GERALD A. TAYLOR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1988-03-09
No. 87-1387
CAMPBELL and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.
522 So. 2d 924 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1988) Caution
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Gerald Taylor appealed the revocation of his probation and resulting sentence, arguing that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentencing scoresheet by adding points for legal constraint when he was not under legal constraint at the time he committed the offenses. The court affirmed the probation revocation but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing without the improper enhancement.


Holding

The trial court erred in adding points for legal constraint because Taylor was not under legal constraint when he committed the offenses. The probation revocation is affirmed, but the sentence is vacated and remanded for resentencing within the proper guideline range.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court errs in adding points for legal constraint to a scoresheet when the defendant was not under legal constraint at the time of the offenses for which sentencin…

[2] A defendant's sentence may be enhanced by one cell for a violation of probation, but this enhancement must be applied within the recommended sentencing guideline range.

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Key Quotes

“The defendant was not under legal constraint at the time he committed the offenses for which he was being sentenced. Therefore, it was error to enhance his sentence on that basis.”

Establishes the core holding that legal constraint points cannot be added when the defendant was not under legal constraint during the commission of the offenses.

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Facts & Procedural History

In January 1986, Taylor pleaded guilty to forgery, three counts of theft with a credit card, and two counts of grand theft, receiving six years' proba…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge.

SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge.

In January 1986 the defendant, Gerald A. Taylor, was placed on six years’ probation and two years’ community control after pleading guilty to forgery, three counts of theft with a credit card, and two counts of grand theft. Upon finding that he violated a condition of his probation, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and sentenced him to four and one-half years each on the forgery and grand theft charges and to time served on the remaining charges.

The defendant appealed the order revoking his probation. The public defender filed a brief with this court asserting that there was no arguable merit in the appeal and requesting permission of the court to withdraw as counsel of record pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Following our practice, we notified the defendant that he could file a supplemental brief within thirty days of our order. After receiving defendant’s pro se brief and the state’s answer brief, we reviewed this case. See Jones v. State, 468 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).

The defendant argues four points in his pro se brief. We only find merit in his contention that the trial court erred in adding points for legal constraint to the score-sheet prepared after his violation of probation. With the addition of six points for legal constraint the defendant’s scoresheet showed a total of 61 points, which placed him in the range of two and one-half to three and one-half years of incarceration. The trial judge then “bumped” the defendant’s sentence another cell for violation of probation and imposed the maximum guideline sentence, four and one-half years. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(14).

The defendant was not under legal constraint at the time he committed the offenses for which he was being sentenced. Therefore, it was error to enhance his sentence on that basis. Burke v. State, 460 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). The trial judge had the option of bumping his sentence one cell for the violation of probation, but that would only have placed him in the two and one-half to three and one-half years’ range.

Accordingly, we affirm the order revoking the defendant’s probation but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. The trial court shall have a new scoresheet prepared without the additional points for legal constraint and shall sentence the defendant within the recommended range of the sentencing guidelines. Our decision, of course, is without prejudice to the trial court’s ability to bump the defendant’s sentence up one cell for violation of probation.

CAMPBELL and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Thorn v. State, 529 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
    …ree felony. Finally, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in assessing points for legal constraint since he was not on probation when he committed the burglary, the offense for which he was being sentenced. We agree. See Taylor v. State, 522 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). In so holding we note the trial court still has the option of bumping the appellant’s sentence one cell for the violation of probation under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(14). Accordingly, we affirm the appellant’s…

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