JOHN WESLEY SHEFFIELD, III, APPELLANT,
v.
HAZEL EDNA SHEFFIELD, APPELLEE
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In a marital dissolution case, the appellate court reversed the trial court's property distribution because the valuations of two corporations that formed the basis of the division lacked evidentiary support. The court also identified the trial court's failure to consider the wife's pension entitlement as a marital asset, requiring remand for complete reconsideration of equitable distribution.
The court held that the trial judge's valuations of the corporations were unsupported by competent evidence in the record and therefore reversed on that basis. The court further held that on remand, the trial judge should consider whether the wife's pension entitlement constitutes a marital asset and, if so, include its value in the equitable distribution, though the trial judge may consider the parties' lengthy separation as justification for disparate treatment.
[1] A trial court's valuation of marital assets must be supported by competent evidence in the record.
[2] Corporate tax returns alone may not be sufficient evidence to establish the value of a corporation for purposes of property distribution in a dissolution of marriage.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial judge valued those corporations on the basis of certain corporate tax returns. Those corporate tax returns, which are in the record, do not reveal the "value" of the subject corporations and no other evidence in the record supports the court's valuation findings.”
Establishes that the trial court's valuations lacked evidentiary support, the core basis for reversal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties' marriage was dissolved and the trial judge divided their property, including two corporations: Sheffield and Associates, Inc. and Sheffie…
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WIGGINTON, Judge.
Appellant husband appeals the final judgment of dissolution of the parties’ marriage, challenging the property distribution. We reverse and remand for further consideration.
The trial judge’s division of property between the parties was based in large part upon the valuation of two corporations, Sheffield and Associates, Inc. and Sheffield Consultation Services, Inc., which he found to be marital assets. We find no error in the determination that both corporations are marital assets. However, the valuation of those corporations is the subject of reversal on appeal.
According to the final judgment of dissolution, the trial judge valued those corporations on the basis of certain corporate tax returns. Those corporate tax returns, which are in the record, do not reveal the “value” of the subject corporations and no other evidence in the record supports the court’s valuation findings. Since the valuations assigned by the trial judge are without any record support, we reverse and remand for further proceedings, if necessary, to redetermine the value of the marital assets based on competent evidence. See Addington v. Addington, 522 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
Appellant also challenges the trial judge’s failure to include appellee’s prospective entitlement to a pension in his list of available marital assets. On remand, the trial judge should consider the issue of whether appellee’s pension entitlement should be deemed a marital asset and, if so, he should include its value in achieving equity in his distribution of the marital property. Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265 (Fla.1986); Pastore v. Pastore, 497 So. 2d 635 (Fla.1986). We note that, in making his determination on this issue, the trial judge may consider the lengthy period of separation of the parties as justification for disparate treatment of the pension entitlement. Compare Temple v. Temple, 519 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
Since, by the above rulings, the entire scheme of equitable distribution heretofore fashioned by the trial judge is affected, we reverse the Final Judgment of Dissolution and remand for the trial court to revisit the entire issue of equitable distribution in this case. Compare Borntraeger v. Borntraeger, 521 So. 2d 125, (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
BOOTH and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
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Polley v. Polley, 588 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…d, 412 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1982). Absent such evidence, the trial court’s valuation constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Marcoux v. Marcoux, 464 So. 2d 542, 544 (Fla.1985); Zucker v. Zucker, 577 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Sheffield v. Sheffield, 522 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Addington v. Addington, 522 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). The wife presented expert testimony as to the value of the parties’ interest in PPC. The expert testified that in his professional opinion, based on an analysis of PPC…
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Bobb v. Bobb, 552 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…However, the marital assets claimed by the wife in Temple consisted of stock which the husband had purchased during the period of separation using funds which the husband had borrowed or earned after the separation. See also Sheffield v. Sheffield, 522 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). As noted in Temple, had the dissolution been obtained at the time of the separation the stock never would have been a marital asset. In contrast the marital assets claimed by the wife in this case were all in existence at the ti…
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Rainford Cole and Linda Turner v. Cole, 723 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…light of the fact that the home was purchased independently of his former wife and while they were separated. See Heslop v. Moore, 716 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Ross v. Bandi, 566 So. 2d 55, 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Sheffield v. Sheffield, 522 So. 2d 986, 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Temple v. Temple, 519 So. 2d 1054, 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Given the former husband’s concession below, however, that the home and its proceeds was a marital asset, subject only to Linda Turner’s equitable interest, he is…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1986)
- Pastore v. Pastore, 497 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1986)
- Marianna Temple v. John Temple, 519 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Borntraeger v. Borntraeger, 521 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Hayes v. State, 522 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)