SHIRLEY STANCATO, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1988-05-17
No. 87-554
Before BARKDULL, DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ.
526 So. 2d 723 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1988) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Shirley Stancato was convicted of both DWI manslaughter and vehicular homicide arising from a single fatal collision. The appellate court affirmed the blood alcohol test admission but reversed the vehicular homicide conviction as duplicative, holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both offenses for a single homicide.


Holding

The blood alcohol test results were properly admitted because the officer had probable cause to believe Stancato's intoxicated operation caused the death, and the State properly laid foundation for the evidence. However, a defendant cannot be convicted of both DWI manslaughter and vehicular homicide for a single homicide; the conviction for the lesser third-degree felony must be vacated.


Headnotes

[1] Probable cause exists to order a blood alcohol test when objective facts and circumstances indicate that a defendant's operation of a vehicle while intoxicated caused a d…

[2] A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of blood alcohol test results into evidence.

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Key Quotes

“the objective facts and circumstances of the defendant's condition and the vehicular accident known to the law enforcement officer who ordered the blood test gave him probable cause to believe that the defendant's operation of her vehicle while intoxicated caused the other driver's death”

Establishes the legal standard for probable cause to administer a blood alcohol test in DWI manslaughter cases

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Facts & Procedural History

Stancato was charged with manslaughter by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and vehicular homicide following a collision in which the driver…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant was charged and convicted of manslaughter by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, in violation of Section 316.1931(1), (2)(c), Florida Statutes (1985),1 and vehicular homicide, in violation of Section 782.071, Florida Statutes (1985). Both charges arose out of a collision in which the driver of the other vehicle was killed.

We find no error in the trial court’s admission of the results of a blood alcohol test administered to the defendant because, contrary to the defendant’s contention, (1) the objective facts and circumstances of the defendant’s condition and the vehicular accident known to the law enforcement officer who ordered the blood test gave him probable cause to believe that the defendant’s operation of her vehicle while intoxicated caused the other driver’s death, see § 316.1933(1), Fla. Stat. (1985); Jackson v. State, 456 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); and (2) the State laid a proper foundation for the admission of this evidence. However, as the State candidly concedes, there being only one homicide, the defendant cannot be convicted for both the second-degree felony of D.W.I. manslaughter and the third-degree felony of vehicular homicide. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence for the lesser offense of vehicular homicide is vacated. Vela v. State, 450 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), approved, Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1985);2 Ubelis v. State, 384 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Thomas v. State, 380 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Carr v. State, 338 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). See generally Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1987). We remand for resentencing on the D.W.I. manslaughter conviction after the points scored for the vehicular homicide on the sentencing guidelines scoresheet have been eliminated.

Reversed and remanded.

. Originally codified at Section 860.01(1), (2), Florida Statutes (1981), Section 316.1931 was repealed by Chapter 86-296, Section 13, Laws of Florida (effective October 1, 1986), and replaced by Section 316.193, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). The offense in the present case occurred in April 1986.

. It appears that in Grata v. State, 414 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), this court affirmed convictions for both D.W.I. manslaughter and vehicular homicide as to a single death. On this issue. Grata has been overruled sub silentio by Houser, 474 So. 2d 1193.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Collins v. State, 605 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
    …th of Barbara Notholt. [*569] Even though they are separate crimes, the courts have held that a person cannot be convicted of DUI/Manslaughter and vehicular homicide for the same death. Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla.1985); Stancato v. State, 526 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 3d DCA1988); Vela v. State, 450 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 5th DCA1984). This court has concluded that the rule that there is only one homicide conviction for a single death survives the statutory amendment to section 775.021(4). Logan v. State, 592 So.…

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