challenge the trial court’s order denying their motions to correct allegedly illegal sentences. We affirm.
The state charged defendants with trafficking in cocaine in excess of 400 grams. Under that charge, defendants were subject to mandatory minimum sentences of fifteen years imprisonment. § 893.135(1) (b)3, Fla.Stat. (1985). As part of a plea bargain with the state, defendants agreed to reduction of the charges and sentences of ten-years imprisonment. Pursuant to negotiations, defendants entered pleas of guilty to reduced charges of trafficking in cocaine in excess of 200 grams, but less than 400 grams, and were each sentenced to serve ten years in prison. The presumptive sentences on the reduced charges are less than the imposed sentences.1
Defendants contend that the ten-year sentences they received are illegal because they exceed the recommended guidelines range and the mandatory minimum sentence. We disagree. Defendants clearly benefited from the negotiated reduction of the charges.
Although the trial court imposed sentences greater than the presumptive sentences, it enunciated clear and convincing reasons for enhancing the sentences.2 The plea agreement constitutes a valid reason for departure. See Holland v. State, 508 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1987); Rowe v. State, 523 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Denmark v. State, 519 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Quarterman v. State, 506 So. 2d 50, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); see also Grimes v. State, 499 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Accordingly, we affirm the sentences under review.
Affirmed.
BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ., concur. . The mandatory minimum sentence for the reduced charge is five years. § 893.135(l)(b)2, Fla.Stat. (1985). Defendant Jacobs’ guidelines sentence range is 3'/2 — Wi years; defendant Cullen’s sentence range is 5'/2 — 7 years. Since the mandatory minimum sentence under the reduced charge exceeds Jacobs’ guidelines sentence, the mandatory sentence takes precedence; thus, Jacobs’ presumptive sentence is 5 years. Vanover v. State, 498 So. 2d 899, 901 (Fla.1986); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(9). Because Cullen’s guideline sentence exceeds the mandatory minimum sentence; Cullen’s presumptive sentence is 5Vi — 7 years. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(9).
. The trial court must state clear and convincing reasons for departure where the sentence exceeds both the guidelines and the mandatory minimum sentence. See Munroe v. State, 514 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), review denied, 519 So. 2d 987 (Fla.1988); Hernandez v. State, 501 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Pedraza v. State, 493 So. 2d 1122, 1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla.1987).
DANIEL PEARSON, Judge,
concurring.
The majority correctly says that a trial court must give a clear and convincing reason for a departure from the sentencing guidelines, and that a plea bargain is such a reason. However, the majority opinion should not be taken to mean that a trial judge must, as is required for sentencing departures that do not result from plea bargains, prepare a written order justifying departures that are the result of negotiated pleas. See Davidson v. State, 506 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (since sentences were imposed according to plea bargain, it was unnecessary for trial court to review a scoresheet); Houston v. State, 502 So. 2d 977, 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (“no purpose whatsoever to be served by preparation of a sentencing guidelines score-sheet” when defendant agrees to a specific sentence); Grimes v. State, 499 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (“a scoresheet seems unnecessary where all parties have agreed on a negotiated sentence”); Lawson v. State, 497 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (same; certifying question), cause dismissed, 501 So. 2d 1282 (Fla.1987); Rowe v. State, 496 So. 2d 857, 859 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
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Citator
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Novaton v. State, 634 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 1994)…otherwise arguably defective sentences when they have been voluntarily accepted by the defendant as part of a mutually advantageous agreement with the state.” Id. at 728 (citing Madrigal v. State, 545 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Jacobs v. State, 522 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 531 So. 2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 418 So. 2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 678 (Fla.1977)). In its fina…
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Novaton v. State, 610 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…many other contexts as well, this court and others have upheld otherwise arguably defective sentences when they have been voluntarily accepted by the defendant as part of a mutually advantageous agreement with the state.3 See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So. 2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So. 2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been…
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Lillyman v. Dep't OF Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 645 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…1321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (erroneous exclusion of testimony required remand for further proceedings). The remedy is similar to granting a new trial when an error is made during trial regarding the admissibility of testimony. See, e.g., Young v. State, 522 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (remand for new trial required where court improperly restricted defendant’s cross-examination of key prosecution witness on matters crucial to witness’ credibility); Sadler v. State, 509 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (precludin…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (14 total)
- Creed Martin Vanover v. State, 498 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1986)
- Rowe v. State, 496 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Quarterman v. State, 506 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Munroe v. State, 514 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Bush Wade Holland v. State, 508 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1987)
- Lawson v. State, 497 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Rowe v. State, 523 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Grimes v. State, 499 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Denmark v. State, 519 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Pedraza v. State, 493 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)