GONZALEZ
v.
GOOGLE LLC
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The parents and brothers of Nohemi Gonzalez, a U.S. citizen killed in a 2015 ISIS terrorist attack in Paris, sued Google under federal anti-terrorism liability statutes, alleging that Google aided and abetted ISIS through YouTube's use by terrorist organizations and supporters. The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case, declining to address whether Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act barred the claims because the complaint appeared to state little or no viable claim for relief independent of Section 230, particularly in light of the Court's contemporaneous decision in Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh that addressed materially identical secondary-liability allegations.
[1] A court may decline to address the application of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act to a complaint that appears to state little, if any, plausible claim for r…
[2] Secondary-liability claims under 18 U.S.C. …
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Syllabus GONZALEZ v. GOOGLE LLC certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 21–1333. Argued February 21, 2023—Decided May 18, 2023 In 2015, Nohemi Gonzalez, a U. S. citizen, was killed in a set of coordinated terrorist attacks carried out across Paris, France, under the direction of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Gonzalez's parents and brothers sued Google LLC under 18 U.
S. C. §2333(a) and (d)(2), alleging that Google was both directly and secondarily liable for the terrorist attack that killed Gonzalez.
With regard to their secondary-liability claims under §2333(d)(2), plaintiffs alleged that Google aided and abet-ted and conspired with ISIS through ISIS' use of YouTube, which Google owns and operates. The District Court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim, though it offered plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. Plaintiffs opted to appeal, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a consolidated opinion that the Court also addressed in Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U. S.
471.
With regard to this case, the Ninth Circuit held that most of plaintiffs' claims were barred by §230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. The sole exceptions were claims based on allegations that YouTube maintained a revenue-sharing system through which Google approved ISIS videos and shared revenue with ISIS; however, the court held that those allegations failed to state a viable claim in any event. Plaintiffs sought review in this Court of the Ninth Circuit's application of §230 but not of that court's holdings regarding the revenue-sharing claims. Held: The Court declines to address the application of §230 to a complaint that appears to state little, if any, plausible claim for relief. The secondary-liability claims here are materially identical to those in the Twitter plaintiffs' complaint, and thus it appears to follow from the hold-ing of that case that the complaint here fails to state a claim for aiding and abetting under §2333(d)(2).
The remainder of plaintiffs' claims here may be barred by the Ninth Circuit's unchallenged holdings below.
Accordingly, the Court remands the case for the Ninth Circuit to consider plaintiffs' complaint in light of this Court's decision in Twitter. Pp. 619–622.
S. C. §§2333(a) and (d)(2), alleging that Google was both directly and secondarily liable for the terrorist attack that killed Gonzalez.2 For their secondary-liability claims, plain-tiffs alleged that Google aided and abetted and conspired with ISIS. All of their claims broadly center on the use of YouTube, which Google owns and operates, by ISIS and ISIS supporters. The District Court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim, though it offered plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. Instead, plaintiffs stood on their complaint and appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a consolidated opinion that we also addressed in Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U. S. 471 (2023). 2 F. 4th 871 (2021).
With respect to this case, the Ninth Circuit held that most of the plaintiffs' claims were barred by §230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 137, 47 U.
S. C. §230(c)(1). The sole exceptions were plaintiffs' direct-and secondary-liability claims based on allegations that Google approved ISIS videos for advertisements and then shared proceeds with ISIS through YouTube's revenue-sharing system. The Ninth Circuit held that these potential claims were not barred by §230, but that plaintiffs' allegations failed to state a viable claim in any event.2 Title 18 U.
S. C. §2333(a) provides: “Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees.” Section 2333(d)(2) provides: “In an action under subsection (a) for an injury arising from an act of international terrorism committed, planned, or authorized by an organization that had been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.
S. C. 1189), as of the date on which such act of international terrorism was committed, planned, or authorized, liability may be asserted as to any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism.” 622 GONZALEZ v. GOOGLE LLC Per Curiam We granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's application of §230. See 598 U. S. ––– (2022). Plaintiffs did not seek review of the Ninth Circuit's holdings regarding their revenue-sharing claims.
In light of those unchallenged holdings and our disposition of Twitter, on which we also granted certiorari and in which we today reverse the Ninth Circuit's judgment, it has become clear that plaintiffs' complaint— independent of §230—states little if any claim for relief. As plaintiffs concede, the allegations underlying their secondary-liability claims are materially identical to those at issue in Twitter. See Tr. of Oral Arg.
58. Since we hold that the complaint in that case fails to state a claim for aiding and abetting under §2333(d)(2), it appears to follow that the complaint here likewise fails to state such a claim. And, in discussing plaintiffs' revenue-sharing claims, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs plausibly alleged neither that “Google reached an agreement with ISIS,” as required for conspiracy liability, nor that Google's acts were “intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, or to infuence or affect a government,” as required for a direct-liability claim under §2333(a).2 F. 4th, at 901, 907. Perhaps for that reason, at oral argument, plaintiffs only suggested that they should receive leave to amend their complaint if we were to reverse and remand in Twitter. Tr. of Oral Arg. 58, 163. We need not resolve either the viability of plaintiffs' claims as a whole or whether plaintiffs should receive further leave to amend. Rather, we think it sufficient to acknowledge that much (if not all) of plaintiffs' complaint seems to fail under either our decision in Twitter or the Ninth Circuit's unchallenged holdings below. We therefore decline to ad-dress the application of §230 to a complaint that appears to state little, if any, plausible claim for relief. Instead, we va-cate the judgment below and remand the case for the Ninth Circuit to consider plaintiffs' complaint in light of our decision in Twitter.
It is so ordered. Reporter’s Note The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the official United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. A list of counsel who argued or filed briefs in this case, and who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made: p. 617, line 12, “that also” is replaced with “that the Court also” p. 617, line 13, “Twitter'' is replaced with “in Twitter” p. 621, line 12, “that also” is replaced with “that we also” p. 621, line 12, “addressed Twitter'' is replaced with “addressed in Twitter”
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M.H. v. Omegle.com LLC, 30 F. 4th 1295 (11th Cir. 2024)…lude that C.H.'s parents have not stated a claim under Masha's Law against Omegle.com for the possession of child pornography, we do not reach Omegle.com's argument that it has a defense to such a claim under section 230. See Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 598 U.S. 617, 622 (2023) (“declin[ing] to address the application of § 230 to a complaint that appears to state little, if any, plausible claim for relief”). B. Having addressed C.H.'s parents' child pornography claim, we turn now to their contention that the…
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- Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U.S. 471 (U.S. 2023)
- Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 598 U.S. 617 (U.S. 2023)